Walt

WORLD POLITICS

A Quarterly Journal of International Relations

Volume V, Number 3 April 1953

Price $5.00 per year

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

UNDER THE EDITORIAL SPONSORSHIP OF

CENTER OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

PUBLISHED BY PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS

EDITORIAL BOARD

FREDERICK S. DUNN, *Chairman*

WILLIAM T. R. FOX, *Managing Editor*

KLAUS KNORR, *Review Article Editor*

PERCY E. CORBETT — WILLIAM W. KAUFMANN

GORDON CRAIG — HAROLD SPROUT

ADVISORY EDITORS

GABRIEL A. ALMOND — HAROLD D. LASSWELL

BERNARD BRODIE — EDWARD S. MASON

MCGEORGE BUNDY — MAX F. MILLIKAN

EDWIN D. DICKINSON — PHILIP E. MOSELY

EDWARD MEAD EARLE — LEO PASVOLSKY

RUPERT EMERSON — DAVID N. ROWE

PHILIP C. JESSUP — JACOB VINER

JOSEPH E. JOHNSON — DERWENT WHITTLESEY

STEPHEN B. JONES — ARNOLD WOLFERS

GRAYSON L. KIRK — QUINCY WRIGHT

Statements of fact and opinion appearing in WORLD POLITICS are made on the responsibility of the authors alone, and do not imply the endorsement of the editors or publishers.

Copyright, 1953, by Princeton University Press

Address communications:

Editorial office: WORLD POLITICS, Center of International Studies, Box 176, Princeton, N.J.

Circulation and Advertising: WORLD POLITICS, Princeton University Press, Box 231, Princeton, N.J.

WORLD POLITICS. Published quarterly by Princeton University Press. April 1953. Vol. V, No. 3. Entered as Second Class matter in the Post Office at Princeton, New Jersey, under the Act of March 3, 1879. Printed in the United States of America by Princeton University Press. Subscriptions $5.00 a year (two years $8.50); single copies $1.50. Foreign postage 25 cents additional per year.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

WORLD POLITICS

VOL. V • APRIL 1953 • NO. 3

CONTENTS

Military Demonstration and Disclosure of New Weapons
Bernard Brodie 281

Notes on a New Approach to U.S. Economic Foreign Policy
W. W. Rostow 302

Protect or Compensate?
John Hulley 313

German Social Democracy and Hitler's "National Revolution" of 1933: A Study in Democratic Leadership
Lewis J. Edinger 330

The Cominform: A Five-Year Perspective
Bernard S. Morris 368

REVIEW ARTICLES

Foreign Policy-making: Modern Design
Bernard C. Cohen 377

Faith, Reason, and Power Politics
Robert W. Tucker 392

Soviet Psychology and the Soviet Conception of Man
Leopold Haimson 414

The Contributors ii

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE CONTRIBUTORS

BERNARD BRODIE is a member of the staff of the RAND Corporation. He is the author of *Sea Power in the Machine Age* (1941), *A Layman's Guide to Naval Strategy* (1942), and co-author of *The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order* (1946).

W. W. ROSTOW is associate professor of economic history at Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He has been Harmsworth Professor of American History at Oxford, Pitt Professor at Cambridge, and served on the Economic Commission for Europe at Geneva. His most recent publication is *The Process of Economic Growth* (1952).

JOHN HULLEY is chief of the European Regional Staff of the Mutual Security Agency. Prior to joining the Agency in 1948, he served with the OSS overseas, and subsequently with the CIA, preparing a classified history of OSS operations.

LEWIS J. EDINGER is an assistant professor in the department of history and political science at the Woman's College of the University of North Carolina. He is currently engaged in a comparative study of political exile movements and their role in contemporary international relations.

BERNARD S. MORRIS received his master's degree from Yale University, and has been employed as a political analyst by the government in Washington since 1945.

BERNARD C. COHEN is a research assistant in international relations at the Center of International Studies, Princeton University, and is engaged in research on public opinion and foreign policy-making.

ROBERT W. TUCKER is assistant professor of political science at San Francisco State College. Called back on active duty with the U.S. Navy, Lieutenant Tucker is at present a member of the staff of the Naval War College.

LEOPOLD HAIMSON is a visiting research scholar at the Center of International Studies, Princeton University. He is the author of *Decision-making and Communications in Soviet Industry* (1952), has contributed to symposia on Soviet culture and on contemporary cultures generally, and is now at work on a history of Bolshevik thought.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

MILITARY DEMONSTRATION AND DISCLOSURE OF NEW WEAPONS

By BERNARD BRODIE

MILITARY demonstrations could conveniently be classified according to objective under two major headings: (a) those intended primarily to convey *purpose* or *intention*, and (b) those intended primarily to convey *capability*. The latter type is generally free of the political risks which often attend the former. Both types, but especially the former, may be effected without necessarily disclosing new advances in the use, design, or performance of weapons. In the latter type, however, there may be a strong temptation—or a strong justification even in the absence of temptation—to parade a new or improved weapon or weapons system which reflects both technological achievement and enhanced capability.

Whether the temptation is yielded to, or the justification is suppressed, more often than it should be is not at the moment at issue. What we are concerned with in this article is the simple fact that there is a continuous conflict, which occasionally poses a specific problem of decision, between the legitimate ends of security in military technology and of disclosure for the sake of demonstration potential. The needs of security may conflict with many other desirable ends as well (e.g., accelerating the rate of scientific progress), but we shall rule such considerations out of the present discussion, except insofar as they may be supplementary to the considerations governing a decision to disclose for the sake of demonstration value, or to refrain from so doing.

Perhaps the greatest and most portentous military demonstration in recent times was the explosion of the two atomic bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki.[1] This demonstration at once gave

[1] I am assuming here that an action which bears all the markings of a demonstration is not deprived of that identification simply because it occurs during wartime and is adjunct to the ordinary operations of war. Nor do we need to take account of some speculations that the Hiroshima-Nagasaki explosions were intended to impress the Russians. They were intended at least to impress the Japanese, and the fact that the objective in dropping those bombs was distinctly that of creating or powerfully imple-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

away publicly the most important single secret about the atomic bomb—the fact that it existed. The Russians had already learned about it, first through their own channels and then by word of mouth from our representatives at Potsdam, but even they must have been impressed by the revelation of actual use. The circumstances under which the main secret was exposed also made inevitable—by virtue of the fact that a foreign city, even if occupied by us, could not be sealed off from foreign observers—the disclosure of much specific data on the destructive power of the bomb and even of its physical characteristics and tactical employment. It also tended to encourage a weakening of security with respect to further data, the disclosure of which was not inevitable (e.g., the Smyth Report).

Of hardly less demonstration value was the first peacetime Soviet atomic explosion. There can be little doubt that the Russians wanted that explosion to be detected abroad, but even if they did not they must have regarded the political consequences of the detection as very large compensation for whatever they lost by the disclosure. In any case, they lost nothing in demonstration impact from the fact that the event came to world-wide notice through being announced by the President of the United States rather than by them.

Similarly, though on a much lesser scale, one may surmise that a good deal of the publicity given recently to the performance of new types of aircraft, rockets, air refueling devices, and the like has been motivated at least in part by something other than the desire to enlighten the American taxpayer. Conversely, we may assume that decisions have often been made in the opposite direction—that is, of avoiding for the sake of security such disclosures as might have real demonstration value. In fact, since the disclosure of almost *any* advance in military technology is likely to have some demonstration value, one might say that the conflict between security and demonstration value is not simply recurrent but constant. This is true whether or not the decision-

menting an impression, rather than of merely adding to material damage wrought by conventional means—as is borne out by the fact, among others, that the two bombs used were the only ones in existence at the time, with only one other at an advanced state of readiness—is what warrants identifying the act as a demonstration.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

maker is actually conscious of the issue at the moment of making the relevant decision. It therefore behooves us to examine this ubiquitous problem rather more systematically than it appears to have been considered thus far, especially with reference to the history and uses of security concerning new weapons.

Disclosure in the Nineteenth Century

The present practice of enveloping in secrecy new advances in military technology is so automatic and overriding that it is difficult to realize how recently it has developed. The habit is in fact scarcely as old as the present century. Throughout the nineteenth century, an era of very considerable technological advances in the military field, especially in the tools of naval war, complete disclosure with respect to such advances prevailed almost universally. There were still in the field of technology such things as trade secrets, sometimes most jealously guarded, but not military secrets—that is, little visible effort on the part of governments to hold knowledge about new military implements within their national frontiers.[2] To the person accustomed to today's practice, the freedom of the nineteenth century in this respect seems to reach comic-opera proportions.

One will find, for example, in the pages of *Engineering* (a weekly begun in London in 1866) frequent notes concerning the

[2] Although one can find certain partial exceptions in the literature, the extent to which these exceptions departed from the normal has been much exaggerated by some authors. Thus Mr. James R. Newman, who seems to be not at all aware of the difference between the nineteenth century and the present with respect to secrecy in weapons, describes the famous *Mitrailleuse* (a kind of machine gun) as having been invented and developed in utmost secrecy by a French officer named Reffye under the orders of Napoleon III (*The Tools of War*, New York, 1942, p. 52). The facts are that the gun was designed by a Belgian, Montigny, who had based his work on that of another inventor of some twenty years before and who constructed several of the guns to supplement the permanent defenses of the Belgian fortresses. Staff officers from several European armies, including the Prussian, had inspected the gun at Brussels and were quite familiar with its design and performance. However, it is true that when the French adopted it, in 1869, they attempted to cloak in secrecy the fact that they were building it in substantial numbers at Meudon. Since the French adoption preceded by only one year the wholly expected Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871, one may surmise that what the French were trying to keep secret was not the design of the gun, which they must have appreciated to be widely known, but the fact that they intended to employ it in numbers and place heavy tactical reliance upon it. See G. S. Hutchison, *Machine Guns: Their History and Tactical Employment*, London, 1938, pp. 9-11; and M. L. Johnson and C. T. Haven, *Automatic Guns: Their History, Development, and Use*, New York, 1941, pp. 11, 13.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

current revolutionary developments in guns, armor, naval architecture, and warship engines. These items not only describe performance in detail (e.g., armor-piercing tests with new guns currently proceeding at the testing grounds), but also include detailed drawings, including cross-sections, of the guns and engines described. Deficiencies in performance or mistakes in design of new ships being added to the Royal Navy are paraded and discussed. Similar disclosure obtained for foreign ships and armament, many of which were indeed built in England for foreign account.

Nor was the situation especially different during wartime. A rather amusing instance is to be found in the same journal early in 1868 (Vol. v, p. 84) when the inventor John Ericsson in a letter to the editor indignantly denied the insinuation of another correspondent that the building of the monitor type of vessels (including the original *Monitor*) in the United States during the Civil War had been somewhat cloaked by security. Ericsson insisted that all the monitor vessels "were built under sheds open to the public; the entire engineering fraternity of the country, thousands of artisans, foreign naval officers and engineers in great numbers, watched the progress of the work. In addition to this publicity, several foreign governments were furnished with minute working drawings of every part of these vessels."

The situation in *Engineering* is of course duplicated in other technical journals and books of the time. In 1880, for example, Lieutenant Edward W. Very, USN, published in New York a book entitled *Navies of the World: Giving Concise Descriptions of the Plans, Armament and Armour of the Naval Vessels of Twenty of the Principal Nations: Together with the Latest Developments of Ordnance, Torpedoes, & Naval Architecture.* The book, complete with drawings and diagrams, lives up completely to the promise of its title page. Down to the very end of the century, the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence was regularly publishing its *General Information Series,* a group of small volumes in numbered sequence designed to keep its (unrestricted) readers completely up to date on ordnance and other developments at home and abroad.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

This policy of complete disclosure, it should be noted, was being followed during a period of genuinely revolutionary development, particularly in ordnance and naval architecture. During the thirty years between 1855 and 1885, guns and warship design were changing at a greater rate than has characterized any comparable period before or since. Battleships changed during that time from wooden, unarmored, broadside, sail-driven vessels to iron and steel steam-driven, heavily armored, turreted monsters. Ships' guns progressed during the same time from smooth bores of a maximum weight of about five short tons to a British 16.25-inch rifled gun of 111 tons and a Krupp gun of 119 tons. Mines, torpedoes, and submarines were also undergoing considerable development. In the 1860's advances in gun design were so rapid that ships were being declared obsolete at the time of their completion, on the grounds that the armor around which they were designed was wholly inadequate to contemporary combat. In the implements of land warfare progress was for obvious reasons not quite so striking; nevertheless, the same period practically spans the change from muzzle-loading muskets to breech-loading rifles, from smooth-bore field guns of bronze or cast iron to rifled, breech-loading pieces made of steel, and covers also the introduction of rather effective machine guns. Certainly, secrecy was rejected on grounds other than that there was nothing to hide.

Certain famous historic instances of surprise allegedly being achieved on nineteenth-century battlefields through the use of new weapons break down under scrutiny into examples of bureaucratic obtuseness on the part of the loser, rather than of secrecy on the part of the victor. For example, the main tactical factor aiding the Prussians to defeat the Austrians so overwhelmingly at Sadowa in 1866 is supposed to have been the needle-gun (which permitted breech-loading and hence ability to load and fire rapidly from a prone position). The needle-gun had in fact been invented a full thirty years before; it had been adopted by the Prussians by 1851 and had been used successfully by them when they were allied with the Austrians against the Danes in 1864; and King William's delight with the gun

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

during the Danish war had been so great that he ennobled the inventor. The Austrians had had every opportunity to observe its advantages and adopt it, but they had failed to do so.

One of the curious things about the absence of secrecy concerning weapons in the nineteenth century was that the issue scarcely arose for discussion. Disclosure was taken completely for granted, even though in respect to such matters as troop movements during wartime secrecy was quite the rule. No doubt, the fact that armaments manufacture was mainly in the hands of private enterprise purveying to an international market had a great deal to do with it. Governments doubtlessly felt that it was in their interest to encourage armaments manufacture within their national territories, and that such encouragement necessitated enabling their armaments firms to compete in foreign markets. Also, the liberal traditions of the time, which especially in Great Britain forbade on a doctrinaire basis any interference by government with private trade, largely accounts for the absence of any real questioning of the disclosure principle. Great Britain, the most liberal nation of the period, was for a long while not only the leader in technological developments in naval guns, ship. design, and naval engines, but actually the chief source of supply of such instruments for many foreign navies. As late as 1905, at the battle of Tsushima, the victorious Japanese ships were entirely British-built and the Russian ships which were sunk had engines made in Britain. If the technological leader of the times did not see fit to impose secrecy, other countries—especially rival countries—were not likely to inaugurate it.

Governments generally refrained from pressing for secrecy even when, as often happened, they were involved in weapons development jointly with the private manufacturer. When Frederick Krupp began in the 1870's to develop his powerful forged steel guns, the German government turned over to his use its vast testing ground at Meppen. Thereupon Krupp began to invite to Meppen artillery experts from all the principal nations of the world, offering not only to sell his guns to any purchaser, but even to set up his special factories in foreign

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

countries. Similarly, when the same House of Krupp developed in 1895 its so-called "New Process" armor, which at the time of its appearance revolutionized the ballistic standard for heavy armor plate, that armor was within three years being applied to new ship construction in all the navies of the world. Purchases of this armor by the U.S. Navy were from the Bethlehem and the Carnegie steel companies, which had obtained from the Krupps the process and the license to manufacture it.

The practice of disclosure permitted one government to leave a particular field of experimentation to another government in the comforting knowledge that the fruits of that experimentation would promptly be made available to all. At the turn of the century Grand Admiral Von Tirpitz, State Secretary of the German Imperial Navy, stubbornly opposed the adoption of the submarine by Germany, one of his reasons being that the "wasting" of money on experimental vessels should be left to wealthier states like Britain and France. At a time when France, Great Britain, Russia, the United States, Italy, and Japan had between them some two hundred submarines, Germany had none. It was only when the Krupps proved with the *Karp* class built for Russia that a submarine of real fighting value had been developed that Von Tirpitz in 1905 sanctioned the purchase of one of this type. And of course the first German model was fully representative of the best in diving-boat performance of that day.

It is difficult to say just when this practice of disclosure came to an end, but by 1906, the year of the construction of the British ship *Dreadnought*, it was rapidly on its way out. The *Dreadnought* was the first British ship built under a security cloak (though in armament and design it represented a far lesser advance than did many of its predecessors). This fact aroused considerable misgivings in Parliament and in the press, where it was argued that this stimulation to secrecy abroad would redound to the disadvantage of a peace-seeking nation like Great Britain. One may recall also that the recuperator or recoil mechanism of the famous French 75-mm. gun, designed in 1898, was kept secret by the French, who in fact refused through

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

World War I to share the secret with their allies. At any rate, by the time of the outbreak of World War I, strict secrecy concerning new weapons was as universal a practice as disclosure had previously been, a fact which permitted the Germans at the outset to introduce a complete tactical surprise in the form of the 11-inch and 16.5-inch howitzers which successfully reduced the Belgian fortresses. Even so, the great tactical surprise of the onset of the war stemmed from the machine gun, which was certainly no secret as a mechanism, but a completely confounding device as an instrument of war.

The Uses and Penalties of Secrecy

There is no doubt that the utility of modern secrecy concerning weapons was in large measure a discovery, just as many techniques of total mobilization, including the intricate ways of war-financing that we now know, represent real administrative discoveries or inventions comparable to technological inventions. We should not assume that the nineteenth-century attitudes on military inventions described above represent either a higher or a lower rationality than the present practice. A rigid, non-reflective attitude favoring universal disclosure seems in the field of military technology to have been replaced by a comparably rigid, non-reflective attitude favoring secrecy. We are here concerned with the margin between disclosure and secrecy, and with the conception that political and strategic costs may be involved in one's own policies either of disclosure or of secrecy. More particularly, insofar as a military demonstration may entail a certain amount of disclosure of weapons otherwise held secret—or conversely, insofar as a specific disclosure may in itself provide a desirable kind of demonstration—we should like to have in each case some basis for considering advantages against offsetting costs.

The costs and risks of gratuitous disclosure are, in the modern world, sufficiently obvious to justify the prevailing bias in favor of non-disclosure. The burden of proof is legitimately on those who favor a specific disclosure in order to realize certain gains which will allegedly offset the costs. The inherent costs and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

risks of a policy of secrecy are, on the other hand, relatively complex and subtle. The issue has been confounded of late particularly by controversy over the atomic bomb, but the points raised in that connection will be discussed in a later place.

No doubt, the issues will be clarified if we attempt to classify and summarize the kinds of advantages which may be sought from a policy of non-disclosure with respect to advances in weapons technology.

(1) During war or imminent threat of war, a new gadget may offer an immediate tactical advantage, perhaps even a decisive one, even if its design or characteristics are such that it is easily copied or countered. In the case of such inventions, the essential purpose of secrecy is to assure that there will be the maximum possible time interval between the first use of the gadget and the enemy's devising means of coping with it. A derivative purpose is to secure on the battlefield such surprise as will result in a discomfiture to the enemy greatly disproportionate to the real intrinsic value of the weapon which stimulates it. Examples of such weapons are to be found from antiquity (e.g., the *corvus* introduced by the Romans in the naval battles of the Punic Wars, and the *harpago* used by Agrippa in the Sicilian War against Pompey) to the present (e.g., the Q-boat and the use of chlorine gas in World War I, and the V-1 of World War II). Such weapons or gadgets are usually simple, and in some instances it is difficult to say that we are dealing with a new gadget at all. For example, chlorine gas dispensed into the air from stationary containers could hardly be called a "new gadget" when first introduced on World War I battlefields, since the same gas in almost identical containers had long been used in peaceful pursuits. It was really the decision to use it in war which constituted it for the moment a new weapon, and, while it was rather quickly and very easily countered by defensive and retaliatory measures, it was extremely effective on the occasion of its first use. Such inventions usually reflect the inspiration of the moment of crisis, or they may be characteristically the offspring of that necessity which is wrongly supposed to be the mother of all invention.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

(2) Contrasting markedly with the ingenious though usually simple weapon of surprise described above is the kind of development which results from accomplishments in science and engineering extending over a considerable period of time and usually drawing heavily upon antecedent and concurrent advances in the peaceful arts—for example, the development of an airplane or tank of better performance than preceding airplanes or tanks. It is characteristic of these inventions (which are as likely to be inventions of peacetime as of war) that they are not easily copied or countered even when their performance and general design characteristics are disclosed. The purposes of secrecy with respect to such weapons are generally: (a) to avoid stimulating the prospective enemy to emulation; (b) to avoid making his task easier in the event that he learns of it and attempts emulation—i.e., to retain and maximize one's lead; (c) to avoid disclosing the tactical and strategic conceptions which are responsible for pushing certain kinds of developments and which are likely to be reflected in those developments; and/or (d) to retain as much as possible of the surprise element which is the whole reason for being of the simpler kind of gadget described in the paragraph above—i.e., to maximize the enemy's discomfort when he first meets the weapon and to delay as long as possible his efforts to find a countering device.

The preceding two paragraphs are intended to be suggestive rather than exhaustive. One can easily think of inventions or developments which fall somewhere in between the two general categories described above, and perhaps one can also think of additional reasons for secrecy besides those mentioned—especially since the attitudes of allies and of one's own people may be equally important to those of the prospective enemy. At any rate, let us test the utility of this classification as far as it goes.

It is clear at once that the first category of weapon or gadget should rarely or never be disclosed for the purpose of making an impression—i.e., for demonstration value. How greatly incidental disclosure, as a result of demonstrations proceeding for other reasons, needs to be guarded against depends on how intrinsically important the weapon is deemed to be. But, almost

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

by definition, this kind of weapon is not complicated enough to impress anyone with one's own technological skill or leadership in having devised it. And, again almost by definition, it is rather easily countered. In short, an instrument or weapon which is not technologically impressive (however important tactically) should rarely or never be used for purposes of demonstration. Similarly, a weapon which, once known, can be countered or adjusted to in relatively short order should rarely or never be disclosed for the sake of demonstrations.

Exceptions are to be found in the following unlikely but certainly conceivable situations: The rival may be known or suspected to be contemplating an attack on oneself in which he reposes hope for quick victory on some special arm. One may have a gadget which, if known to him, would cause him to lose that confidence, at least for the date on which he had planned to make the attack. Even if the feasibility of a countering device be immediately apparent, it might take some months for him to develop it and distribute it in the necessary numbers. One may consider it so important to oneself to secure a delay (perhaps in the hope of avoiding rather than merely postponing the war) as to pay the price of disclosure in order to encourage the rival to delay.

Or, conversely, the aggressor might by disclosing a new and tactically formidable weapon secure the yielding of an opponent on an immediate political issue, even if the latter could see a way of countering the device if given even a short time (the latter situation is not too far afield from that envisioned by those who picture A-bomb or H-bomb blackmail through sudden disclosure by the aggressor that he has merchant ships carrying such bombs in all the opponent's harbors). Perhaps the paucity of historical examples has been due as much to the extreme aversion of the military to displaying its secret gadgets as to the lack of opportunity to make such display usefully. It is doubtful that the British ever even considered disclosing their search radar in order to cause Goering's confidence in the Luftwaffe to drop a notch, or that the Germans considered disclosing their magnetic mine in order to scare the British more

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

effectively in 1939. No doubt, in both these specific cases the retention of secrecy was fully justified on the grounds that in neither case would disclosure in itself have been sufficiently impressive to make the difference between war and peace—which simply confirms the statement made earlier that these exceptions are unlikely.

The second category of inventions described above represents the main current of technological progress in weapons-making both in war and in peace. A technologically advanced country like the United States is likely to be able to acquire a commanding lead over all rivals so long as it devotes sufficient effort to doing so, and so long as the work of its scientists and engineers is not unduly circumscribed by frozen tactical and strategic conceptions on the part of its military leaders. That we can acquire such a lead under pressure is indicated by the experience of World War II, when despite our very late start we ultimately outstripped our enemies and our allies not only in production, but also in the design and performance of weapons and other military instruments in almost all the major departments of ordnance, ship, and aircraft design, and electronics. There were exceptions, to be sure—we were generally behind Germany and Japan in torpedoes and behind Russia and Germany in tanks, and missed out entirely on the jet engine—but, taking the whole range of military technology, it did not require the atomic bomb to demonstrate the terrific potentiality of the United States for leadership and achievement in this field.[3]

We may thus assume (especially since the prevailing attitude today toward preparedness and progress in weapons is very different from that in the period between the two world wars) that the United States has and will continue to have weapons and

[3] It was inevitable during the war that our failures should have received a good deal more publicity than our successes. One of the important areas where we especially outclassed other nations was in the fire-control devices for our ships' guns. Our naval anti-aircraft batteries were the envy of our allies and, quite apart from the VT fuze used on our 5-inch and later our 6-inch guns, accounted in large measure for the fact that Japanese aircraft were far less effective against our ships than our aircraft were against theirs. Most of the essential developmental work in fire control had been done before the war, though few of the warships available at the time of Pearl Harbor had the most modern equipment and none of them had anything like enough anti-aircraft guns.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

weapons systems which it has good reasons to believe are unique or at least substantially in advance of those of other countries. Such weapons or systems have a potential demonstration value of greater or lesser degree. The actual degree of demonstration value will depend upon several factors already mentioned—i.e., the feasibility of and the time required for matching or countering it—and also upon the specific tactical or strategic capability reflected in it. For example, a new American bomber plane of a range and speed performance sufficient to give it a high capability for penetration with atomic bombs deep into the Soviet Union (from presently available bases) would give the Russians a much sharper impression of our capacity to injure them than the most revolutionary kind of American submarine possibly could. The latter would probably have the reverse effect, since the Russians could legitimately hope to copy it and since the submarine is, in the net, a far more useful weapon to them than to us. Obviously, too, the demonstration value of a new type of weapon depends heavily, for any given period of time, on whether it is disclosed to exist only in prototype, in production model, or in substantial numbers.

It should be noticed that of the four main reasons for secrecy mentioned in the paragraph numbered (2) above, all but (b) are to some extent compromised by the mere disclosure that a particular weapon exists with roughly such and such characteristics. To take the atomic bomb as an extreme example, the Hiroshima explosion at once stimulated in the Russians the intense desire to copy it, implemented their impression of the immense importance we attached to strategic bombing in general and especially to bombing with this new type of weapon, and assured that they could never be wholly surprised by its being used against them. From that moment on, the secrecy with which the whole atomic enterprise was shrouded could have little purpose other than delaying the advent of the first Soviet atomic bomb and helping to assure that neither their bomb nor their methods of manufacture would be as efficient as ours of the same date. Of course, the secrecy attached to the size of our stockpile, our continuing rates of production, and the actual per-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

formance of later models of the bomb helped keep them somewhat in the dark about our actual strategic capabilities with this new weapon, but enough was disclosed under our democratic processes to give them some pretty good guesses even on that.

The corollary to the point just made is that, once the existence and general characteristics of a new weapon are disclosed, the rival is not likely to learn much more of value to him about it unless he is furnished a great deal of specific data in the form of blueprints, detailed photographs, accounts of research difficulties and their solution, description of production processes, or actual models of the weapon. In other words, there is a great hiatus between mere disclosure of existence on the one hand and details of operation and production on the other, and this hiatus allows considerable room for leniency with security. An example of how little this may be understood by authorities is provided in our World War II experience with radar. Long after it was completely known to us not only that the enemy was aware of our radar but that he was actually using it himself, officers in the armed services were forbidden even to mention it, on the grounds that if they were permitted to say anything about it they might say too much.[4] But it is doubtful whether at that point the enemy could possibly have been benefited by anything communicable by word of mouth or by casual writing. Besides unnecessarily depriving our propagandists and others of useful materials, in a field in which we retained throughout the war a commanding lead, this kind of security tended to compromise all legitimate security by making itself appear ridiculous.

The decision whether or not to disclose deliberately the existence of a new weapon for demonstration purposes must of course be greatly affected by considerations of the inevitability of such disclosure. A prototype of a radically new kind of aircraft may quite likely be a proper subject for close secrecy, but when this model has entered into large-scale production, when a

[4] The present writer, after being permitted by the Navy security authorities in 1943 to mention radar in one large printing of his *Layman's Guide to Naval Strategy* (Princeton, N.J.), and after *Life* had run a descriptive article on the subject, was required in a subsequent printing to delete those same references.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

great many young men have been trained to operate it, and when it is actually flying about the country in the full view of masses of people, the justification for the original secrecy is obviously attenuated. On the other hand, one can be too defeatist about this—the records do indicate some amazing security successes. The Japanese began work in 1922 on a torpedo charged with pure oxygen rather than air for its combustion (thus giving it greater speed and/or range), but until we were well into the war against them we remained quite ignorant of this development. The Germans appear to have been equally ignorant of British search radar until their bombers encountered it in the Battle of Britain in 1940. Our own VT or "proximity" fuze was kept hidden not only from the enemy, but also from large numbers of officers in our navy after it had been in large-scale use in the fleet for over a year.[5] Here is clearly a field for careful and systematic investigation: When and under what conditions does disclosure of a new weapon or weapons system become "inevitable"?

We come finally to a consideration of those other reasons for disclosure (i.e., penalties of secrecy) which may support the considerations favoring disclosure for demonstration purposes and, in fact, tip the scales in favor of such disclosure. Here we encounter a great deal of excited, doctrinaire, and frequently fanciful expostulation. We also encounter some abiding truths which are often not taken as fully into account as they deserve

[5] The VT fuze is an example of a weapon kept so secret that it was not even used against the enemy in many areas in which it would have been highly effective. For almost two years following its introduction into war operations, it was restricted to use by ships at sea against enemy aircraft, on the grounds that (a) warships are almost never captured; (b) shells fired against aircraft over the sea are never recovered; and (c) it did not automatically disclose itself to the airmen against whom it was fired—if the shell came close enough to be fired at all it would probably destroy the aircraft and its crew, and if it did not the enemy airmen would have no especial grounds for feeling that they had witnessed anything other than remarkably accurate fuze-setting. Although the fuze promised greatly enhanced effectiveness in land artillery operations by giving an entire new utility to shrapnel (which had practically dropped out of use during and after World War I), it was not so used until the Battle of the Bulge of December 1944. By that time, the war was obviously too close to its end to warrant many worries about the secret falling into the hands of the enemy. In view of what the Germans might have accomplished against our strategic bombers (and of course our land forces) had they had the secret earlier, this extreme form of security was probably fully justified.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to be. These additional considerations will have to be considered quite briefly.

One of the arguments most frequently heard is that "secrecy strangles science," that is, that the only kind of climate in which scientific progress can flourish vigorously is one in which wellnigh complete openness prevails concerning the activity and findings of the scientists.

It is obvious that secrecy must interfere to some extent with that interchange of findings, ideas, and insights among scientists which is so necessary to providing stimulus and direction to their efforts. But the religiosity with which the assertion is so constantly repeated brands it as doctrinaire and thus probably of only partial validity. The important scientific accomplishments of the Manhattan District Project indicate that, while secrecy may on occasion inhibit or impede scientific endeavor, it certainly does not paralyze it. In short, we are speaking here of a cost of secrecy which has to be measured, appraised, and balanced against the gain, and rote formulae of an absolutistic character are not likely to provide us with the answers. One may even wonder whether the effects of secrecy upon scientific endeavors are always negative, or, where they are clearly negative, whether it is necessary that they be so. Certainly, much depends on specific arrangements, and the whole subject deserves careful study. At any rate, to the layman the assertion frequently made by scientists that the national security would gain more than it would lose from a policy of complete disclosure in the atomic energy field appears on the face of it quite rash.

Besides, the secrecy covering many weapons and weapons systems concerns gadgetry rather than scientific principles; and whatever may be the ethical impermissibility of trammeling science, there surely is no law of nature demanding the utmost progress in gadgets. And what is militarily important about weapons is not that they be the best which human ingenuity can devise, but that they represent the maximum *competitive advantage* for oneself as against the opponent.[6]

[6] Lord St. Vincent (Admiral Jervis) was not so simple as historians have made him appear when he observed in 1805, apropos of Pitt's encouragement of Robert Fulton's

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Similarly, the nuclear physicists and other scientists who cried over and over again that there was "no secret about the atomic bomb"—by which they meant that the Russians could solve for themselves the problems we had already solved and that they would therefore have the bomb sooner or later—forgot that there was a potentially great political significance in the difference between "sooner or later." A secret destined to be of only short duration may still be very much worth keeping. In the specific instance of the atomic bomb, a rather substantial amount of information was divulged gratuitously in published materials and a good deal more leaked through the operations of informers and spies. How much these divulgences hastened the Russian development of the atomic bomb we shall probably never know, but it is dogmatic in the extreme to assert, as some do, that (a) in a large-scale operation like that of developing and manufacturing the A-bomb such leakages are inevitable, and (b) they did not help the Russians much anyway.

The controversy over A-bomb secrecy provides still another example of a somewhat fanciful but politically important attack upon the security principle. The late Senator Brien McMahon, among others, argued that secrecy concerning the current production rate of atomic bombs keeps from the Congress and the public knowledge indispensable to an intelligent appraisal of our over-all security needs and of our current military policy. There is of course some important truth in this proposition—the importance of maximizing intelligent lay criticism of our military policies can scarcely be exaggerated—but it overlooks the fact that by and large neither the Congress nor the public are equipped with the other kinds of knowledge and strategic insights into which the withheld data would have to be fitted if

experiments with submarines, that "Pitt was the greatest fool that ever existed, to encourage a mode of war which they who commanded the seas did not want, and which if successful would deprive them of it." That indeed was an age of disclosure, but the remark may conceivably retain some pertinence even to an age of (not always impenetrable) secrecy. Thus, where Mr. Vannevar Bush berates the naval officers of all countries for failing to develop a homing torpedo in the interwar period (*Modern Arms and Free Men*, New York, 1949, p. 74), we may conclude that while our own officers were certainly blameworthy in this respect, it may in the net have been a good thing for us that they were.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

genuinely positive results are to follow. In fact, disclosure might, by providing apparent support to some current and quite superficial bias, create pressures from the public which would have a decidedly negative effect upon our military policy.

One must distinguish between informing the public with respect to issues on which it exercises a real decision-making responsibility and disclosure which simply satisfies general curiosity. It is all too easy to beat the drums for fuller realization of the democratic process when that issue is really not involved. As for those few outside the defense establishment who interest themselves in military problems in something other than a casual way, they will of course be handicapped in their critical function by their enforced ignorance of important and perhaps even vital data. But they are not thereby crippled in their function, and in any case ways could be found to bring them discriminately into the fold with respect to selected data.

On the other hand, one may expose as hollow many of the arguments raised against security and neglect entirely what is most important about those arguments—the fact that they reflect dissatisfactions. However irrational in whole or part have been the anti-secrecy views of the scientists engaged in nuclear energy developments, their dissatisfaction with affairs as they stand (and especially as they stood during the Manhattan District Project) has added greatly to the cost of security in the field, for those scientists represent a skill group whose collaboration was and is indispensable to progress and at the same time obtainable only on a voluntary basis. The fact that a certain kind of employment entails obligations to secrecy will for many persons, representing a considerable range of skills, be a sufficient reason for avoiding such employment. In a society such as ours, this must be a powerful consideration in favor of seeking always to reduce security safeguards to the essential minimum.

There is another consideration somewhat more subtle, though no less important. Security safeguards tend in general to act as a convenient screen behind which tactical and strategic conceptions can freeze and ossify. And the "secret weapon" is often the one upon which too much reliance is placed. That was true

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of the British Asdic or super-sonic submarine detector, which encouraged the British to neglect their production of destroyers and convoy-escort vessels. It was secret enough to prevent any general discussion of its limitations as well as its merits. One cannot be dogmatic on these matters. Some devices which were well worth keeping secret have been successfully concealed for astonishingly long periods of time. Some have been quite prematurely revealed. Others have been kept secret much longer than they deserved to be, or at least much longer than was good for those "in the know." But it is in general a valid assumption that the reasons for secrecy about a particular weapons system are subject to the same process of obsolescence as the weapons system itself, though not necessarily at the same rate. Here is obviously an area for the utmost discrimination and judgment.

Findings and Operational Principles

(1) New developments in military technology have a potential value for demonstrating specific military capabilities on the part of the possessor nation, and of emphasizing its technological leadership in the tools of war, such value often being realized by the mere act of disclosure.

(2) The potential demonstration value will depend on the intrinsic characteristics of the weapon or weapons system in question, on its tactical efficacy, and especially on the pertinence of that efficacy to the entire strategic situation as appreciated by the persons toward whom the demonstration is aimed. It will likewise depend on the context of events and on the particular technique of making the disclosure.

(3) Demonstrations of military capabilities (as evidenced by technological achievements) are usually free of the kinds of political risks which may attend demonstrations of intention. That risk is replaced by the various kinds of penalties which proceed from disclosure.

(4) A weapon which, once known to the opponent, could be countered by him in a relatively short time should as a rule not be disclosed for demonstration purposes, however great may be its immediate tactical efficacy. Conversely, a weapon which dra-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

matically increases capabilities and which is not easily countered (e.g., atomic bomb, long-range rocket, radioactive gases) lends itself readily to demonstration uses.

(5) The most important secret about many weapons or systems is simply the fact that they exist. Once it is ascertained that that fact is known to the opponent, there is little likelihood that he will be assisted appreciably by further disclosure which falls short of providing him with details of performance and the manufacturing process. That is especially true where the weapon or system entails highly complicated and refined mechanisms. Where the disclosure of existence has already occurred or where it is more or less inevitable, a wide area is opened up in which further disclosure for demonstration value may be exploited without incurring serious penalties from such disclosure.

(6) The demonstration value of disclosure is enhanced, and the penalties reduced, as the phase during which disclosure occurs moves from prototype through production model through possession in substantial numbers.

(7) The demonstration value of a particular weapon is likely to depend far more on how it fits into the over-all strategic situation than on its individual tactical efficacy. Thus, for the United States vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, an A-bomb carrying bomber of very high speed and, at the same time, substantial range will have much greater demonstration value than an atomic-powered submarine. Similarly, a weapon which greatly aids the defensive in land operations (e.g., radioactive gases, tank destroyers) will, under the circumstances likely to obtain for some time, be of much greater demonstration value than a weapon which aids the land offensive.

(8) In every military demonstration there is an audience other than the target audience. A weapon the disclosure of which is intended to frighten the opponent may frighten even more one's allies and one's own people. These are the political risks attending demonstrations of capabilities. On the other hand, disclosure may have the primary utility of reassuring one's allies and the domestic population rather than of impressing the opponent.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

(9) Disclosure should never be inadvertent (as frequently happens), but always considered, deliberate, and for a purpose. The prescription is thus not for less care in security, but for more flexibility of policy on the part of the security guardians. Decisions with respect to secrecy or disclosure of weapons are decisions of high political as well as military policy, and should be so treated. The post of security officer, especially on higher levels, must be regarded as requiring great discrimination and sensibility rather than mere stubbornness.

(10) Disclosure will obviously be more effective for demonstration purposes during a period of tension than during one of relative tranquillity. But the method of disclosure, once it is decided upon, is also important. Disclosure may be made to appear an inadvertent result of war games, or a concomitant of conventional military demonstrations, or it may be "leaked," or it may take place with considerable fanfare and histrionic effects (e.g., Bikini). Each method may, under the specific circumstances prevailing, maximize the demonstration effect.

(11) There are likely to be various pressures for disclosure of a weapon or weapons system which have nothing to do with demonstration purpose but which will implement the considerations in favor of demonstrative disclosure. These pressures must be carefully considered to determine whether the alleged advantages to be gained are real or fictitious.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

NOTES ON A NEW APPROACH TO U.S. ECONOMIC FOREIGN POLICY

By W. W. ROSTOW

Introduction

THE purpose of this article is to outline a fresh approach to America's economic relations with the non-Communist world. These proposals envisage a direct attack by the United States and its allies on the structural distortions which have persisted since 1945 in the non-Communist world economy. The chronic dollar shortage of our major allies is taken to be, essentially, a symptom of these more basic structural distortions. The proposals would end, after a transition period, the system of annual Congressional grants to our allies and would substitute for it the combined operation of investment and financial pools. These pools might be built up from the present International Bank and the International Monetary Fund, although they would require operations different in scale and purpose from those now conducted by these institutions. The proposals would apply a common approach to the problems of both the industrialized portions of the non-Communist world and the underdeveloped regions, and would thus combine or coordinate U.S. economic efforts in Europe, Japan, and in underdeveloped areas. It is believed, also, that they would mitigate some of the more serious political friction between the United States and other non-Communist countries and strengthen the non-Communist world as against the Soviet bloc.

The Underlying Analysis

These proposals are based on an analysis which regards the major economic difficulties of the non-Communist world as stemming from three related structural distortions in the non-Communist world economy: (a) the total level of foodstuffs and raw material production is too low in relation to industrial production; (b) an inadequate proportion of foodstuffs and raw

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

materials output is being produced within the non-dollar area; and (c) the rate of growth of income in the non-dollar area is too low to absorb the export capabilities of the industrialized countries, notably those of Great Britain, Western Germany, and Japan.[1] As a result of these distortions, the foodstuff and raw material imports of industrialized countries are too high in price, and obtainable in disproportionate amount only from dollar sources; and a serious trade war for inadequate markets threatens as among Britain, Germany, and Japan. Their trade conflict might well lead to still further deterioration in the terms of trade.

In addition, liquid financial reserves of gold and dollars are too small and too inflexibly used to cushion the countries of the non-Communist world against short-period capital flights, inventory fluctuations, mild fluctuations in U.S. business conditions, etc. This short-run difficulty arises partly because of chronic weakness in their balance of payments; and the operation of the proposed investment pool would, in itself, diminish the danger of short-period difficulties. Nevertheless, a fresh approach might well include an effort to establish and to employ with vigor an international banking fund.

Structural distortions of the kind which the world is now experiencing have existed in the past. The world economy was brought back toward structural equilibrium by the free flow of international capital, responding flexibly to a free world price system and the profit incentives it offered. When, for example, the world found itself relatively short of foodstuffs and raw materials in the two decades before the First World War, the prices of these commodities rose and capital flowed in large quantities to Canada, to U.S. farming areas, to the Argentine, India, Australia, and elsewhere. This free flow of capital not only brought the world back into an appropriate structural balance but, when combined with the special incentives to basic materials output during the First World War, produced chronic excess supply in the interwar period. We have been implicitly

[1] This analysis is elaborated on in the author's *Process of Economic Growth* (New York, 1952), notably in its final chapter.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

assuming, in our year-to-year efforts since 1945 to cover the dollar shortage of our allies, that some such structural readjustment would take place automatically. This has not happened for a variety of reasons, among which are the following: (a) private international capital has felt itself insecure in many parts of the world, and has not, therefore, exploited all opportunities for profitable investment; (b) the world price system has not freely reflected, in all instances, the relative scarcity position of various commodities; (c) government policy in many areas potentially capable of profitable expansion in foodstuffs and raw materials has directly and indirectly deterred investment in these directions; and (d) fiscal, currency, and monetary controls have inhibited the movement of capital in the appropriate directions. These elements in the world position have interfered with a natural structural adjustment and have resulted in a continuation of the chronic balance of payments difficulties of our major industrialized allies. It is believed that only a direct attack on the investment problem is capable of bringing the non-Communist world into a structural balance which would end the dependence of America's major allies on dollar grants. It follows also from this definition of the problem that such a direct attack would require an increase in allocations to non-dollar non-Communist areas, including underdeveloped countries, for purposes of general income expansion, and would thus combine, around a single conception, the European, Japanese, and Fourth Point programs.

An Outline of Specific Measures

The substance of such a direct attack on the world's structural economic problems might consist in six major measures: (a) creation of a large investment pool, including both dollar and non-dollar currencies, to be administered, perhaps, by a reorganized version of the International Bank; (b) concerted measures to increase the flow of private capital including, perhaps, the drafting of an international code to protect both the states receiving capital and the international investor; (c) the possible enlargement and increased flexibility of use of an international short-term capital fund designed to cushion the impact of short-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

period capital movements on the balance of payments of non-Communist countries; (d) the enlargement of the Fourth Point program and its reshaping more pointedly around the issues of world structural adjustment; (e) a sharp lowering of American tariffs, if necessary on a unilateral basis, designed to maximize the possibilities of the United States as a market for non-dollar areas; and (f) provisions for a smooth transition from present aid schemes to schemes based on the investment pool conception.

The International Bank has developed, in its early years, a considerable knowledge of the world economy, as well as good repute and professional know-how in the formulation of loan proposals. To engineer a structural readjustment of the world economy, however, it must be provided with increased resources. More than that, its loans must be made not merely in terms of good individual projects, but also in terms of the structural requirements of the world economy. This means, among other things, that the Bank must operate from an awareness of major commodity shortages. In this connection, its operations might well be linked to those of the International Materials Conference, which, after a good start on allocations, was moving into promising explorations of long-term price agreements, investment, and storage plans. The IMC is now in abeyance, awaiting fresh political initiative from the United States. Its staff work should be linked to the operations of the proposed investment pool. The pool would not only allocate its resources to increase raw materials and foodstuffs production, but also devote a certain amount of its capital to increasing the productivity of industry in non-dollar areas. It would, for example, be an admirable instrument for helping to finance the productivity aspects of the Schuman Plan, for aiding Italian agricultural reform and industrialization, and so on. Further, the Bank would be empowered to make substantial loans designed to increase the rate of economic progress in non-dollar markets, both to help underdeveloped countries directly and to increase their ability to absorb industrial imports. It is believed that increased investment in foodstuffs and raw materials in underdeveloped areas would assist in the rise in real income; but it is evident that such

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

investment is not likely to be sufficient either to achieve well-rounded development programs or to achieve a requisite rate of increase in income and import absorptive capacity. Although many fine points of analysis would be involved in achieving an appropriate balance in the investment outlays of the pool, it is believed that the present state of knowledge, if addressed directly to the problem of world structural balance, could effectively guide such an investment effort.

Equally important, the investment pool should take the initiative in trying to bring about conditions which would maximize the flow of private international investment. Its loans should be made against a background of knowledge and awareness of the total flow of international investment, not only that part of the flow which is conducted by governmental and intergovernmental bodies. It is believed that the time is now about ripe for a consolidation of new rules for the flow of international investment, notably into underdeveloped countries. Out of their history, the latter have had an understandable but partly irrational fear of private investment flows. Gradually, on a piecemeal basis, we have been sorting out more or less acceptable conditions for the carrying-on of such activity. It is believed that the possibility should be explored of consolidating such experience in the form of a world investment agreement which would lay down certain rules for the protection of the sovereignty of underdeveloped countries as well as for the protection of the private investor. Provision might be made for appeal to an international body if these rules should, allegedly, be violated. It is felt that an international approach to this problem might strengthen the willingness of the smaller underdeveloped countries to accept international capital, since they are extremely sensitive to their relative bargaining weakness on a bilateral basis.

As noted above, the new approach might include an effort to increase the sums available for short-term purposes, as well as their flexibility of use. The international position of some of America's major industrial allies has been seriously hampered by the occurrence of short-period balance of payments disturb-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ances against the background of chronic dollar shortage. Although the investment pool is designed fundamentally to correct conditions which have produced the dollar shortage, nevertheless, provision should be made for funds to be thrown in to shield countries from the worst effects of these short-term fluctuations in gold and dollar reserves. The question as to whether the present sums available in the Monetary Fund are adequate, if flexibly and freely used in the classic manner of central banks, would have to be examined. Should they not be judged adequate, some modest enlargement of this short-period pool might well be envisaged.

At the present time, the Fourth Point program is proceeding mainly on an agricultural technical assistance basis, as an enterprise separate from the efforts to solve the dollar shortage of the industrialized countries. It is central to the conception on which these proposals are based that the character and rate of development of underdeveloped countries is directly relevant to the solution of the dollar problem. The Fourth Point program should be regarded as an integral part of a first-priority effort, rather than as a second-priority matter with separate and distinct purposes. Specifically, the implications of the scheme would tend to emphasize the importance not only of technical assistance in agriculture, but also of investment designed both to increase the output of foodstuffs and raw materials for export in underdeveloped areas and to increase the over-all rate of growth of income, so as to provide larger markets for the exports of the more industrialized portions of the non-dollar non-Communist world. It is also suggested that the multiple technical assistance efforts should be reviewed and common policy criteria be established. At the present time, such programs are being pursued by the United States, the United Nations, various specialized agencies of the United Nations, and the British Empire. Although some value inheres in a multiplicity of efforts directed to different specific purposes, an assessment of their present and foreseeable results in the light of clear over-all criteria for the structural readjustment and development of the non-Communist world would be of advantage.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

It is evident that some portion of the structural adjustment problem of the non-Communist world could be solved by a lower level of American tariffs and by stubborn efforts over considerable time-periods to increase the sales of our allies in the United States. Further, the gradual development of increased U.S. requirements for imported raw materials and foodstuffs could assist somewhat in solving the structural problem. Although a lowering of American tariffs is, evidently, not sufficient to produce structural balance, it is believed that the United States should make a fresh effort sharply to reduce its tariff barriers. Given U.S. economic power at present and in the foreseeable future, it is wholly in the interest of American welfare that such policies be pursued, just as Britain pursued free trade in the nineteenth century, despite the fact that many other countries, relatively weaker, felt it necessary to conduct policies of limited protection.

It is central to the suggestion made here that what the non-Communist world requires is a massive, purposeful investment program, rather than annual dollar grants designed to cover deficits after they have emerged. An investment program, however, takes time to organize and to put into effect. The exigencies of the non-Communist world alliance would not allow the world to pass through a major dollar crisis during the period in which the new system was being installed. Therefore, provision must be made for a transition period, which might last up to a year or eighteen months, depending upon the scale at which loans were granted by the investment pool and the sums actually drawn from it and put into the world's financial circulation. As a target date, one might envisage the pool bearing virtually total responsibility by, say, July 1, 1954, if action is taken promptly by the new administration.

A Few of Many Difficult Problems

The effective implementation of this approach to American economic foreign policy would, of course, confront many problems and difficulties, some new, some already familiar. In general, it is felt not only that most of these problems are capable

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of useful partial solution, but that, without a conscious and concerted effort to solve them, the economic and therefore political position of the non-Communist world is likely to prove precarious.

Perhaps the most important of the difficulties concerns the ability of the underdeveloped areas in the non-Communist world effectively to absorb new investment on the requisite scale. An act of investment is not simply an act of granting money. It demands that those receiving the money have precise plans, often of an advanced engineering character, for the proposed project. It demands that men be available to manage and to take responsibility for the execution of the project. It demands that the project itself be conceived of in the larger setting of the national and world economies of which it is a part. It would be a mistake to be overoptimistic concerning the possibilities of effectively absorbing, by mature standards, very large loans in the underdeveloped areas. Careful exploration of the maximum capabilities for absorbing sensible investments would have to be conducted. Without prejudging the issue, it is my impression that if the full staff work and leadership capabilities of these areas were mobilized, around the incentive of available investment resources, the level of effective investment in these areas could be substantially increased. One of the major problems which would confront the investment pool would be to establish the appropriate level as well as character of productive investment in these areas and to do what lay in its power to increase the effective absorptive capacity of these areas. It should be noted, however, that the loans of the investment pool would be addressed not only to underdeveloped countries, but also to developed countries, for productivity purposes. The real terms of trade of industrialized areas may be improved not only by a fall in import prices, but also by a fall in the real cost of producing exports. This provision should make possible the release to the non-dollar world as a whole of very substantial fresh funds, whose short-term effect would be to ease the dollar shortage in any case. It should be strongly emphasized, however, that these proposals are not a device simply to make more dollars available

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to the world economy, but aim at a fundamental correction of structural distortions. This means that it is not only the scale of disbursements that must be considered, but their character.

A second range of difficult problems centers on the appropriate handling of raw material production and trade. On a piecemeal basis we have accumulated a considerable body of experience concerning the conditions under which medium and long-term price agreements, designed to assure raw material producers against undue fluctuations, are likely to work. There has been much discussion, although relatively little international experience with problems of storage. Since a key function of the investment pool would be to redress the lack of balance in the scale and location of raw material and foodstuff production, these proposals require progress in this difficult area. The suggestion that the activities of the investment pool be linked to a revived and strengthened version of the International Materials Conference should, in this context, be noted.

If, as we all would wish, the burden of intergovernmental investment transactions could, over time, be diminished and supplanted by more normal flows of private investment capital, a great job of international statesmanship would lie ahead in facing the conditions which have made difficult such private investment arrangements, and making good a new international framework which would serve to revive them as a major continuing means of world structural adjustment. The experience of ECA with guaranteed investment has not been promising, although it has been a small-scale, second-priority effort. There has been a sustained and unwholesome tendency for an increasing proportion of the world's investment, both domestic and international, to fall under the command of governments. Nevertheless, the increasingly responsible attitude of the underdeveloped countries toward private international capital and the opportunities which the existence of an international investment pool would offer for the framing of an investment code make reasonably promising a concerted effort to induce larger private investment flows.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Politics of the New Scheme

The line of attack on the world economic problem suggested in these proposals can be defended in terms of economic analysis, both historical and theoretical, as well as in terms of the practical problems which we have encountered and failed to solve since 1945. But what makes these proposals worthy of serious immediate attention is the fact that they converge with a set of political circumstances, which makes some such effort now mandatory upon the United States and its allies. These political circumstances can be grouped under three headings:

(a) President Eisenhower, during his candidacy for the American presidency, formally expressed his dissatisfaction with the system of annual dollar grants to our allies and broadly committed his administration to a new effort which would avoid this form of short-run salvage of the economies of the non-Communist world. Perhaps more important, there is a widespread dissatisfaction in the American Congress with this method of aid, which has failed to solve the world's structural problem. Similar dissatisfaction is evident throughout the country. It is believed that proposals of this sort, which aim at a fundamental solution, and which would involve constructive investment rather than the bailing-out of our allies after crises have emerged, would have considerable political appeal. Given the present temper of the country, it might well be easier to get American support for, say, a 10-billion grant to an investment pool than it would to get half that sum from the Congress to salvage our allies from the latest phase of the chronic dollar shortage.

(b) Shortly before his death, Stalin enunciated a challenging conception on which, in fact, the Soviet regime had been operating for some time. He proposed to appeal to certain of the industrialized non-Communist countries with the bait of East-West trade, against the background of their difficulties in finding non-dollar sources of foodstuffs and raw materials and adequate export markets. He quite explicitly expressed his faith that the non-Communist world would be unable to solve its structural problem. This challenge, with its evident basis in certain unresolved

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

problems of the non-Communist world, must be met; and Stalin's enunciation of it has probably made more possible, notably in the United States, a program for meeting the threat. Further, only the existence of such a positive alternative program for coping with the structural problems of the non-Communist world would make politically safe any efforts to continue or to expand trade between the non-Communist world and the Soviet bloc. If such arrangements are carried on against a background of chronic weakness, East-West trade offers from the Soviet bloc are likely to be accompanied by dangerous political strings. If, on the other hand, the non-Communist world is seriously going about the business of structural adjustment, business-like offers from the Soviet bloc could be examined on their merits, from a position of strength, without political danger.

(c) Perhaps most important of all, the American alliance with the major European countries has been badly corrupted by the vicissitudes and relationships which inevitably surround annual dollar Congressional grants. More than any other single factor, the awkward dependence that has gone with this relationship has helped to violate the sense of dignity of our allies and to breed a largely irrational anti-American mood. The joint operation of an international pool, in which American influence would be enormously great, but in which our allies could participate (as, for example, they now do in the International Bank), could aid substantially in building and maintaining a true and stable world alliance.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PROTECT OR COMPENSATE?*

By JOHN HULLEY

I

THE postwar drive to liberalize trade, increase competition, and thereby improve productivity within Western Europe has met with determined opposition, as have similar attempts at reducing trade barriers in the United States. This resistance has come from a variety of groups which fear that their interests will be jeopardized as a result of keener competition, and its magnitude can hardly be overestimated. Indeed, it probably constitutes the major single barrier to European economic unification. Certainly, it can no longer be passed off with lectures on the virtues of competition, mobility of the factors of production, and international division of labor.

The modern economies of the Atlantic community are so highly organized, the component parts so closely interdependent and sensitive to the ills of any one part of the whole, and the various economic and other groupings so forcefully represented in government that the sometimes harsh laissez-faire economic tenets of an earlier day no longer find numerous or ready adherents. The adjustment problem must be answered with programs and policies which meet most of the needs of the various economic groups, or it will successfully and permanently prevent progress. The development of such programs and policies will prove a difficult task, requiring ventures into novel types of economic activity. But the result of failure to develop them is already painfully apparent, particularly in Western Europe.

In most of the participating countries, government, labor, and business have joined to pay lip service to the ideal of a single market in Western Europe, while simultaneously proceeding either to block trade liberalization or to prevent anything more than the most insignificant progress. In one country after an-

* This article represents the author's own view and is not necessarily the official view or policy of the Mutual Security Agency or its forerunner, the Economic Cooperation Administration.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

other, national labor organizations have appended to their public endorsements of trade liberalization detailed analyses of the dangers of economic dislocation and unemployment. At the same time, the influence of business on the retention of QR's,[1] or on the substitution of tariffs for QR's, has been obvious. Finally, governments representing in part purely business and labor interests, and in part the wider interests of defense, nationalism, or full employment, have either honestly opposed real trade liberalization or have offered liberalization measures whose real effectiveness was dubious. The more general and weaker forces of nationalism and inertia might long since have been overcome by a growing belief in internationalism and the advantages of free trade, had not economic interests fostered and reinforced them.

II

Analysis of the generalized resistance to trade liberalization and classification of its component parts will provide a key to the development of a readjustment program. These component parts appear to consist, first, of certain general interests shared by all parts of each nation and, second, of certain specific interests peculiar to labor, to business, and to government.

GENERAL RESISTANCES

At least two closely related major resistances to trade liberalization pervade the policies and practices of most of the Western European countries: unsatisfactory levels of economic activity, and fear of change.

(1) *Restrictive Levels of Economic Activity.* There is one rather narrowly defined level of economic activity which, if both sustained over a long period and consistently pursued by several countries, is most conducive to trade liberalization between those countries. For want of a better term, that level may be called "full employment," in the American definition.[2] Wide departure

[1] Quantitative restrictions (quotas, etc.).

[2] I.e., not 100 per cent "hyper-employment" of the total labor force. According to one of President Truman's Economic Reports to the Congress, unemployment should not exceed 4 per cent of the labor force.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in either direction from this level creates the most serious obstacles to trade liberalization. On the one hand, substantial unemployment and low demand creates such a state of insecurity in the minds of laborers and businessmen that it is difficult enough to prevent the raising of trade barriers, much less to lower them. If the unions are strong, featherbedding and resistance to labor-saving improvements grow extremely effective. If business organizations are strong, the allocation of markets and the reduction of output rather than prices becomes prevalent. Examples could be found almost everywhere in the 1930's and may be seen in Italy (and perhaps France) today. On the other hand, "hyper-employment" and inflation require the general imposition and tightening of QR's, not only because of balance of payments difficulties, but also because the necessary rationing of consumption and allocation of resources can be easily and effectively reinforced by import controls. Examples are the persistence in several northern European countries of import controls imposed not purely for balance of payments reasons, but to support national development programs.

Thus, achievement of the full employment level of activity (as defined above) by all members of the projected free trade area is an essential element and probably the most important single prerequisite of successful trade liberalization. Failure of any country to achieve and maintain this common level will prevent real participation in the free trade area.

(2) *Fear of Change.* A most important factor in European resistance to trade liberalization and productivity, and one which has often been emphasized, is fear of change. The mobility of the factors of production and distribution in the American economy is probably unknown anywhere else in the world, certainly not in the advanced industrial states of Western Europe. In Europe the search for security, for stability, for assurance that the future holds nothing much worse than the present, holds back the forces of economic progress. The defensive psychology of a static, rather than an expanding, economy is prevalent. The upheavals of many wars combine with centuries of tradition to place a heavy emphasis on motionless stability. The problem

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

might best be described in social terms: the desire for economic progress is probably equally strong in Europe and the United States, but the European desire for individual security and stability is far more potent than the American. Both business and labor show the effects of this scale of social preferences. In Europe the traditional effort of business has been to gain control of a certain limited market and then to supply that established market from year to year with a steady flow of an unvaried product. Greater emphasis is placed on maintaining than on expanding the market. A traditional level of gross and net income need only be preserved, not enlarged. Similarly, European laborers are traditionally attached to the work for which they were originally trained in the locality of birth. The willingness to learn new skills, to seek new occupations, or to take the risk of moving long distances for better opportunities is nowhere near so common as in the United States. This traditional inertia and status-quoism is difficult to define and quantify, but virtually all American observers have agreed on its prevalence and on the necessity of somehow counteracting it if rapid economic progress is ever to occur.

SPECIFIC FACTORS

The resistance to trade liberalization resulting from over- or underemployment and from fear of change affects business and labor, as well as government, generally, but often in quite different ways. Furthermore, each of the three groups has other interests and responsibilities conflicting with trade liberalization that must be analyzed before a satisfactory solution to the readjustment problem can be developed.

(1) *Labor.* Specific to labor forces are resistances to change arising from the fears of individual workers themselves. These include objections to the uncertainty and high personal cost of temporary unemployment; fear of permanent unemployment; and unwillingness to see special skills, which have been acquired over many years through individual investment and initiative and which earn commensurate wages, suddenly rendered useless either by technological improvement or by foreign competi-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tion. Workers today require assurance that in relinquishing existing jobs they stand an excellent chance of finding new and equally remunerative jobs and that they (and their families) will not have to bear the burden of temporary unemployment, and perhaps transportation, alone. The marginal and less confident workers—the infirm, the aged, the women, and others—will be particularly insistent upon some kind of personal security.

The argument for this position runs along something like the following lines: Trade liberalization brings tremendous economic benefit to the national community as a whole from the point of view of all consumers. For this generalized gain, however, a high personal cost is forced upon a few workers in marginal industries which cannot produce under conditions of international competition. The incidence of this cost is not determined by the workers themselves and there is no justification for singling them out for punishment. Therefore, the community as a whole should distribute the cost among all of its members, and still end up a net beneficiary. If it is not then a net beneficiary, trade liberalization should not be undertaken at all.

This argument appears to be sound and the force behind it will have to be recognized. In days gone by, unorganized workers could not demand, and indeed did not expect, personal security in the face of the general interest in maximum mobility of the economy. Today they not only expect it, but are in a position to insist upon it. Therefore, if we truly desire trade liberalization, we must recognize the need for measures designed to meet this demand.

(2) *Business.* Business (including farmers) fears the readjustment problem less than the flat loss of invested time and money. Other factors may be more or less consciously operative—a clinging to power and to institutions established by earlier generations—but these will tend to be publicly expressed in the form of objections to capital loss. Applying the same logic as that outlined above for labor, individual businessmen and farmers will ask why they should be singled out to suffer for the general benefit. Producer groups which have been protected for decades,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

less because of their own pressures than because of the pressures of previous generations as well as of external events, will not lightly accept removal of protection.

Furthermore, there is a large special class of producer groups for which the investment is both so great and so fixed that removal of protection without special readjustment measures cannot practicably be advocated. Since its distinction is a matter of degree, this class cannot be precisely defined, but two general types of enterprise may be differentiated. In one, the capital equipment and other resources may be converted with relative ease from one kind of activity to another; such enterprises would include those of the retail trade and light industry in general—the majority of European enterprises. In the other type, the capital equipment and other resources cannot be used for any other purpose without great inefficiency, approaching uselessness, or inordinate costs of conversion; such enterprises include, among others, heavy industry, mining, and farming. Between these two extremes fall large groups of enterprises whose classification would be arguable, but it is clear that the treatment for these two types should differ. The "transferable" group should be able to readjust to conditions of international competition with perhaps some small measure of assistance. On the other hand, the "non-transferable" group has adjustment problems which limited readjustment assistance alone will be inadequate to solve.

That the special problems of the two types of enterprises cannot be ignored has been proved repeatedly and ubiquitously. Business (including farmers) is traditionally well represented in government and is able to enforce its most insistent demands. While other groups in the community (labor and consumers) have recently increased their relative strength through organization, business today is still strong enough to protect its interests. A successful trade liberalization program must take its needs into account.

(3) *Government.* In addition to the specific interests of business and labor, national governments also represent general in-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

terests of the whole community. Among others, these include defense and, in certain countries, full employment.

With their memories of two wars being constantly refreshed by fears of a new one, most European governments are committed to plan for a maximum self-sufficiency in the absolute essentials. The kinds of enterprise which it is considered essential to promote for this purpose are primarily those that produce the most basic economic elements of consumption and defense, i.e., agriculture (excluding luxury foods) and heavy industry. Thus this government interest is entirely contained within the class of enterprise described above as "non-transferable." Since non-transferability and defense interests reinforce one another, they require all the more attention.

In addition, certain governments in Europe, those of the north, are firmly bound to maintain full employment as a matter of highest priority. Of course, all the Western European nations, like the United States, are committed more or less vaguely to "high and stable levels of employment," but in the countries north of Belgium this policy has the clearest mandate from the electorate. If trade liberalization with balanced payments required these countries to deflate to the Belgium-Germany-Italy level, they would be forced to reject it. However, as appears from the last British elections, the popular mandate does not necessarily approve inflationary hyper-employment. Therefore, it may be hoped that agreement on the level of economic activity defined earlier in this paper may be achieved.

This section has attempted to define and outline the different forms of resistance to trade liberalization: the restrictive pressures aroused by over- or underemployment; a climate of opinion unduly fearful of change; the opposition of individual laborers to assuming unaided the burden of adjustment; the unwillingness of business, especially non-transferable enterprise, suddenly to face competition excluded for decades; the government interest in defense and, in some cases, in full employment. This long list is certainly not all-inclusive. There may be other minor or even major forms of resistance which must be added before a successful trade liberalization program can be prepared,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

but the length of the list is certainly not intended to indicate that the problem is hopeless. Nor does it imply that the direct attack on trade barriers (the QR reduction program of the OEEC and the ITO-GATT program) is useless. There is always room for whittling away exaggerated or false resistance to trade liberalization—as witness the limited progress that has been achieved by these programs. However, the list does show that a far more important element of the trade liberalization effort must be the indirect attack—i.e., the preparation of a readjustment program to meet the demands of each of the resisting groups.

III

Any attempt to set forth a readjustment program, especially one of so broad a nature, must necessarily be extremely tentative. Most of the problems are susceptible of several solutions, either in combination or as alternatives. Therefore, what follows is intended only to serve as an exploratory indication of the kind of program which will be necessary. Before proceeding to suggest programs to meet the general resistances to trade liberalization, as well as the specific resistances of labor, business, and government, certain principles applicable to any readjustment program should be established.

PRINCIPLES

In developing an assistance program, it is important to realize that the readjustment burden appears far more ominous in prospect than it will prove in fact. This is true not only because people naturally tend toward gross exaggeration of their fears, but also for the following reasons: (a) Production and marketing shifts will take time. Foreign products must not only be cheaper after transportation, but must also compete with established tastes and distribution systems. (b) Enterprises can respond with reduced prices, rather than with reduced output, to a larger extent than they now think they can. By and large, competition should stimulate reduced prices and greater efficiency and should

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

disable only the really marginal producers. (c) Assuming balanced payments, increased imports must be compensated by increased exports. Therefore, resources released from some enterprises will be taken up by others.

For these reasons, it can be concluded that the dire predictions of the disruptive results of competition will in practice find few true examples. Certainly, a few exceptionally inefficient enterprises (along with their labor forces) will be hard hit and these will receive nation-wide attention, but the total of such cases will be small. Therefore, our purpose must be to advance Western Europe from its present fearful state over the hump into the actuality of competition. To achieve this, we must give the interested parties fairly solid advance assurance of readjustment assistance in the event of the disasters which they anticipate. Since the weight of the readjustment problem will be much smaller than the interested parties expect, we can and must be generous in establishing such advance assurances of readjustment assistance.

The second major principle of a readjustment program must be a tendency to encourage progress rather than to protect the existing situation. Since its purpose is to assist each country to tolerate the sudden shock of international competition, the program will fail if it attempts to preserve inefficient productive activities. If private agreements to divide markets and to preserve existing jobs take the place of trade barriers, the liberalization effort will have been vain. Therefore, the readjustment program must seek always to encourage and facilitate progress and change; to help laborers to find new useful jobs, rather than to preserve old ones or to substitute inactivity; to develop or convert industry, rather than to preserve markets.

These two principles, then—the offering of generous advance assurance of readjustment assistance which will be needed much less than is expected, and the injection of a positive bias toward change and progress—should serve as guide lines in the development of all aspects of a readjustment program.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

OVER-ALL MEASURES FOR ENCOURAGING PROGRESS UNDER CONDITIONS OF FULL EMPLOYMENT

As indicated in the previous analysis, steps must be taken to counteract the pervasive Western European feeling of insecurity, which discourages mobility of the factors of production and distribution. The most obvious and necessary corrective, of course, is to restore military and economic security, first, by defense arrangements and, second, by the maintenance of full employment over a sustained period. But these measures to increase security must be supplemented by an information program designed to encourage willingness to make the adjustments which progress requires.

The essential nexus which must be achieved within the minds of Europeans is that between economic progress and change. Europeans have reached a real impasse if they both earnestly desire economic progress and pathologically fear change. These two motivations contradict one another. If some Europeans think that Communism will bring wealth to all without widespread changes in jobs and businesses, they are deluding themselves. They are more likely to get the latter than the former.

A new psychology must sweep Western Europe, favoring the changes and risks which progress requires. Such a psychology can probably most easily be bound to a great political movement such as that for Western European unification. It will require, in addition to the special assistance measures to be outlined below, an information program sponsored not only by ECA, but by the national governments as well. Economic progress means economic change. This elementary thought must somehow be transformed into a principle of action accepted by large groups of the European population.

A further and absolute prerequisite for free trade between separate economic areas is pursuit of consistent monetary and fiscal policies—i.e., maintenance of similar deflationary or inflationary situations. If no other economic element needs to be coordinated, the volume of demand does. Otherwise, free trade can only lead to unmanageable deficits or surpluses. The uncon-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

scious coordination of the gold standard, at levels of demand determined more by hazard than anything else, can no longer be accepted; conscious coordination must be introduced. Acceptance of coordination will require common agreement on a desirable level of demand. Common achievement of this level can be assured only by a central institution for coordinating fiscal and monetary policy.

Apart from questions of defense, these appear to be the only major tasks to be carried out in favor of trade liberalization which do not fall into the category of assistance programs.

SPECIFIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS

Even if the countries involved can lay the basis for a single market by coordinating their fiscal and monetary policies and by improving their willingness to accept economic change as the necessary condition of economic progress, it will still be necessary to devise special measures to meet the specific group interests listed in the previous analysis. In the following pages, the discussion of these special measures is grouped under three main headings: labor, transferable enterprise, and non-transferable enterprise. Since most of the measures discussed would necessarily represent new departures in European recovery policy, they must be regarded only as first approximations of the kind of readjustment programs which will be needed.

(1) *Readjustment Assistance for Labor.* To achieve mobility of labor, it is necessary for workers to have the resources to afford transitional unemployment and to receive fairly satisfactory assurance that such unemployment will indeed be only transitional. Assuming the existence of full employment, as defined above, the type of readjustment assistance required will fall into five main categories:

(a) *Temporary unemployment compensation.* Assistance for a limited period should be provided for unemployed workers. In order to extend mobility to the influential middle and upper brackets, assistance might be graduated, as a fraction of previous earnings.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

(b) *Retraining for skilled workers.* Powerful objections to trade liberalization and technological improvement come from skilled workers, whose greater earning powers, acquired through long personal investment, are thereby threatened. The number of unemployed in this category will never be large, but there is a good case for offering them some assistance in acquiring new special skills.

(c) *Transportation costs.* Some of the necessary re-employment will involve movement from one locality to another (and, it is hoped, in an increasing number of cases, from one nation to another). Since the cost of movement will prove a serious obstacle to mobility for many workers, especially those with numerous dependents, limited transportation assistance should also be made available.

(d) *Employment information service.* The great value of free information on labor opportunities has been proved time and again. This relatively inexpensive service should be provided to assist employed workers to find new jobs not only within the nation but also across national borders.

(e) *Housing problems.* Housing represents a special problem in many participating countries, particularly in those whose real economic resources are already fully employed. However, to the extent that the availability of resources permits, the rapid construction of low-cost housing in growing industrial areas will contribute greatly to the mobility of labor, as well as to the rapid expansion of new enterprises.

Most of the measures described above are already in effect in one form or another in many Western European countries. Where they do exist, however, they are generally regarded as necessary evils designed to shore up the weak spots which occasionally appear in an immobile economic structure. What is needed is to achieve widespread use of these measures as positive, desirable, and perhaps permanent means for encouraging and maintaining the fullest possible mobility of labor.

(2) *Readjustment Assistance for Transferable Enterprise.* Although the resistance of business to mobility stems from the same fundamental causes as that of labor, the form of the problem

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and of the solutions differs. Again there is considerable precedent for labor readjustment assistance, but the traditional answer to business fears has been protection and market allocation. We must, however, press for real mobility of all that class of enterprise which may be defined as transferable.

Transferable enterprise includes all those firms not specifically excepted below under the non-transferable heading—i.e., it includes all light manufacture, finishing, and fabricating, as well as most elements of the distribution system, in short, all except very heavy industry and agriculture. The common characteristic of this group of enterprises is that the investment can be salvaged without substantial loss. Buildings, standard tools, and so forth can generally be converted to new uses and need not constitute total losses. But, in order to get the owners of transferable businesses to accept real mobility, it will be necessary to reduce the magnitude of the losses to small proportions. For this type of enterprise, reduction of losses should be accomplished by readjustment assistance rather than by maintenance of protection or allocation of markets.

The administration of assistance can probably best be carried out through government corporations, empowered to make occasional grants, but primarily extending credit. Preferably, they would operate to support or partially to guarantee private extensions of credit. Three general categories of credit might be extended to enterprises suddenly confronted with superior foreign competition. These would serve: (a) *To increase efficiency.* The great bulk of credits (or grants) should be advanced to help businessmen improve production techniques and equipment, in order to enable enterprises to meet competition by reducing prices rather than by reducing output. (b) *To convert.* Where competition is impossible, but the existing plant can be easily converted to the manufacture of related products, loans or grants should be given to finance such conversion. (c) *To create new enterprises.* Even within this class of so-called "transferable" enterprise, there will be some instances of almost complete loss, where there is no really economic use of plant or equipment. Such enterprises will in fact be non-transferable, because plant

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and equipment are so specialized or obsolescent as to be useless, but they are not included within the limited group of enterprises listed as non-transferable in the following section. In such cases, loans or grants might be extended to the owners for the purpose of establishing new enterprises. This will better serve the readjustment of the economy and the maintenance of high levels of activity than would flat compensation for loss. If measures such as these are adopted, they can, as in the case of readjustment assistance for labor, best be performed on a decentralized basis, primarily by improving and modifying existing agencies.

This approach to the problems of transferable enterprise does, however, present serious difficulties. Whereas readjustment assistance to labor will generally be desirable within certain limits no matter what the cause of unemployment, assistance to business should be limited to those cases clearly affected by trade liberalization. It will hardly be in the national interest to assist managers and owners whose sluggishness and inefficiency are primarily responsible for business difficulties. But it will rarely be possible to distinguish in clear-cut fashion between the effects on failing enterprises of trade liberalization and of inefficiency. Perhaps this administrative difficulty will be partially overcome if the assistance program is handled through private banks which will also hold a substantial interest in any assistance credits.

An alternative attack on the readjustment problems of transferable enterprise could be made through the "depressed area" approach. Businesses will encounter greatest difficulty in transferring to new activities in areas of declining economic activity. In such areas, regional programs for facilitating credit and for encouraging and developing new economic activities might cover the problem. On this thesis, enterprises would be expected to care for themselves in areas of expanding activity.

(3) *Reorganization of Non-transferable Enterprise.* Cushioning with readjustment assistance the shock of trade barrier removal is not a practicable concept in the case of non-transferable enterprise. Whether we wish it or not, in the foreseeable future total competition will not be applied between the various national agricultural economies or between the extractive, metal,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and fuel industries. Assertion of this fundamental truth can be substantiated by examination of the degree of organization in the United States of most agricultural products, as well as of iron and steel, some other metals, coal, petroleum, and lumber. The high degree of organization in this class of enterprise arises from certain special characteristics. Generally, the investment in such enterprises cannot easily be liquidated by its owners. The plant and equipment cannot readily be utilized for alternative production. The high ratio of fixed capital means that little of the total investment can be salvaged. It also means that overhead costs are relatively so high that any decrease in production reduces profits inordinately. Thus, if several producers are competing in any one of these classes, they will rarely change output in response to mild fluctuations in demand and, because of this rigidity of supply, they will cause prices to fluctuate violently. These fluctuations work severe hardship on owners, as well as on workers. And these in turn are sufficiently well represented in and out of government today, and will be tomorrow, to ensure maintenance of some degree of organization among themselves.

Thus the question to be examined is not *whether* there should be organization, but rather *how* such classes of enterprise should be organized. Organization exists in Europe today in the worst form—i.e., allocation of markets. Within each nation, agriculture and heavy industry enjoy protected monopolistic positions within which they can control prices and output. If we oppose measures for international reorganization of these classes of enterprise, the applicable trade barriers will not be removed and the single market will not apply to them.

If, on the contrary, we do desire a single Western European market even in these classes, we must begin to consider what types of international reorganization would constitute a net improvement over the present effective allocation of markets. It is certainly too early to state what forms of organization would best meet our purposes, particularly since these will differ in each commodity class and must also include specific proposals for each national group. It would probably be wisest, therefore, to propose establishment internationally of reorganization and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

redevelopment study committees on each of a limited number of heavy industries and on agriculture as a whole.

These committees would be charged to examine the possibilities of reorganizing each group of enterprises so that they could all produce in and for a single market. The general nature of such reorganizations would presumably be to abolish trade barriers on these products; to limit price fluctuations (but to have price determination participated in by public international representatives); to encourage other forms of competition—delivery, quality, and so forth; to plan the gradual retirement or improvement of marginal firms and the creation of new ones.

As has been noted above, non-transferable enterprises are generally also matters of concern to national defense planning. If we hope to achieve any degree of reorganization of these enterprises into a European single market, it will be necessary to take account of defense interests. If relationships could be established between the reorganization and development committees and the EDC council (or another European defense organization), the single market concept might have some chance of overcoming the more autarkic plans which defense officials are likely to favor from a purely national point of view. To make such relationships possible, however, EDC (or an alternate body) would in the future have to enter into economic defense planning on a scale which has not so far been authorized by its members.

IV

The ideas set forth above are intended less as specific proposals than as explorations of the kind of measures which will be necessary to achieve a really large degree of free trade in Western Europe. In summary, the institutions or practices (excluding those of defense) which should be developed are:

(1) Successful coordination of monetary and fiscal policies around an agreed level of economic activity approximating the American definition of full employment.

(2) Public information programs favoring a mobile, changing economy as a condition of economic progress.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

(3) Readjustment assistance for laborers and transferable enterprises.

(4) Development of European reorganization programs and agencies for non-transferable enterprises, providing for the gradual merger of markets, the promotion of maximum feasible competition, and the re-equipment and relocation of enterprises.

The means and measures discussed in Part III of this paper may not be the most desirable of the possible approaches to the problems listed in Part II, and there may be other problems which have been overlooked. Furthermore, the problems of governments whose financial difficulties already impose serious strains on their national economies will have to be considered. But this article does indicate the kind of thought and action which will have to be undertaken if the European single market, essential to the economic and political success of the free world, is ever to become a living, dynamic reality.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY AND HITLER'S "NATIONAL REVOLUTION" OF 1933: A Study in Democratic Leadership

By LEWIS J. EDINGER

THE comparative ease with which authoritarian groups have come to power in nations where large parties stood pledged to defend the democratic order to the bitter end has become one of the most disturbing elements in modern world politics. Such developments have brought into question the validity of accepted liberal-democratic norms governing the behavior of responsible leaders, both in the domestic opposition to the authoritarian regime and in foreign governments whose security arrangements are adversely affected by the suppression of free institutions. Basically, these traditional norms have implied non-interference with constitutional political processes and acceptance of their consequences. On June 23, 1933, Hitler outlawed the German Social Democratic Party (SPD), which for over four decades, until 1932, had been the largest German party and, since the founding of the Weimar Republic in 1918, the principal advocate and defender of the democratic system and a peaceful foreign policy. In considering the actions of its leadership from the accession of Hitler to the outlawing of the party, this article seeks to contribute to a re-examination of these accepted norms, particularly insofar as they concern the behavior of a liberal-democratic mass party faced with a government seeking total power.

I

Founded in 1875, the German Social Democratic Party remained for almost sixty years the most powerful and prominent representative of evolutionary socialism. Marxism at first played only a minor role, but as a result of Bismarck's endeavors to suppress the movement between 1878 and 1890, it became official

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

party doctrine. The determinist, eschatological doctrine of the class struggle proved to be the psychological cement which enabled the leaders to weld their supporters into a solid opposition, deaf to the threats as well as the bribes of the "Iron Chancellor." When in 1890 the SPD emerged from semi-legality as the largest German party, its leaders credited Marxism with the greatest share in their victory over Bismarck. Economic determinism, the class struggle, and the inevitable proletarian revolution became the central elements of party doctrine, and the efforts of the party's savants were directed toward reconciling Marxist theory with the tactics employed in building the SPD into a mass reform party. The outbreak of the First World War in 1914 seemed to resolve this dichotomy, as the party split into a patriotic social reform faction and a minority of pacifists and Marxists who opposed the "imperialist war." However, this development proved to be only temporary and ended with the war.

After the SPD emerged from its "heroic age" of suppression, a new type of functionary replaced the veterans of that period. The party no longer needed daring heroes, but capable officials, trustworthy treasurers, skilled parliamentarians, and clever journalists. Solid, dependable, and skilled negotiators, far more sensitive to the sentiments of the broad voting public than of the Marxist theorists, this new generation of leaders gradually moved from minor posts in party and trade unions into the Reichstag and the all-powerful executive committee. The party split in the First World War placed these men in complete control of the SPD and the collapse of the imperial system in 1918 unexpectedly put them at the head of their defeated country. Their plans for a gradual reformation of the monarchy were shattered as power was thrust into their inexperienced hands. Uncertain regarding its own course of action, but determined to preserve order until a popularly elected assembly could express the will of the people, the Social Democratic leadership refused to sanction a "proletarian revolution" and crushed its radical advocates by force. When the elections yielded the SPD only 38 per cent of the popular vote, its leaders formed a coalition gov-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ernment with the non-socialist parties. This "Weimar Coalition" drafted an ultra-democratic constitution and made peace at Versailles.

Though complete power had been theirs for only a few weeks, the Social Democrats considered themselves the principal founding fathers and guardians of the new democratic state. This claim was accepted by their opponents, who made the SPD the chief target of their attacks. Throughout the fourteen years of the Weimar Republic, Social Democracy had to contend with the undying hostility of the Communists, who accused it of treason to the proletariat, as well as of extreme nationalists, who charged that it had betrayed the fatherland.

While the role of the SPD in the state had changed considerably, the former trade union secretaries and party functionaries who led the party during the Weimar period retained the outlook and practices which they had come to esteem in prewar days. Accustomed to peaceful bargaining for political and economic advantages, they were convinced that Social Democracy owed its gains under the empire to "realistic" but law-abiding tactics. The new constitution expressed their faith in liberal democracy and the innate rationality and goodness of man. Tentative efforts by some of the leaders to all but drop the Marxist doctrine had come to naught with the emergence of the Communists as a rival mass party which claimed exclusive rights to "true" Marxism. But the emasculated Marxism of Kautsky, Bernstein, and Hilferding seemed to the leaders of Social Democracy entirely reconcilable with liberal humanism. Firm believers in the perfectibility of man and unlimited progress, they credited the "mature" German with sufficient good sense and social consciousness to understand, once properly enlightened, that capitalism was not only economically inefficient, but morally repugnant and the source of insecurity and irrationality. Germany, as an "advanced civilization," would show the evolutionary socialist way to universal peace and happiness. Within the framework of the democratic state, the Social Democratic leaders expected to gather a "proletarian" majority around disciplined and socially conscious workers. The assumption of power by this

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"proletariat" would be a democratic process and would come in time in accordance with the laws of economic determinism. The peaceful "class struggle" was believed to be a matter of educating the electorate to support Social Democracy and extending economic and social democracy through the welfare state until a Social Democratic government could supervise the "transition" to the "classless" millennium.

The administrators and parliamentarians who led the SPD considered collegial leadership by a little-known executive committee more democratic than the monocratic rule which Bebel had exercised before the war. Mature, reasonable, and liberal men, "fanatical anti-illusionists," were declared to be of greater value to the movement than charismatic leaders and spellbinders who appealed to the irrational man. The cause, not personalities, was thought to be of paramount importance. The proportional representation list system assured such leaders safe seats in the Reichstag, where it was believed that experts in parliamentary maneuvering and social and economic legislation were needed more than brilliant orators.

However, the postwar generation of German voters failed to live up to the optimistic expectations of the Social Democratic leaders who had insisted in 1919 that the voting age be lowered five years. An ever-growing number of German youths rejected liberal humanism and democratic socialism as old-fashioned and incapable of curing what they conceived to be a "sick" society. From the early turbulent years of the Weimar Republic, through inflation and into the depression, a romantic and collectivist rejection of what they called "the tyranny of materialism" and the conflict of "selfish" interest parties ruled by machine bosses led these young Germans to the extremist movements. Nazis and Communists wooed them with the image of a new, collectivist order, free of the misery, exploitation, and injustice which was attributed to the "Weimar System." To the Social Democratic leaders, men in their fifties who had grown up in an entirely different intellectual and social climate, these sentiments appeared to be "irrational" and childish, and they did their best to discourage and disparage them. Preferring the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

backing of men and women who shared their own outlook on life, the Social Democratic leaders were not overly disturbed by the fact that they failed to find favor with the younger generation. Until 1930, the overwhelming majority of the latter did not express its views at the polls. That year, the postwar generation turned out in force to vote for the extremists and give Hitler his first great electoral victory.

The economic and political crisis of the early thirties led certain elements in the SPD to demand changes in its strategy and tactics. A left-wing of radical Marxists wanted the party to wage a militant class struggle, possibly in league with the Communists, and bitterly denounced the party leaders for cooperating with the "bourgeoisie." On the other hand, a number of young reformists rejected revolutionary Marxism as well as democratic liberalism. They demanded that the party appeal to youth and to the truly "national socialist" elements among the Nazis by "capturing their imagination" with a dynamic national socialist program of its own. They proposed to outdo Hitler in the realm of propaganda by substituting emotional appeals and manipulative techniques for the logical and rational approach of the party leaders. The leadership was declared to be superannuated and was asked to yield to "new forces that have not yet been worn out."[1] The party leaders refused to make any concessions. They were contemptuous of the extremists' propaganda techniques, which they held might be of interest to psychiatrists, but not to politicians. The left-wingers were thought to skirt dangerously close to the party's bitterest enemies, the Communists. Suggestions that Social Democracy yield to the nationalist and irrational passions which gripped the distracted supporters of the Nazis only alarmed the older party leaders. The young reformists were told that they placed far too much importance on youth, emotions, and irrational appeals. Like the rest of the younger generation, they were considered rather erratic and unstable, all too eager to seize the helm and do away

[1] Serge Chakotin, *The Rape of the Masses*, New York, 1940, p. 246. See also various articles by Carl Mierendorff, principal spokesman of this group, in *Die Gesellschaft* and *Sozialistische Monatshefte* during the period 1930-1933.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

with ideas and tactics which had stood the test of time. In complete control of the powerful party organization, the leadership succeeded in denying to its critics the more important posts and silenced them by enforcing party discipline or expelling them. The principal party positions did not change hands throughout the Republican era. Younger men who aspired to them were told to follow in their elders' footsteps, and gradually work their way up the hierarchy by loyal service to the party and its leaders.[2]

After the November 1932 elections had seen a drop in Nazi strength, the political situation seemed still grave to the Social Democratic leaders, but by no means hopeless. The extremist gains were considered a direct consequence of mass unemployment and misery. An upturn in the business cycle and with it a decline of the extremist parties seemed to them to be just around the corner. The SPD leaders played for time. As a temporary holding action they had "tolerated" the "lesser evil," Chancellor Bruening, and supported President von Hindenburg for re-election. When in June 1932 the former's successor, von Papen, had seized control of Prussia, the SPD stronghold, the party leaders had made it abundantly clear that they would not "sacrifice" a million members, over seven million voters, and considerable property in a "hopeless" struggle against the "legitimate" German government. Extra-parliamentary and "unlawful" actions were condemned by a leadership which trusted that constitutional processes and the return of reason and fair play would assure the survival of the Weimar Republic and its chief supporters.

[2] In 1932 the average age of the twelve most prominent leaders of the SPD (Wels, Vogel, Crispien, Löbe, Braun, Severing, Breitscheid, Hilferding, Stelling, Scheidemann, Stampfer, Dittmann) was fifty-eight, that of the twelve Nazi party *Reichsführer* thirty-seven. Twelve per cent of the SPD Reichstag deputies, but only 1 per cent of the Communist and 3 per cent of the Nazi deputies, were over sixty. However, 70 per cent of the Communist deputies and 62 per cent of the Nazi were under forty, compared with 14 per cent of the Social Democratic deputies. SPD membership, after a considerable decline during and immediately after the First World War, climbed back to an enrollment of one million in 1930. Membership in the party's youth groups, however, declined from 105,000 in 1923 to 50,000 by 1928. By 1931, as Hans Gerth has pointed out, only 19 per cent of the SPD members were under thirty, compared to 38 per cent of the Nazi party members ("The Nazi Party: Its Leadership and Composition," *American Journal of Sociology*, XLIV [January 1940], p. 530).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

II

"The reactionaries have played their last card by calling out their Fascist mercenaries," an emergency meeting of the principal Social Democratic leaders was told on January 30, 1933. Rudolf Breitscheid, leader of the SPD Reichstag delegation, represented the Hitler government formed that day by avowed enemies of the democratic republic as the last and vain effort of "monopoly capitalism" to stave off the inevitable victory of democratic socialism.[3] A manifesto drafted at the meeting appeared on the front page of every Social Democratic paper in Germany the following morning. Addressed to all "working people" and "republicans," it described the new government as "a cartel of reactionary big capitalist and agrarian interests." The party leaders warned:

> We stand ready to use every means to ward off any attack upon the political and social rights of the people, guaranteed to them by the Constitution and by law. Any attempt by the Government to pervert or violate the Constitution will be met by the utmost resistance of the working class and of all liberty-loving people.[4]

The leaders of the General Confederation of Labor and the *Reichsbanner,* a republican, para-military organization, informed the SPD leaders, "If you call upon us, we shall be ready." "The working class," announced Franz Künstler, leader of the Social Democrats of Berlin, "is ready to mount the barricades to defend its constitutional rights."[5] However, Hermann Göring assured his cabinet colleagues that the Social Democrats would mount nothing more than the rostrum of the Reichstag.[6]

"The majority of our supporters expected overt resistance," Paul Löbe recalled some sixteen years later, "but the leaders were convinced that the blood bath which was certain to follow

[3] See *International Information* (organ of the Labor and Socialist International), February 8, 1933, p. 52 (hereafter referred to as *I.I.*).

[4] *Vorwärts,* January 31, 1933 (morning ed.); *I.I.,* February 8, 1933, p. 52.

[5] *Vorwärts,* January 31, 1933 (evening ed.); *I.I.,* February 8, 1933, p. 52; *New York Times,* January 30, 1933.

[6] International Military Tribunal, *Trial of the Major War Criminals,* Nuremberg, 1947-1949, XXIV, pp. 373-75, Document 351PS (Minutes of the first session of the Hitler Cabinet, January 30, 1933).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

would be utterly futile."[7] Karl Severing later claimed that on January 30 he vainly sought to receive assurances from the *Reichswehr* that it would resist a Hitler regime "by force of arms."[8] A comparison with the nationalist Kapp Putsch of 1920, which was brought to an end by a general strike, seemed inappropriate. Hitler was believed to have received the chancellorship legitimately and constitutionally, and while no one trusted him to honor the Constitution, he had as yet taken no steps to violate it. The chief of state had appointed him as the leader of the largest party in the legislature, and "to rise against him on the first night would make the rebels the technical violators of the Constitution they wanted to defend."[9] The Social Democratic leaders felt quite certain that Hitler was only waiting for a "legal" pretext to destroy the SPD with the full power of the state behind him. If it came to that, they expected to be beaten, and beaten as violators of their own Constitution. Moreover, "a yearning for bloody adventures was completely alien to them," Friedrich Stampfer wrote later. "Social Democracy had for decades been a party which believed in peaceful evolution, rational judgment, [and] non-violent compromise," and extra-parliamentary action would, therefore, have been a denial of "its true nature."[10]

The SPD leaders announced that they would leave "all responsibility for starting a conflict in which both sides would abandon the normal weapons of political action" to the government. They refused to be the first to discard "constitutional and legal means." The SPD rejected a Communist appeal for "united proletarian action" and a general strike against the government. Its leaders recalled that the Communists had sought many times in the past to use a "united front" to take over the SPD and received the invitation with utter distrust, the product of bitter experience in years of conflict between the two "proletarian"

[7] Paul Löbe, *Erinnerungen eines Reichstagspräsidenten*, Berlin-Grunewald, 1949, p. 147.

[8] *Trial of the Major War Criminals*, XIV, p. 264 (Testimony of Karl Severing, May 21, 1946).

[9] Arnold Brecht, *Prelude to Silence*, New York, 1944, p. 74.

[10] Friedrich Stampfer, *Die ersten vierzehn Jahre der ersten deutschen Republik*, Carlsbad, 1936, p. 632.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

parties. But they feared that under the circumstances some of the left-wingers in their party would heed the call in violation of the policy of utmost restraint which the leadership considered essential. The party conceded that a general strike would be a "legal weapon" and "a hundred times justified to defend the liberties of the people and the social and political rights of the working class," but maintained that "tactical common sense" advised keeping this weapon in reserve "so that the decisive moment will not find the workers already exhausted." "A general strike at this moment would simply be firing the ammunition of the working class foolishly into the air." They asked their followers not to allow themselves to be misled into "precipitate and, therefore, harmful, isolated actions," but to remain cool, resolute, disciplined, and united.[11]

On February 1 the government set at rest many apprehensions regarding its future course. In a surprisingly moderate statement it announced that it would seek a legitimate majority in the Reichstag, where it now controlled only 35 per cent of the seats. The chamber was dissolved and new elections ordered for March 5. All the opposition parties, even the Communists, felt reassured. There was to be no "March on Rome" and, while it is now known that none was planned, many then had expected it. Its failure to materialize led to the hope that many of the past threats and plans of Hitler might turn out to be propaganda, and that Hitler could be tamed by his conservative colleagues. The Social Democrats refused to take the Nazi program too seriously. It sounded utterly absurd and appeared unlikely to receive the support of a majority of the electorate.

The Social Democratic strategy was to prevent the coalition from gaining a majority. Here was an opportunity to fight with the weapons which the party leaders knew best and felt most confident of. Not once, even when fighting Bismarck, had the SPD abandoned the ballot box as the principal means for ad-

11 See *Vorwärts*, January 30 (evening ed.), January 31 (morning ed.), February 1 (both eds.), February 2 (morning ed.), and February 8 (morning ed.), 1933; *I.I.*, February 8, 1933, p. 53; *New York Times*, February 1 and 7, 1933.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

vancing its cause. As the campaign began, the *Vorwärts*, the leading SPD paper, strongly emphasized that it did not expect Germany to become another Italy. The new government now appeared to many to be but slightly more to the right than its immediate predecessors, those of Papen and Schleicher, which had been labeled "Fascist" by the Communists and "reactionary" by the Social Democrats. The three-to-one preponderance of conservative Nationalists in the coalition cabinet, their close connection with von Hindenburg, incumbent of the powerful presidency, and with the kingpin in German politics, the army, the oath which they had taken to uphold the Weimar Constitution, and the contempt which army and President were believed to feel for the Nazis, all reassured the Social Democratic leaders. They were prepared for a strong conservative reaction, but not for a "National Revolution."

The Social Democratic campaign started on the keynote which Breitscheid had sounded at the meeting on January 30. The "reactionary capitalist" Hugenberg, not Hitler, was depicted in the *Vorwärts* as the real master of a shaky coalition. Not since the days of the imperial regime had Marxist symbols and slogans played as great a part in Social Democratic appeals. The campaign was described as a "class struggle" between the Social Democratic workers and "monopoly capitalism" and "reactionary feudalism." The SPD, promised Löbe, would "never again make coalitions or compromises" with other parties, but would hereafter "go all out to conquer sole power for itself."[12] A strong effort was made to hold the dissatisfied left-wingers who threatened to support the Communists, and the faint of heart who feared a Nazi victory. On February 2 the Social Democratic election manifesto proclaimed:

> Defend yourself, defend your independence as citizens against your oppressors, against the Upper Ten, against the miserable minority of barons, against the capitalists; break their economic and political power! Fight with us for the expropriation of the landowner and the division of the land among the peasants and agricultural laborers!

[12] Quoted in Robert T. Clark, *The Fall of the German Republic*, London, 1935, p. 473.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Fight with us for the socialization of heavy industry, for the construction of a socialist-planned economy.[13]

This "seditious" manifesto brought a three-day suspension upon the entire Social Democratic press in Prussia, which comprised three-fourths of the population. It was the opening gun of the Nazi campaign, which was to give Germany a taste of the sugar-coated terror which was later to become familiar to the entire world. In the face of tremendous government propaganda, supported by every means of modern mass appeal, the strength of the opposition was sapped by keeping it in a constant state of insecurity and alarm. The radio, monopolized by the government, the huge Hugenberg press and film combine, and the Nazi press, handbills, and speakers bombarded the public with reassuring promises of stability and security if the coalition got its majority. Simultaneously, the "unofficial" terrorism of the storm troopers sought to increase fear and insecurity and to intimate what might happen if Hitler did not win. The so-called "Marxist parties" were its particular targets. Not a day passed without murderous attacks upon their supporters. Social Democratic rallies were broken up, printing plants and campaign headquarters wrecked in an effort to intimidate the SPD and the voters.

"Officially," the government professed ignorance of these acts and limited itself strictly to "constitutional and lawful means" to further its cause. Under a series of presidential decrees to maintain the "public order and safety" in accordance with the Constitution, it banned all criticism of its members by the press, prohibited or dissolved opposition rallies, raided the homes of anti-Nazis without warrant, and generally infringed upon constitutional liberties. On February 6 a decree "for the restoration of normal conditions of government in Prussia" stripped the legitimate government of that state, led by Social Democrats, of the few powers which the Supreme Court had left in its hands as a result of the court fight following Papen's seizure of Prussia in July 1932. The Social Democrats declared that Hitler had

[13] *Vorwärts*, February 2, 1933 (morning ed.); English translation from Clark, *op.cit.*, p. 471.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

flagrantly violated the Constitution by arrogating for the national government powers reserved to the state. But an intricate legal question "did not seem to present a good starting point for an uprising that could only be hopeless."[14] The Prussian Braun-Severing government went to court, unsuccessfully trying to get a favorable decision before the election, to prove to the electorate that Hitler, and not the Social Democrats, had violated the Constitution. Meanwhile, Göring, placed in charge of the Prussian police, transformed it into a tool of the Nazi campaign. Assigning his lieutenants to all principal posts and creating an "auxiliary police" of storm troopers, he deprived the opposition of all protection, while he ordered the police to "support" the storm troopers.

The "constitutional" actions of the government were a far greater handicap to the law-abiding Social Democrats than all the "unofficial" terror in the streets. The *Vorwärts* promised to "speak more softly" after its first suspension, but within a few days it was prohibited once more for "treasonable" criticism of the government. The rest of the SPD press suffered a similar fate. Constantly harried by brief bans, the threat of suspension hung over it to guarantee compliant behavior during the short intervals it was allowed to appear. The consequent financial and emotional strain seriously limited the effectiveness of the principal media of the Social Democratic campaign.

The Social Democratic leaders conducted their election campaign as best they could. They considered the "official" actions of the government to be within its constitutional and legal powers, and the "unofficial" terror appeared to them, as to most Germans, a mere change in quantity over preceding months. The SPD strategy was to afford the government a minimum of opportunity to interfere in the name of law and order with its campaign. The belligerent tenor of earlier appeals was considerably toned down, and the leadership appealed to its supporters to maintain, above all, discipline, sobriety, and courage despite the provocative acts of the Nazis. Still, militant Marxist slogans assured the faint-hearted that victory was in-

[14] Brecht, *op.cit.*, p. 87.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

evitable. Unable to ignore the sentiment for greater "working class unity" among the rank and file, though still highly suspicious of Communist intentions and moving extremely cautiously, the Social Democratic leadership called for "unity" in the "class struggle" against "monopoly capitalism" and its "Fascist stooges." At the same time, the SPD sought to defend itself against Nazi charges that it had betrayed the German nation in pursuit of its internationalist, Marxist aims. "Gagging the press may suppress criticism," wrote the *Vorwärts*, but "nothing can stop us from showing the people the historical truth." "Truth must win out" became one of the principal campaign slogans of the Social Democrats. "We wish to cleanse Germany of the rule of irrational passions and terror," proclaimed the heirs of nineteenth-century democratic liberalism. "We wish to demonstrate on March 5 that freedom and reason still rule supreme—to the honor of Germany."[15] "Death rather than slavery" was the defiant theme at party rallies. But the *New York Times* reported that gloom and pessimism were spreading among anti-Nazis.[16]

On February 27, a week before the election, the SPD staged a mass rally in Berlin. It was dissolved by the police as soon as it started. Homeward-bound participants could see a big glow in the sky. The Reichstag building was burning. "Now is the time for action!" wrote Goebbels in his diary. "If anyone resists, the streets will be thrown open to the storm troopers."[17] The government claimed that a captured arsonist had implicated the the SPD in the abortive "Red" uprising for which the fire was to have been the signal. It immediately occupied the *Vorwärts* building, national headquarters of the party in Berlin, and banned SPD publications throughout Prussia. All over the country hundreds of Social Democratic functionaries were arrested, along with Communists. "For the protection of people and state," a presidential decree abrogated all constitutional civil liberties.

[15] *Vorwärts*, February 12, 1933 (morning ed.); also *ibid.*, February 15-26, 1933, *passim*.

[16] *New York Times*, February 15, 1933.

[17] Joseph Goebbels, *Vom Kaiserhof zur Reichskanzelei*, Munich, 1934, p. 270.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Armed resistance by "enemies of the state" was to be punished by death.

The executive committee of the SPD immediately protested indignantly that the actions of the government were unconstitutional and charges of complicity by the SPD in setting the fire, or planning an uprising with the Communists, unwarranted. The entire history of the SPD bore witness that acts of terrorism had never been sanctioned and infraction of orders of the leaders were extremely rare, Otto Wels, the party chairman, wrote to Vice-Chancellor von Papen, Reich Commissioner for Prussia. He pleaded that the ban on Social Democratic publications be lifted.[18] But Goebbels noted in his diary: "Göring has opened a campaign against the Red Parties in Prussia: it will end with their complete annihilation. . . . No resistance anywhere. The enemy camp seems so completely surprised that it dare not resist. . . ."[19] Though the charge implicating the SPD in the fire was quietly dropped, the party was nonetheless practically immobilized during the critical five days preceding the election. Most of its newspapers were silenced, its headquarters closed, and some of its most militant and energetic functionaries in prison. Many were Reichstag deputies, but even friendly legalists held that their detention was constitutional.[20]

In the few remaining days Nazi propaganda went into high gear, while Social Democratic posters were destroyed and printing presses turning out leaflets smashed. Some of the leaflets, surreptitiously distributed in Berlin, maintained that "our party has always gained fresh vigor from persecution." But the Social Democrats felt keenly that they were powerless to reply to a "flood of monstrous accusations."[21] A few hours before the polls opened on March 5 it was announced that Otto Braun, Social Democratic leader of Prussia and "legally" still Prime Minister, had gone to Switzerland. The Nazis broadcast throughout the day that the Social Democrats had already given up and taken to their heels.

[18] *Leipziger Volkszeitung*, February 28 and March 1, 1933.
[19] Goebbels, *op.cit.*, p. 271.
[20] See Brecht, *op.cit.*, p. 93.
[21] *New York Times*, March 2, 1933.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Despite the nature of the campaign and the mobilization of the greatest reservoir of Nazi strength, the politically indifferent who ordinarily abstained, the returns failed to provide the Nazis with a majority, and their bare 44 per cent appeared to give them no more of a democratic mandate to make fundamental changes in the state than had the 46 per cent given to the two Social Democratic parties in 1919. The entire government coalition received 52 per cent, a majority of 33 in the Reichstag. The SPD retained practically all of its supporters and with 7.2 million votes (18 per cent) remained the second largest party, followed by the Center with 5.5 million (14 per cent) and the outlawed Communists with 4.8 million (12 per cent).

III

Before the election Otto Wels had reminded his followers of the old German proverb: "Strict masters do not rule for long."[22] Now that it was over, the majority of the party leaders believed that parliamentary life would go on and "legality would be restored as soon as the first onslaught had spent itself."[23] Accordingly, they told their supporters:

> The party remains unbroken, tried in battle, still ready for the fray. Your ranks are steadier than ever. The near future will make still greater demands upon the Social Democrats of Germany. We are equal to them. The fight to reconquer the liberties of the working class movement and its political rights still goes on. The election does not represent the will of the people. The special court for the trial of election petitions will have to decide whether the conditions for a free election were fulfilled.[24]

Nevertheless, Friedrich Stampfer, editor-in-chief of the *Vorwärts*, announced that the SPD was prepared to accept the outcome of the election and assume the role of a loyal opposition. "They have only to act as a legal government, and it will follow naturally that we shall be a legal opposition," he wrote on March 11. "If they choose to use their majority for measures

[22] Quoted in Evelyn Anderson, *Hammer or Anvil*, London, 1945, p. 152.
[23] *I.I.*, June 10, 1933, p. 267; also *ibid.*, March 18, 1933, p. 119; Otto Braun, *Von Weimar zu Hitler*, New York, 1940, pp. 145f. [24] *I.I.*, March 11, 1933, p. 110.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that remain within the framework of the Constitution, we shall confine ourselves to the role of fair critics until such time as the nation calls upon us to play another part." Everything seemed to him to point to such a development, not only the oaths which the President and the ministers had taken to uphold the Weimar Constitution, but, even more, political "considerations of a severely practical character." The unexpected accession to power of men who had made no secret of their revisionist, even expansionist, ambitions in the past had caused fear and alarm throughout Europe. Stampfer believed that the government would endeavor to appease these sentiments to strengthen its position in pending delicate negotiations at the Geneva Disarmament Conference and would follow a relatively moderate domestic policy to unite the nation behind its claims for equal rights.[25]

In the eyes of the Social Democratic leadership, a very direct relationship existed between the reaction of foreign powers to the Hitler government and the immediate future of the SPD. Pressure from more conservative elements at home, particularly the army, together with diplomatic pressure from abroad, was expected to check Hitler's ambitions and the excesses of his supporters. At worst, the SPD was believed to be facing a period of semi-legality, much like the political twilight in which it had existed during its suppression under Bismarck.[26] Despite severe restrictions, the party's electorate had increased fivefold, and Bismarck finally fell from power. The party leaders, some of whom had participated in the campaign of the eighties, in 1933 reverted to the strategy which had then brought success. Once more a peaceful and law-abiding campaign would succeed, aided by the "inevitable" process of economic determinism. Karl Kautsky, since the days of Bismarck the most prominent of the party's theorists, predicted on March 18 that Hitler would be abandoned by his supporters as soon as his inability and unwillingness to live up to his demagogic promises became evident.

[25] *I.I.*, March 11, 1933, pp. 110f.

[26] According to former leaders of the SPD interviewed by this writer, including Friedrich Stampfer, Paul Hertz, Marie Juchacz, and Erich Rinner, all members of the executive committee in 1933.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

While he would preside over the final collapse of German capitalism, the masses would flock to Social Democracy as their last and only salvation from political and economic chaos. Ignorant fools who knew only "how to pose as Nordic knights" could never attain the totalitarian power of the Fascists and Bolshevists. The SPD was to conserve its strength until the regime spontaneously disintegrated and, therefore, Kautsky insisted, "*The maintenance of our organization and propaganda work is the most important task facing us*" (his italics). However, he warned, "As long as the dictatorship has the mass support of the population behind it, trials of strength by illegal mass action are certain to lead to defeat." Not until "all the weary and oppressed . . . come streaming back . . . [and] the majority [is] once more on our side," could the SPD lead this "proletarian majority" against its "capitalist oppressors." "The vision of this splendid future" was the eschatological sustenance which Kautsky offered the Social Democrats for the difficult "days of trial" ahead.[27] The party, wrote Stampfer, was as "unbreakable as a rock" and its supporters, another Social Democrat added, "a firm, unbreakable nucleus of resistance" which would "wait and endure" until its hour arrived.[28]

IV

Hitler soon made it clear that he would not be satisfied to rule with a scant majority in the Reichstag. The chamber was summoned for March 23 to consider an enabling bill which would give the government constitutional power to rule by executive decree. Such legislation required the presence of two-thirds of the members and a two-thirds majority. Strong and, on the whole, successful pressure was exerted to assure its passage. Hitler intimated he could not be responsible for the actions of his supporters unless he received the desired power. The Communists had been outlawed and would not be there to vote. All parties but the Social Democrats were won over, more than enough to pass the bill. However, the Nazis hoped to make this

[27] *I.I.*, March 18, 1933, pp. 114-17.
[28] *I.I.*, March 11, 1933, p. 110, and March 18, 1933, p. 119.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the first great demonstration of German unity behind Hitler and made every effort to persuade the Social Democrats to vote, if not for the bill, at least not against it.

Only ninety-four of 120 elected Social Democrats could take their seats on March 23. The rest had fled or were under arrest, some being detained as they were about to enter the chamber. A mob of howling Nazis raged outside, threatening fire and murder if the bill were not passed. Armed storm troopers lined the chamber. Hitler declared that to overcome the economic crisis and to obtain the status of a great power for Germany he needed a free hand and asked the parties to demonstrate the unity of the country behind his government by passing the enabling bill. One after another, the various party spokesmen pledged their support—with one exception. Amidst the hooting of the Nazis, the defiant applause of his own party, and the stunned silence of the others, Wels announced that the SPD would not vote to eliminate parliamentary control over the government. It had enough votes in the Reichstag to govern "strictly according to the letter and spirit of the Constitution." Every "positive proposal" in the realm of domestic as well as foreign affairs would have the support of the Social Democratic deputies. Speaking to the country rather than the Reichstag, Wels recalled his party's victory over Bismarck, its achievements on behalf of the nation, and pleaded for popular support in defense of the democratic system. Addressing the government, he declared:

> The attempt to turn back the wheel of history will fail. . . . We recognize that in terms of power politics you possess for the moment a preponderance of force. But the people's sense of justice is a political force as well, and we shall not cease to appeal to it. . . . In this historic hour, we German Social Democrats solemnly pledge our allegiance to the principles of humanity and justice, freedom and socialism. No enabling act can give you the power to destroy ideas that are eternal and indestructible. . . . The anti-socialist law could not destroy Social Democracy. From new persecutions Social Democracy can once again gather new strength.
>
> We salute the persecuted and oppressed . . . our friends throughout

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the country. Their constancy and loyalty . . . the courage of their convictions, their unbroken confidence, promise a brighter future.

As Wels resumed his seat, Hitler rushed forward. "You weep too much, and are not fit for this day and age if you already complain of persecution," he shouted at the Social Democrats. ". . . You are no longer wanted. . . . Do not take ours for a middle-class world. . . . You maintain that the anti-socialist law did not break you. But that was a time when the German workers saw in you something different from what you represent today. . . . Your hour has . . . struck." The cowed gathering then voted 441 to 94 to grant the government "limited" dictatorial powers. It was enjoined from altering the fundamental organization of constitutional power, and the multi-party system was to remain inviolate.[29]

V

Hitler's new powers sufficed for the moment to enable him to carry out the next step in his "National Revolution." A "co-ordinating drive" during the following weeks strengthened his control over the civil service, the state governments, and numerous other aspects of political and economic life. However, there were no new moves against the opposition. The optimism of the Social Democratic leaders seemed to be borne out. Unlike the Communists, the SPD was permitted to retain its parliamentary seats and to engage in a limited amount of intra-party activity, though its press remained prohibited and a scheduled party congress had to be cancelled. "Unlawful" violence and mass arrests directed against Social Democrats diminished considerably. The elections had shown that Hitler still did not have the support of a majority of the people, and the enabling act gave him an opportunity to consolidate his power in a manner less offensive to those elements in Germany who thought they agreed with many of his aims, but disapproved of the lawless tactics associated with the Nazi movement in the past. Particularly for the benefit of the conservative elements entrenched in

[29] See *Verhandlungen des Reichstags, VII, Wahlperiode 1933*, pp. 32-41.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the judiciary, the bureaucracy, and the army, Hitler had to prove himself fit to receive their support as leader of the nation by conforming to the principles of the *Rechtsstaat*. While these considerations undoubtedly accounted in part for the adoption of somewhat more moderate and law-abiding tactics in the establishment of the totalitarian state, diplomatic considerations were probably even more important. Göring provided a clue when on March 25 he complained to representatives of the foreign press about fantastic rumors of a reign of terror in Germany which, he said, "Marxist elements" were spreading abroad.[30]

As the Social Democratic leaders had noted with satisfaction, Hitler's accession came as a shock to the world. His ruthless and brutal methods aroused indignation as well as apprehension throughout Europe. Particularly for France and her anti-revisionist allies, a resurgent Germany under the leadership of the Nazis appeared as a threat to peace and the status quo, and their vigilance was, therefore, immediately aroused—this at the very moment when at Geneva the Disarmament Conference was considering German claims for abolition of the military limitations of the Versailles Treaty. On March 18 Mussolini proposed a Four-Power Pact between Italy, Germany, France, and Britain which aimed at revision in Germany's favor and the substitution of a concert of the four powers for the League to settle the affairs of Europe. In view of the expansionist principles of the Nazis, these proposals met with strong opposition from the anti-revisionist states. While there was never a question of armed intervention in German affairs, the Hitler government encountered considerable antagonism abroad, a situation which was not improved by the belligerent pronouncements of its spokesmen.

In order to overcome fear and hostility both at home and abroad, Hitler had to demonstrate that he was not intent on war, but sought only a peaceful modification of certain "unjust" clauses in the peace treaty. If he could do this, he might unite Germany behind his foreign policy, subordinating domestic

[30] *Schulthess' Europäischer Geschichtskalender*, 1933, p. 78.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

problems to the primacy of foreign affairs, while showing the world that, whether it liked it or not, he expressed the will of his people. For that he needed the Social Democrats. They were to remain in the wings, ready for the ignominious role reserved for them as their last action on the German political stage. Toward this objective, while they ceased their frontal attacks on the SPD leaders, the Nazis strove to isolate them from their supporters. They realized that the power of the leadership rested almost entirely upon the monolithic party organization. Banning of the SPD press and the murder, arrest, and flight of many among the important strata of secondary leaders—vital mediums of communications to and control of the rank and file—had already greatly weakened the authority of the leadership. The Nazis hoped that once the links between leaders and followers were completely severed, they would have little trouble in taking control of the Social Democratic masses, while the national leadership would be at their mercy.

Simultaneously, the majority of the Social Democratic leaders continued to believe that the tactics which had worked against Bismarck would enable the party to survive its present eclipse until dissatisfaction at home and strong pressure from abroad would see it triumph over Hitler. Wels's speech to the Reichstag was thought to have laid the groundwork for a future counter-offensive. Intimately connected with these plans was the conviction that, as the traditional major source of Social Democratic strength, the party organization had at all cost to be preserved. Kautsky supported this contention by invoking the doctrine of economic determinism. Under present conditions, he declared, it was incumbent upon rational Marxists to employ dilatory tactics. Support for Hitler was "a passing fancy," he reiterated, particularly among "politically and economically uneducated youth," and the collapse of his government was inevitable because it could "only bring economic chaos and paralysis to its climax." Therefore, he wrote,

> avoiding a decisive battle under unfavorable circumstances is by no means a surrender. If evasive tactics permit the continuation of the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> struggle, the ability to carry on the fight will be weakened far less by them than by a catastrophic defeat. . . . A strategy of attrition is mandatory for an army if its temporary position in a conflict happens to be disadvantageous, but an improvement may be expected if the conflict is drawn out. . . . The Social Democratic army is far superior to the Brown Shirts in this strategy of attrition. Hitler's mercenaries can only be kept together by a continuous series of quick and easy spoliative successes. At the least resistance, they will melt away.

And Kautsky was absolutely certain that such resistance would come sooner or later from inside and outside Germany.[31] To preserve peace, it was "the duty of the civilized world to stop these adventurers," insisted Phillipp Scheidemann, who in 1918 had proclaimed the republic. However, he, like Wels and others, rejected armed intervention.[32]

In accordance with these strategic concepts, the party leaders welcomed the apparent breathing space which followed the passage of the enabling act. For the time being, the conservation and rallying of their organization appeared to be their chief task. But the means were lacking. Not only had mass arrests and flight removed many of the most important functionaries of the movement, but the party press, the other principal medium of communication and control for the leadership, was still prohibited. Moreover, there was no way of replying to charges in the government press against the SPD and particularly against its international connections, which party leaders believed to be doing real damage to their cause. Wels had insisted on March 23 that claims in the Nazi press that the SPD had sent "exaggerated" accounts of conditions in Germany abroad were not true. Then "your party with its international connections should have no trouble in establishing the truth," Hitler had replied. ". . . No one prevents you . . . from making public your knowledge of the true situation. I shall be curious to see how effective your international connections will prove to be."[33] Göring, as noted, amplified this complaint two days later when he met the foreign

[31] Karl Kautsky, "Einige Ursachen und Wirkungen des deutschen Nationalsozialismus," *Der Kampf* (Vienna), XXVI (June 1933), pp. 235-45. An editorial note indicates that the article was written in April or early May 1933.

[32] Quoted in *Neue Volkszeitung* (New York), July 22, 1933.

[33] *Verhandlungen des Reichstags, VII, Wahlperiode 1933*, p. 41.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

press. But there seemed to be no way for the SPD to answer, now that the Reichstag had adjourned and its publications continued to be banned. Paul Löbe went to see Göring to ask him to lift the ban on the Social Democratic newspapers in Prussia. He was assured that the government would

> release a certain number of Social Democratic papers eventually, but you must be patient just a little longer. What good will it do you if you print the *Vorwärts* now and your delivery boys are attacked by storm troopers and the papers are burned?[34]

In the meantime, it was intimated to the Social Democratic leaders, they might help to calm tempers and thus speed the reappearance of their papers. They could convince their associates in foreign lands that it was against the interests of the SPD to publish "atrocity stories" about conditions in Germany. Accordingly, Otto Wels requested the Labor and Socialist International not to print "false" reports about persecution in Germany. Paul Hertz and other emissaries of the party executive traveled about Europe, pleading with socialists to discontinue the publication of "incorrect" statements about German conditions. But the International and the European socialist press insisted on their right to print "authentic reports." Thereupon Otto Wels withdrew on March 30 as the representative of German labor in the Labor and Socialist International.

While, in accordance with Hitler's strategy, the Nazis left the top of the Social Democratic organizational pyramid relatively unmolested, they were hard at work undermining the base. The party's supporters had proved loyal to their leaders in the election, but Nazi propaganda and intimidation were undoubtedly having an effect. The flight of prominent leaders, such as Braun, Hilferding, and Breitscheid, and the mass arrests and "unofficial" terror preceding the passage of the enabling act had not improved morale among them. Now, in April, civil servants who had in the past supported the SPD were either dismissed or compelled to pledge their allegiance to the "National Revolution" in order to retain a precarious hold on their jobs.

[34] Löbe, *op.cit.*, pp. 151f.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Employers were ordered to discharge workers who gave evidence of hostility to the regime.

Opportunist collaborators began to appear among the Social Democrats. Thus, a certain Henning Duderstadt, prominent among the younger right-wing functionaries, emerged from temporary detention by the Nazis as self-appointed leader of the "generation of front-line veterans" in the SPD. Endeavoring to align the rank and file "voluntarily" behind Hitler, he testified that he "worked within every group I had any contact with . . . for some sort of armed coup against the party executive committee." Simultaneously he recommended himself to "certain influential connections . . . as editor-in-chief of the *Vorwärts* and leader of the party."[35] While Duderstadt was unsuccessful, collaborators in the General Confederation of Labor (ADGB), since 1906 the mainstay of the SPD, accomplished more. Under their influence, the leaders of the Confederation severed their once intimate ties with the SPD on March 21. Early in April they began to negotiate for a merger of all German trade unions under Nazi leadership, dismissed those of their functionaries labeled politically or racially objectionable by the Nazis, and agreed to recall union funds deposited abroad for safekeeping. On April 19 the leadership of the Confederation called upon its members to participate in a "Day of German Labor" which the Nazis planned as a "Germanic" substitute for the traditional socialist First of May celebration. On May 1 the former Social Democratic trade unions marched behind the swastika. German labor, the Nazis proclaimed, united and free from the influence of "international Marxism," had demonstrated its support for Hitler.

These developments upset the dilatory strategy of the SPD leaders. Moreover, apart from demoralization and defection among Social Democrats due to Nazi activities, they were faced with elements in the lower echelons of the party who denounced the cautious and law-abiding tactics of the leadership and demanded the immediate transformation of its organization into

[35] Henning Duderstadt, *Vom Reichsbanner zum Hakenkreuz: wie es kommen musste*, Stuttgart, 1933, pp. 129-35.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a revolutionary underground movement. Early in April a number of socialist youths were expelled from the SPD for violating the express orders of the leadership by engaging in "unlawful" activities against the government. To overcome their growing isolation from the rank and file and to avert further dissident activities in the party, which threatened it with disintegration regardless of Nazi action, the leaders summoned a "National Conference" of party functionaries.

The conference met on April 27 in the undestroyed part of the Reichstag in Berlin. Indicative of their attitude, the party leaders deliberately chose to meet at this conspicuous place, expecting protection from the President of the Reichstag, Göring. Indeed, neither "official" nor "unofficial" Nazi quarters made any move to interfere. Wels in his keynote address attributed Hitler's accession to the temporary political situation created by the economic crisis. Echoing Kautsky, he blamed insufficient "scientific knowledge" among the masses for lack of enthusiasm for the "reasonable and practical" program of Social Democracy. Wels and other speakers denounced the collaborationist activities of the trade unions, but declared that the SPD would survive its present ordeal, as "the spirit which lives in the masses of organized workers cannot be killed and will in time become active again."[36]

A new executive committee was chosen "to rejuvenate the party and make it more active." The older leaders, in the interest of greater unity, but also to silence criticism of the leadership and to prevent the formation of dissident splinter groups, agreed to broaden the representative character of the party leadership. Three party functionaries, aged forty-five, thirty-two, and thirty-one, were to represent the "younger generation." Together with four representatives of the left-wing and two of the most prominent leaders of the right-wing, Löbe and Wilhelm Sollmann, they replaced the leaders who had fled abroad. Eleven incumbents were re-elected, since "it was felt that the older generation ought . . . to have an opportunity to work alongside the younger," according to the report to the socialist press abroad. With

[36] *Neue Volkszeitung*, May 27, 1933.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the "older generation" still in control of the party leadership, the conference adjourned on April 28, directing the party leaders to carry on the "legal" fight against Hitler.[37]

VI

The new executive committee immediately became the center of a dispute among the SPD leaders which apparently had been brewing for some time. Though the old leadership had retained control, its own ranks were now badly split by tactical differences. One faction wished to limit the overt party organization to a skeletal staff and parliamentary deputies, as in the eighties. The party then had maintained a center in Switzerland which was credited with having done a most effective job in unifying and encouraging an initially demoralized movement and making many of the gains which the party registered at the polls. Anticipating that the party press might once more be outlawed, Friedrich Stampfer, as early as February, had made tentative arrangements with the Sudeten German socialists to use their facilities for a propaganda center. After the prohibition of the SPD press following the Reichstag fire, between one and two million reichsmarks from the party treasury were deposited abroad. Stampfer urged the use of these funds for the establishment of a "foreign representation" of the SPD, placing little credit in Göring's assurances that the press would be released. Now, late in April, he and his supporters in the leadership predicted further restrictions on the party's activities and wanted a number of leaders to go abroad to establish such a center, to publish literature in support of the campaign being waged inside the country, and, if necessary, to speak for the party in case the leadership in Germany should no longer be free to do so.

Stampfer's plan was opposed by a group of leaders around Paul Löbe. They insisted that the party should under no circumstances provoke the Nazis into further repressive actions. The

[37] *Ibid.*; also *I.I.*, May 6, 1933, pp. 189-91, and May 20, 1933, p. 226; *Frankfurter Zeitung*, April 28, 1933; interviews with Rinner, Stampfer, Hertz, and Juchacz. Erich Ollenhauer, present leader of the SPD, was the youngest member of the new executive committee.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Löbe group believed that the party's press might be released, its functionaries freed, and the organization preserved relatively intact, if extreme caution were exercised in dealing with the Nazis. Löbe, who would not believe that the government was as much of a threat to the party as the Stampfer group argued, repeatedly went to see Göring and the chief of the new secret police, hoping to persuade them to release the party's functionaries and lift the prohibition on its publications.[38] Moreover, this faction felt very strongly that, particularly after the unfavorable publicity attendant upon the departure of Otto Braun before the election of March 5, the remaining leaders were duty-bound to remain under all circumstances in the country, regardless of personal consequences. "Emigration is no solution . . . ," they maintained. "The working class and the rank and file must remain in Germany. They have to man the front-line trenches in the battle to preserve the party, and they want to see their leaders fighting alongside them."[39]

The moderate attitude of the Nazis during April seemed to support the optimism of the Löbe group. But on May 2 the Nazis seized the leaders and property of the General Confederation of Labor, only a few hours after it had demonstrated its "political neutrality" by participating in the "Day of German Labor." At an emergency meeting of the SPD executive committee on May 4, this ominous sign led to the decision that "the persecuted party must have a representation abroad." Realizing that under arrest or in hiding they would hardly be able to rally their supporters or appeal to German and world opinion, the members of the executive committee authorized six of their number to set up a "Representation Abroad," with the proviso that Berlin remain the headquarters of the party.[40] Hitler's announce-

[38] See Löbe, *op.cit.*, p. 151.

[39] *I.I.*, March 31, 1933, p. 142. On this conflict within the SPD leadership, see *I.I.*, June 10, 1933, pp. 265-70; Löbe, *op.cit.*, p. 152; Max Klinger (pseud. for Curt Geyer), *Volk in Ketten*, Carlsbad, 1934, pp. 66ff.; *Neuer Vorwärts* (Prague), December 23 and 31, 1933, and December 31, 1937; Ludwig Lore, "The Fate of the Worker," in *Nazism, an Assault on Civilization*, ed. by Pierre van Paassen and James Waterman Wise, New York, 1934, pp. 121f.

[40] Interviews with Friedrich Stampfer and Paul Hertz. See Klinger, *op.cit.*, p. 66; Konrad Heiden, *A History of National Socialism*, New York, 1935, p. 257.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ment on May 7 that "the hour of reckoning had arrived" was followed on May 10 by the confiscation of the party's funds and property. Numerous district officials of the SPD hastily resigned their posts. The isolation of the leadership in Berlin was now complete; the breathing spell was over.

VII

In the interval, Germany's relations with the rest of the world had gone from bad to worse. Her representatives at the Disarmament Conference refused to accept anything but complete equality in armaments with other major powers, while Mussolini's Four-Power Pact proposal had produced violent reactions in France, the Little Entente, and Poland. Negotiations in Geneva were close to a breakdown when, early in May, British and French spokesmen declared that continuing German intransigence would end any further considerations of revising the Versailles Treaty. They refused to agree even to a greatly emasculated version of the Four-Power Pact. At this point the Reichstag was summoned for May 17 to receive a major foreign policy declaration from Hitler. Diplomatic activity remained suspended as Germany and the rest of the world awaited his speech.

The SPD "Representation Abroad," temporarily located in the League-administered Saar, dispatched two of its members to Berlin to prevent attendance by their party's deputies. A few days abroad had sufficed to convince it that the leaders isolated in Berlin were misjudging the political situation. The two emissaries warned their associates who had remained behind that "legal" opposition was doomed and the prohibition of the party close at hand. While there was widespread moral condemnation of the Nazis throughout Europe, there was no inclination to interfere in any way with what were considered internal German affairs. The Social Democrats could not count upon pressure from abroad to undermine Hitler's position. They would have to go underground in order to remain an active opposition, the emissaries advised; if the deputies so much as attended the coming Reichstag meeting, they would compromise themselves too

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

much to take the helm of a "revolutionary" movement. Not only would Social Democrats inside Germany refuse to follow them, but they would forfeit the backing of the international socialist movement. Already, they warned, various spokesmen for dissident elements in the party, claiming to represent the "real" revolutionary sentiments of German labor, were gaining support among European socialists who strongly condemned the present tactics of the official party leadership.

These arguments found some favor in the caucus preceding the Reichstag meeting, and it was proposed that the party explain its reasons for absenting itself in a public manifesto. However, others asked how the party was going to answer the certain Nazi charge that the SPD had deserted the nation in its hour of need. The Social Democratic press was still forbidden, and there was only the tribune of the Reichstag if the party wanted to appeal to Germany and the world. Moreover, it was argued, could Social Democracy afford to oppose a government declaration which was expected to be conciliatory, asking only "justice" for Germany, a demand which the party had always endorsed? Hitler's popularity was cited as proof that Social Democracy had made a mistake in underestimating the potency of nationalist appeals. To recover its lost prestige and gain the ear of the people, the party had to give a clear demonstration of its patriotism. Support for Hitler's declaration would conciliate the Nazis and gain time to prepare for a comeback.

In many ways, the stormy caucus was reminiscent of that of August 3, 1914, which had decided to vote for war credits. But now, quite apart from patriotic and strategic considerations, party members who were hostages of the Nazis in concentration camps and Gestapo cellars weighed heavily upon the minds of those present and probably proved decisive in the end. A majority voted to attend the meeting and endorse Hitler's declaration in an explanatory statement from the rostrum. However, shortly before the start of the session, Frick, Nazi Minister of the Interior, announced that no other speeches would be in order, only unanimous approval. When the future of Germany was at stake, he pointedly remarked, individual lives were un-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

important, a thinly veiled threat against the Social Democrats. The SPD deputies thereupon decided to approve the speech without comment.[41]

In a dignified speech, "carefully calculated to depict him as a chief of government filled with moderate and lofty views," Hitler pleaded on May 17 for "justice" and "equality" for his people.[42] By a rising vote the deputies present, including less than half of the Social Democrats led by Löbe, approved his declaration. The "vote" of the SPD was exploited to the fullest. "The world has been shown that the German people are as one when their national existence is at stake," proclaimed Göring, the presiding officer.[43] François-Poncet concluded that "at home . . . Hitler appeared to even the malcontent as a wise, reasonable man. Abroad . . . the speech left foreign opinion with the impression that an understanding was still possible."[44] It was followed at once by a more conciliatory attitude on the part of the German delegates in Geneva. The threatened breakdown of the Disarmament Conference was averted and "international tension relaxed sufficiently . . . for the . . . Four Power Pact to be initialled. . . ."[45]

In the absence of reliable data, it is difficult to say how the Social Democratic rank and file reacted to the participation of the SPD deputies in the May 17 meeting. However, it provoked violent reaction among European socialists. The deputies were declared to have "walked into an obvious trap." To survive this debacle, the party was pressed to break with "the tradition of legality and parliamentary democracy which has become an anachronism," dissolve its "legal" organization, repudiate its mandates in "bogus parliaments," and go underground. The

41 See Wenzel Jaksch, *Hans Vogel*, London, 1946, p. 16; Paul Hertz, "Unsere Aufgaben und ihre Erfüllung," *Zeitschrift für Sozialismus*, No. 12/13 (September-October 1934), p. 423; *Sozialistische Aktion* (May 1934); *I.I.*, May 29, 1933, pp. 234ff., June 3, 1933, p. 242, June 10, 1933, pp. 272f., and June 17, 1933, pp. 280, 300; *Neue Volkszeitung*, June 10, 1933; *Frankfurter Zeitung*, May 18, 1933.

42 André François-Poncet, *The Fateful Years*, New York, 1949, p. 101.

43 *Frankfurter Zeitung*, May 18, 1933. For a vivid description of the scene in the Reichstag in *Politiken*, a Danish paper, see Ludwig Lore, "The German Socialist Debacle," *Current History*, XXXVIII (September 1933), p. 697.

44 *Op.cit.*, p. 102.

45 Royal Institute of International Affairs, *Survey of International Affairs, 1933*, London, 1934, p. 217; see also *ibid.*, pp. 221, 227.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

deputies were asked to follow the example of Italian, Polish, and Hungarian socialists who had accepted persecution rather than submit, or at least to surrender the mandates of a party "which could no longer be called Social Democratic, if it made its peace with Hitler." Only a complete break would allow its present leaders to organize the "illegal revolutionary struggle," the only way to liberate their country.[46] The deputies replied that they had not cast a vote of confidence in Hitler, but had merely endorsed "a peaceful foreign policy for Germany."[47] They still hoped that a cautious and wise policy would save the party and its imprisoned functionaries for a better day.

The six leaders of the "Representation Abroad" were then told that it was their duty to save the party by assuming its leadership, since their comrades in Berlin had hopelessly compromised themselves.[48] They were persuaded that only by breaking immediately and conclusively with the Berlin group and calling for a revolution could they check the complete disintegration of the movement in Germany and the desertion of its supporters to the Nazis or underground Communist and rival socialist groups. On May 29 the "representatives abroad" therefore deliberately risked the lives of their fellows in Berlin, claiming that it was the only thing to do for the sake of Germany and Social Democracy. They proclaimed that "between these deputies and those of the party who see their duty in waging a determined war against . . . Hitler, there is a yawning gulf." The action of May 17 was termed "a futile and politically absurd sentimentality on the part of combatants in a war," which had "raised a serious obstacle in the way of the transformation of the German Social Democrats into a fighting organization against the Hitlerite despotism." The party was to sacrifice its present "body" so that its "soul" might live. The latter was said to be "of far more importance than the organization, which must

[46] See *I.I.*, June 24, 1933, pp. 313-16, and June 3, 1933, p. 249; also Lore, *op.cit.*, p. 699.

[47] *I.I.*, June 3, 1933, p. 242.

[48] Friedrich Adler, Secretary General of the Labor and Socialist International, told them that "the body of the party is helpless without its head in another country" ("The Task of the Emigration in the Persecuted Party," *I.I.*, June 10, 1933).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

be adapted to the altered conditions of the struggle" as "the instrument and vehicle of the idea."[49] On June 10 Otto Wels, now leader of the "Representation Abroad," repudiated his earlier resignation as spokesman of German labor in the International and announced that "the members of the executive of the German Social Democratic Party active abroad" were going to prepare a revolution against the present German government: "The period in which we could hope to save something by avoiding [any] pretext for . . . [Nazi] violence has passed."[50]

The Nazis announced at once that the Berlin leaders were hostages for the behavior of their associates abroad, and strong pressure was exerted upon the former to denounce the "traitors" and read them out of the party. Realizing that the Nazis might now have a pretext for outlawing the party, Löbe labeled untrue the émigrés' claim that the action of May 17 was the result of Nazi pressure and insisted that the deputies had voluntarily supported a policy which they wholeheartedly approved. On June 9 the leaders and deputies in Berlin proclaimed that no one else spoke for the SPD, and expressed the fervent hope that imprisoned functionaries would be released and restrictions on the party's activities be removed. The reply was a new terror wave against Social Democrats. The Berlin leaders hastily renounced all declarations made in the name of their party abroad. The *Frankfurter Zeitung* reported that they were about to expel the émigrés and reorganize the party under Löbe, "who for some time already has been conducting the affairs of the party," in the hope that they might soon receive permission to publish the *Vorwärts* again.[51]

On June 18 the émigrés issued an appeal modeled on the *Communist Manifesto*, calling for the violent overthrow of the Hitler government.[52] The leaders in Berlin repudiated it the next day. They appointed a new executive committee and proclaimed that

[49] *I.I.*, May 29, 1933, pp. 234ff., June 7, 1933, p. 260, and June 17, 1933, pp. 277ff.

[50] See *I.I.*, June 10, 1933.

[51] *Frankfurter Zeitung*, June 7, 9, 10, 11, 14, and 15, 1933. See also Otto Bauer, *Die illegale Partei*, Paris, 1938, pp. 154ff.; Anon., "The Underground Movement in Germany," *American Socialist Monthly*, VI (May 1937), p. 27; Klinger, *op.cit.*, p. 86.

[52] *Neuer Vorwärts*, June 18, 1933.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

it was "the only responsible leadership of the party. . . . Party members who have gone abroad" had no right to speak in the name of the SPD; the party refused "any responsibility for any of their statements." Nonetheless, none of the émigrés was actually expelled from the party, as the Nazis had demanded. Goebbels informed "Löbe and associates" that they "should not delude themselves and think that the government would fall for their hypocritical maneuver." The émigrés' "high treason" would be credited to their account. Not that the government planned to prohibit the party. It was already dead and you couldn't keep a corpse from stinking, as he announced in typical Nazi vernacular.[53]

But on June 23 the Minister of the Interior declared the SPD to be a subversive organization and prohibited all its activities, ostensibly because its leaders had failed to dissociate themselves from the "treasonable activities" of the émigrés in Prague. The party's parliamentary mandates were invalidated, Löbe and other prominent leaders who had not escaped were arrested, and membership in the SPD forbidden. The remaining parties announced their voluntary dissolution within a fortnight, and on July 14 Hitler proclaimed the "National Revolution" at an end with the establishment of the one-party state.

VIII

None of the German parties was either mentally or physically prepared for the ruthless Nazi drive for total power in 1933. The Center and the smaller parties yielded with fatalistic resignation, nursing some hope that the responsibility of public office would have a moderating effect on Hitler. The Communists, convinced by the very violence of the Nazis that the class struggle against "monopoly capitalism" was nearing a climax and the "proletarian dictatorship" just around the corner, fell victim to their illusions. Even Hitler's Nationalist partners soon paid the price of collaboration with a totalitarian movement; they were expelled from the cabinet and their party outlawed like

[53] *Frankfurter Zeitung*, June 21, 1933.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

all the rest. However, it is the role of the largest opposition party and the principal supporter of democracy which is of the greatest interest to the student of democratic leadership in a crisis situation.

The Social Democratic leaders were confronted by a ruthless and determined group of adventurers, equipped with a disciplined and efficient political apparatus, lavishly financed by certain big business interests, and supported by thousands of young toughs, fanatics, and desperate *déracinés*. One third of the voters had supported the Nazis in November 1932. The agencies of the state, the army, the police, the civil service, and the judiciary either connived or assumed a "neutral" attitude. The Social Democrats, on the other hand, had been weakened by a succession of political setbacks during the preceding period, by internal strife, and by the determined effort of the Communists to destroy the "social fascists." The Nazis concentrated their fire upon the SPD leaders rather than upon the rank and file in the expectation that, if they could discredit and isolate the former, the latter would readily succumb to their influence and control. The leadership was confronted with three alternatives in the face of this situation: capitulation, counteraction within the orthodox constitutional framework, and counteraction utilizing other than the traditional political techniques. For ideological and organizational reasons it chose the second course, to be driven from pillar to post until the party succumbed ignominiously.

A few of the Social Democratic leaders, such as Otto Braun, at once decided that with Hitler's accession all was lost, but the majority refused to capitulate. Expecting to fight a temporary conservative reaction, they chose to wage a "lawful" campaign against Hitler and refused to sanction "unconstitutional," extraparliamentary tactics. The outcome of their strategy proved not only fatal for Social Democracy, but enabled the Nazis to claim that Germany stood behind Hitler. Within a matter of months, he withdrew from the League and the Disarmament Conference in the name of the entire German people. The foundations had been laid for the "collective guilt" charge of World War II.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The leaders of the SPD in 1933 were the captives of strategic and tactical concepts which belonged to an earlier stage in the party's development. Much as they might profess and be accused of radical notions, they revealed themselves rigid adherents to the ideals of their youth and were unable to adjust themselves to the demands of a crisis which took place in an entirely changed climate of opinion. The leadership was the product of decades of peaceful and legal growth of the party. Its members clung to the organizational and tactical forms to which they attributed the party's successes in the past and without which they could not conceive a Social Democratic movement. During the preceding years they had refused to modify their thinking and had declined to rejuvenate the party leadership with elements whose ideas did not conform to their own philosophical and tactical concepts. Respect for law and order, particularly for their own Constitution, and their pacifist-humanist principles prevented them from resorting to extra-parliamentary action against the Hitler government. The latter confronted them with a "sliding revolution" which, because of its "legalistic disguise . . . made it impossible to ascertain a definite date on which the Constitution had been violated."[54] Consequently, the SPD leadership found itself driven to abandon one position after another for fear that it might be acting "unconstitutionally" or "illegally." Having accepted the legitimacy of the Hitler government, it accepted the results of the election of March 1933 despite the campaign which had preceded it, because as liberal democrats the leaders believed that laissez-faire should rule at all times in the market place of politics. They announced their willingness to become a "loyal opposition," trusting that, in accordance with the laws of economic determinism, the pendulum would in time swing once more in their favor. Reason and common sense would gain a "spontaneous" victory over terror and propaganda methods which seemed to them psychotic aberrations. Open conflict with the Nazis struck them not only as "unrealistic" and "illegal," but filled with horror humanitarian pacifists who remembered

[54] Brecht, *op.cit.*, p. 4.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

only too well the bloodshed which accompanied the founding of the republic and its struggle to survive against extremist opposition. Once the Nazis had arrested a large number of Social Democrats, fear for their lives increased the determination of the party leaders to remain law-abiding. Finally, they were trapped into endorsing a foreign policy plank which many of the party leaders sincerely believed was in the national interest.

Undoubtedly, the leaders rationalized a good deal in defending their tactics. Basically, they were unable to sacrifice the components of Social Democracy which they considered essential for the survival of the party and their own leadership: the "legal" organization, parliamentary mandates, and the party press. Their vested interest was based on power, rather than on economic considerations. "Illegality" would not merely have meant confiscation of the party property and loss of income for its functionaries, but the leaders would have lost control over what remained of the movement. Not only were they far too well known to command an "illegal" party, but they were neither temperamentally nor "vocationally" equipped to be resistance leaders. The successful agitator and conspirator is a type totally unlike the expert parliamentarian and functionary, less "reasonable" and more intolerant, and endowed with some of the qualities which Weber called "charismatic . . . the very opposite of bureaucratic."[55] "Illegality" would have required a complete structural transformation of the party. Collegiate leadership, too, in normal times a means of compromise for conflicting interests, is seriously handicapped in times of crisis, as democratic governments learned long ago. A committee of ten, twenty, or more is far less capable of making sudden tactical improvisations and enforcing their execution than a more monocratic form of leadership.[56] The oligarchy, which had deliberately avoided the rejuvenation of the party and its leadership, included

[55] "The Sociology of Charismatic Authority," *From Max Weber*, trans. and ed. by H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, London, 1947, p. 247.

[56] "Collegiality unavoidably obstructs the promptness of decision, the consistency of policy, the clear responsibility of the individual, and the ruthlessness to outsiders in combination with the maintenance of discipline within the group" (Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, trans. by A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons, New York, 1947, p. 402).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

not one leader whom it would have dared entrust with far-reaching powers, who would have been fully conscious of the seriousness of the crisis and the nature of the enemy, and who would have had the stature and personality to rally any opposition to Hitler. Fearful that "illegality" would produce a new leadership entirely out of sympathy with the old, the latter clung to "legality" in the hope of saving not only the party, but its own power as well.

The organization and tactics of a party are the derivatives of its functions. When the accession of Hitler imposed upon the SPD entirely new and different tasks, neither the leaders nor the media existed to permit a transformation of functions and tactics. The oligarchical and bureaucratic structure of the party and its leadership stood in the way. The ruling oligarchy retained control and took the party with it, when it was ultimately destroyed.

While every historical event is unique, this experience may provide a useful analogy for the student of political behavior. The failure of the Social Democratic leadership in 1933 illustrates the paralyzing effect of oligarchical development upon a democratic party confronted with a totalitarian movement determined to establish absolute control. In the case of the SPD, resistance to rejuvenation of leadership and tactics produced fatal inflexibility on the part of leaders who were unaware of the revolutionary nature of the current climate of opinion. As a British political analyst warned in 1913: "Few even among the greater reforming statesmen have had the adaptability to carry their thoughts away from the generation which was young when they were young, and to turn to that which is young when they are old, and will be old when they are dead."[57]

It remains to be asked whether any anti-Nazi counteraction outside the constitutional framework could have succeeded. While it would have been a dangerous and probably costly gamble, in retrospect it might have been worth the effort, for the

[57] Sidney Low, *The Governance of England*, London, 1913, p. 36. In this connection, it is interesting to note that in September 1952 only 13 per cent of the SPD membership was under thirty-six, while 42 per cent was fifty-six and older; see *Sopade* (Bonn), No. 926 (October 1952), p. 45.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

alternative proved catastrophic, not only for Social Democracy, but for Germany and the world. Recent experiences seem to indicate that once a modern totalitarian dictatorship has consolidated its position, only the loss of an extensive war may lead to its overthrow. The configuration of power in 1933 only gradually stabilized in Hitler's favor, and if he could have been stopped at all, it was then. On the part of his domestic opponents, this required the realization that traditional political norms were inapplicable in fighting a government striving for totalitarian power, that no other alternative existed if Germany was to remain a constitutional democracy at peace with the rest of the world. But it also would have required strong political, though not necessarily military, support on the part of foreign nations interested in preventing a bellicose revisionist dictatorship from coming to power in Germany. Probably such action would have violated traditional liberal rules of international conduct, but, once more with the benefit of hindsight, it may be asked whether this was not warranted in 1933. However, the tradition of non-intervention, indifference, pacifism, and sometimes even sympathy for the Nazi cause ruled out the possibility of such support by Britain, France, and other affected nations at that time. The consequences should induce the student of world politics to ponder the validity and relevance of the principle of non-intervention in contemporary international relations.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE COMINFORM:

A Five-Year Perspective

By BERNARD S. MORRIS

FIVE years ago the Comintern loomed once again as a spectre on the European horizon with the founding in Poland, September 1947, of the Information Bureau of the Communist Parties of the USSR, Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia (expelled June 1948), France, and Italy. It has since become both fashionable and convenient to identify the "Cominform" with all aspects of international Communist activity, ranging from the most general of policy directives to an isolated Communist-led strike. The indiscriminate identification of "Cominform" with international Communist activity provides the layman with a convenient stereotype which spares him the trouble of further inquiry. For the student of Communism, however, this lack of precision merely results in obscuring the actual role of the Cominform, as it is known to us, and more particularly, its function within the configuration of various covert and overt instrumentalities of the international Communist movement. To speak, for example, of a "Cominform" policy of collectivization or of a "Cominform" purge trial in the Balkans, or to suggest by "Cominform" the whole web of controls of national Communist parties maintained by the USSR is to ascribe a role and importance to the Cominform that it simply does not have. For without minimizing the importance of the function the Cominform has come to discharge, it may be said that its role is essentially that of a central, but by no means the most important, propaganda instrument of the international Communist movement, designed primarily to provide public guidance and information to the leadership of various national Communist parties. Thus *Pravda* and the USSR radio broadcasts furnish daily guidance to the international Communist movement, and the World Federation of Trade Unions is

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

continuously engaged in attempting to bring trade union activity in line with Communist policy.

If it is a fact that the Cominform discharges other functions, these are so shrouded in secrecy as to elude detection by the observer. As it is, however, the public information which casts any light on the Cominform's role is limited to the formal pronouncements issued at the Cominform meetings, statements by the spokesmen and the press of the national Communist parties, and the Cominform's weekly organ, *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy!*, the latter being virtually the only overt evidence of the Cominform's continuous activity.

Four meetings of the Cominform are on public record: the founding meeting in Poland in September 1947; the meeting in January 1948 in Yugoslavia which chose a permanent editorial board for the journal; the session in June 1948 in Rumania when the Yugoslav Communist Party was expelled; and, finally, the meeting in Hungary on November 27, 1949, which, by and large, reaffirmed past policy.[1] Since then, more than three years have passed without a gathering of the representatives of the member parties.[2] One is almost tempted to recall as substantially accurate Moshe Pijade's charge made in September 1949 (two months before the last publicized meeting of the Cominform) that the Cominform ". . . does not exist any more. The only thing

[1] This paper does not attempt to undertake an analysis of the various pronouncements made at these meetings. Such an analysis would inevitably develop into a discussion of the world outlook and policy objectives of the USSR after World War II and would not help to clarify the central inquiry of this paper—the function of the Cominform as an organizational body. The reader is referred to the following issues of *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy!* for the speeches and reports issued by the Cominform on the four meetings: November 10, 1947, No. 1; December 1, 1947, No. 2; December 15, 1947, No. 3; and January 1, 1948, No. 1 (4), for the resolutions and leading speeches at the founding meeting; February 1, 1948, No. 3 (6), p. 1, for the "communiqué" announcing the establishment of an editorial board; July 1, 1948, No. 13 (16), on the Yugoslav Party; and November 29, 1949, No. 28 (55), and December 2, 1949, No. 29 (56), for the meeting in Hungary.

[2] Of the Communist party representatives to the four known meetings of the Cominform, V. Poptomof (Bulgaria), Giuseppe Rossi (Italy), and A. Zhdanov (USSR) have died, presumably of natural causes; T. Kostov (Bulgaria), R. Slansky and B. Geminder (Czechoslovakia) have been executed; and the following have been purged, demoted, or have disappeared: S. Bastovansky, G. Bares, and L. Kopriva (all of Czechoslovakia), J. Kadar (Hungary), W. Gomulka and Z. Kliszko (Poland), and A. Pauker and V. Luca (Rumania).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

surviving from it is its organ, the dirtiest journalistic rag that has ever soiled the international working class movement."[3]

Although the Cominform today has few attributes of an organization of political parties, there is, nevertheless, some evidence from statements of Communist leaders that it had been intended to operate as something more than a propaganda house of a select number of Communist parties. Thus, while Pijade's bitter remarks must be regarded as the reaction of a leader of the excommunicated Yugoslav Communist Party, he may have been correct in saying that the Cominform was supposed to have developed into a group of elite Communist parties meeting regularly and discussing policy. As far as the composition of the Cominform is concerned, shortly after its establishment Jacques Duclos, French delegate to the first Cominform conference, in answer to direct questions on the role of the Cominform put him by Henry Cassidy, correspondent for the National Broadcasting Company, stated that Communist parties not represented at the conference were free to coordinate particular actions with the Cominform or request admission to it.[4] Again, shortly after the first meeting, the Albanian Communist Party, the only European Communist-controlled country which did not participate in the Cominform conference, was reported to have announced that it would apply for membership in the Cominform, without, however, specifying the conditions.[5] Finally, the Communist Party of the United States stated that it had decided against affiliation because such action would provoke repressive measures by the government.[6] In retrospect, it appears doubtful whether the Communist Party of the United States, or of any other country, had been invited to join. Plans for the admission of new members have never been announced by the Cominform. If there was any original intention of enlarging the actual membership of the Cominform, the course of events has decided otherwise.

[3] *New York Times*, September 26, 1949.
[4] *New York Herald Tribune*, October 28, 1947.
[5] *New York Times*, October 27, 1947, p. 11.
[6] *Washington Post*, November 3, 1947.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In short, taking only existing evidence into account and avoiding any mere surmise to the contrary, official Communist statements that the creation of the Information Bureau did not constitute a revival of the Comintern[7]—that it was, indeed, designed to achieve closer coordination of the activities of countries in the Communist orbit and in the fight against the Marshall Plan—can be readily accepted. The affiliates of the erstwhile Comintern had long since been Stalinized and made docile instruments of Soviet policy. The membership of the American, Norwegian, or any other minor Communist party would contribute nothing to these purposes, either in the way of enhancing control by the center or in promoting effectiveness on the national level. But the emergence of Communist governments in Eastern Europe after the war and the stiffening of American policy called for improvisations in methods of control (a) to keep the new-found "independence" of Eastern European states in line with USSR policy, and (b) to give some semblance of equality—at least at the beginning—to their Communist parties.[8] Moreover, in view of the concentration of Communist efforts to prevent the successful implementation of the Marshall Plan, the two strongest parties of Western Europe, France and Italy, had to be included among the original members. On an international level, the policies brought into focus by the Cominform were designed to rally the separate Communist parties and the mass organizations in Europe around the slogans of national independence and peace, that is to say, in opposition to measures intended to strengthen Western Europe against Communism; and in Asia, in support of revolutionary movements.

Within less than a year after its founding, however, the Yugoslav Communist Party was expelled from the Cominform (and

[7] See, e.g., the denial by *Pravda* in *New York Times*, October 11, 1947, p. 6.

[8] Both R. Slansky and G. Gheorghiu-Dej emphasized the initiative of the Poles in convoking the original Cominform conference in the speeches they delivered there. Thus Slansky: "In conclusion, I would like to emphasize that we welcome the initiative of our Polish comrades who gave us the opportunity to meet here and exchange views on our political problems" ("The Activities of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia after the Liberation of the Country," *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy!*, December 1, 1947, No. 2, p. 6). Cf. Gheorghiu-Dej, "The Communist Party of Rumania in the Struggle for the Democratization of the Country," *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy!*, December 15, 1947, No. 3, p. 5.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

here, too, the controversy should be regarded as a controversy between Yugoslavia and the USSR, not between Yugoslavia and the Cominform as a collective body), with the result that the normal development of the Cominform as the leading organ of the Communist movement was stunted.

The only tangible evidence of the Cominform's existence today is the appearance each week of its journal, *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy!*, published in several languages in Belgrade before the expulsion of the Yugoslav Communist Party, and now in Bucharest.[9] The Chinese version, appearing for the first time in October 1949,[10] was credited with a circulation of 520,000 copies.[11] Circulation figures for the other editions are unknown, but since the main intent is to get the paper to the leading cadres of the national parties, circulation figures, as such, are not important in estimating its influence. The journal presumably operates under the direction of an editorial board, with some sort of apparatus linking it to the national Communist parties on the one hand, and to Moscow on the other.

A permanent editorial board under P. Yudin's direction was selected at a meeting of the Cominform in January 1948 in Yugoslavia.[12] Its composition today, however, is unknown, aside from the fact that the original Yugoslav members are no longer with it, and another USSR national, M. Mitin, succeeded Yudin as editor-in-chief.[13] There is, moreover, no reliable data on the size of the staff in Bucharest, on the manner in which articles are prepared, on the channels of communication between Bucharest and the national Communist parties, etc. Judging from the content of the journal over a period of five years

[9] The editions published today are in Russian, English, French, German, Spanish, Rumanian, Japanese, Arabic, Italian, Chinese, Polish, Bulgarian, Hungarian, Czech, Slovak, Albanian, Swedish, Dutch, and Korean. The first eight are published in Bucharest and the others in their respective countries.

[10] *New York Times*, October 2, 1949, p. 47.

[11] Radio Peking, April 7, 1950.

[12] The composition of the editorial board was announced as follows: P. Hentges (France); D. (probably Giuliano) Pajetta (Italy); B. Voda-Peksa (Czechoslovakia); Z. Biro (Hungary); A. Buikan (Rumania); H. Halachev (Bulgaria); J. Finkelstein (Poland); M. Gorshich and B. Ziherl (Yugoslavia); V. Grigoryan, N. Shumilov, and P. Yudin, editor-in-chief (USSR), in *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy!*, February 1, 1948, No. 3 (6), p. 1.

[13] Radio Sofia, June 8, 1950.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and the possibility of the adaptation of Comintern patterns, there might be an area division of the journal's staff of writers, editors, and translators in Bucharest, with certain members of the national Communist parties charged with the preparation of articles and news items for the journal, or of comments on articles published in it, etc. This is all in the realm of conjecture, however, based on the kinds of materials appearing in the Cominform paper.

The journal's purpose, as stated at its inception, was to publish materials on the application of Marxist-Leninist theory to the concrete situations of the several Communist parties, on "socialist construction" in the USSR as well as in the People's Democracies and, in general, to ". . . help the Communist parties exchange experience, . . . strengthen the mutual contacts and fraternal solidarity of the working peoples of the different countries in their great struggle for a lasting peace and a people's democracy."[14] The content of the journal has largely conformed to this original prospectus, publishing articles on collectivization, industrialization, and party discipline in the Communist-controlled countries of Eastern Europe, the strategy and tactics of the Communist parties of Western Europe to slow down Western rearmament and integration, and the exploits of the Asian parties in their revolutionary activities. The class of readers to which the journal is directed is not the average Communist party member or the interested non-Communist, but rather the functionaries of the international Communist movement. In this respect, the journal fulfills the function of the Comintern's International Press Correspondence which served the movement during the interwar period, without, however, matching its caliber of writing, presentation of controversial opinions, or polemics. The Cominform journal is written in a style that can only be called "Stalinese": didactic in tone, repetitive in content, and humorless in prose style, employing a limited vocabulary with selected clichés. In short, *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy!* is an internal party organ, not de-

[14] *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy!*, November 10, 1947, No. 1, p. 1.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

signed to convert the uninitiated, or even to reach the rank and file of party members, but to inform the movement's functionaries of the prevailing line and, on this level, to enforce discipline and conformity to the policies of the USSR.

Illustrative of the "educational" role of the Cominform journal vis-à-vis the national Communist parties is the publication on April 15, 1948, No. 8 (11), p. 1, of a leading editorial, "The Ideological Weapon of the Communist Parties," calling for intensified indoctrination of party members, and the response to it from the national Communist parties. The Cominform editorial states: "It is high time to generalize theoretically the rich experience of state construction in the new democracies, to analyze the class changes that have taken place in these countries, and to chart the new ways and means of strengthening the alliance of workers, peasants, and intelligentsia." The response elicited from the Rumanian Communist Party was typical of those coming from a number of parties of Eastern Europe. The Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Rumania summoned a meeting of the "active" to discuss matters connected with ideological work. Among other measures, it was decided to resume the "ideological problem" column in the newspapers *Scanteia* and *Libertata*; to devote a special column in *Scanteia* to "Party Life"; to publish more of the Marxist-Leninist classics and, in particular, to speed up the preparation of a new edition of the *Short History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*. Other measures provided for the publication of booklets dealing with various aspects of Marxism-Leninism, the theoretical elaboration of questions relating to the growth of the people's democracy in Rumania, the improvement of the programs in use in party schools and of brief courses for the district "actives."[15]

Leading articles in the Cominform journal are often reprinted in the organs of the various national parties. Thus

[15] *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy!*, No. 10 (13), May 15, 1948, p. 6. For additional response by the Rumanian Communist Party, see *ibid.*, June 15, 1948, No. 12 (15), p. 5, and August 15, 1948, No. 16 (19), p. 6. From Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia, see *ibid.*, September 1, 1948, No. 17 (20), p. 6, and September 15, 1948, No. 18 (21), p. 6.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

L'Humanité devoted a whole page to a reprint of a Cominform article, "The Tasks in the Struggle for Peace," observing editorially: "This exceptionally important article that we have published here is an extract from No. 77, 28 April 1950, *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy!*"[16] Such examples of the interaction between the Cominform journal and the national Communist parties could be easily multiplied, but since they are peripheral to the central inquiry of this article, the task will be left to the content analyst.

On exceptional occasions, however, the Cominform journal has published articles which gave rise to drastic shifts in the policy of particular Communist parties. Thus a modest item, "Concerning the Situation in Japan," published by the Cominform journal on January 6, 1950, No. 1 (61), p. 3, castigated the Japanese Communist Party for its policy of "peaceful revolution" and precipitated a bitter intra-party feud which eventually was resolved by a complete repudiation of its postwar program in favor of one weighted on the side of violent opposition to the Yoshida government and what was called "the American occupation system."[17] An interesting sidelight on the relations between the national Communist parties and the directing organs of the world Communist movement is the fact that the Japanese Communist Party leaders claimed to have first heard of the Cominform criticism in a Chinese radio broadcast and, indeed, dismissed reports of the Cominform article as "ill-designed propaganda stuff."[18]

Another criticism of party activities—this time an editorial, "Mighty Advance of the National Liberation Movement in the Colonial and Dependent Countries"[19]—paved the way for the adoption by the Indian Communist Party of a policy of nonviolence and the building of mass support, in place of its mani-

[16] *L'Humanité*, May 9, 1950, p. 5.

[17] The Japanese Communist Party's revised program was published in the Cominform journal of November 23, 1951, No. 47 (159), p. 3, "Immediate Demands of Communist Party of Japan."

[18] For the sequence of events connected with the change in the Japanese Communist Party line, see Evelyn S. Colbert, *The Left Wing in Japanese Politics*, Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, 1952, pp. 285ff.

[19] *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy!*, January 27, 1950, No. 4 (64), p. 1.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

festly unsuccessful policy of violent action in both the cities and the rural areas.

While the importance of these articles—and, for that matter, of others dealing with less important themes—in the direction and instruction of Communist parties cannot be gainsaid, it is an unwarranted assumption to ascribe to the Cominform itself any part in the formulation of strategy. Until evidence to the contrary is forthcoming, it can be assumed that the functions of the Cominform are limited to the publication of predigested statements of policies and tactics.

In sum, public materials force us to conclude that if the Cominform was envisaged as a body of important Communist parties meeting regularly to coordinate and announce policy, its performance over the past five years has not matched its promise. There is no evidence that the Cominform, as such, has anything to do with the formulation of policy, and, in more precise terms, it is misleading to talk of a Cominform policy of collectivization, disarmament, or, for that matter, anti-Titoism. After five years of existence, then, the Cominform emerges as a press and propaganda adjunct of Communist organizations given exclusively to the publication of a weekly journal of instruction intended for the cadres of the international Communist movement. Its importance in this respect is granted; its existence in any other respect must be discounted unless authoritative evidence to the contrary is made available. Its future is a matter of speculation, being subject to the whims of the international Communist leadership.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Review Articles

FOREIGN POLICY-MAKING: MODERN DESIGN

By BERNARD C. COHEN

William Y. Elliott, *United States Foreign Policy: Its Organization and Control*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1952, pp. xviii, 288. $3.75.

Daniel S. Cheever and H. Field Haviland, Jr., *American Foreign Policy and the Separation of Powers*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1952, pp. xii, 244. $3.75.

I

IT is traditional, and frequently beneficial, to express dissatisfaction with the process of foreign policy-making in the United States. If political scientists have attracted a disproportionate share of attention for their indulgence in this national pastime, it may well be due to their command of word and pen rather than to the uniqueness of their concern with the subject. Nearly everyone who thinks about the problem has had a liberal amount of unkind words to distribute among different actors and institutions engaged in policy formulation.

For a time, the "pressure groups" were especially castigated for nefarious political influence on behalf of special and selfish interests. When lobbyists were required by law to register, they became less vulnerable and the abuse moderated somewhat, even though the product of policy-making, which is policy itself, continued to show the marks of special interest. Then the Department of State and particularly its internal administration moved into the limelight as the target for complaints. The recommendations of the Hoover Commission relating to the State Department were the most widely praised of the successive efforts of the past decade to suggest that definite improvements in policy-making would attend a drastic reorganization of the Depart-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ment. A number of reorganizations were effected, and State was allowed to creep toward the wings and out of the critics' direct line of fire. Policy-making after these changes, however, seemed to have nearly the same characteristics that it had before the reforms were instituted. Tacit admission that these alterations in the formal structure of the State Department were of limited effectiveness seems to lie in the latest proposals for structural revision.

If the most recent literature on the subject is an accurate reflection of the trend in academic thinking about foreign policy-making, it seems likely that the new school of foreign policy design will embrace the whole Federal government, rather than just part or all of one branch, and try to "streamline" it. Quite apart, for the moment, from concrete proposals to this end, the general proposition that the entire governmental structure is a reasonable object of foreign policy concern has considerable if circumscribed merit. For one reason, it gets away from the patently untenable idea that there is somewhere a single group or agency responsible for our foreign policy decisions. And it has merit for another reason; it is the beginning of a constructive effort of thought to match the now-common observation that foreign and domestic policy are inextricably intertwined and thus are affected and effected by nearly all policy-making branches and departments of government.

But if the lesson that there is no single locus of foreign policy decision-making has been well learned, it does not follow that related lessons have been equally well absorbed. Lacking any evidence that internal reorganization of the State Department, whatever its benefits in terms of economy or the clarification of lines of authority, has contributed in any unusual or substantial way to an improvement in the quality of decisions made in that Department, critics have nevertheless concluded that the proper course of action with respect to the entire Federal establishment is to reorganize, coordinate, and streamline.

The two studies under review have ties of different strength with this new school of foreign policy design. Professor Elliott was chairman of a Woodrow Wilson Foundation Study Group

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

whose members included McGeorge Bundy, Harry D. Gideonse, George F. Kennan, Don K. Price, and Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.; Elliott himself drew up the report of the Group's discussions in a synthesis that reflects agreements both registered and withheld. The volume by Professors Cheever and Haviland grew out of their research for the Foreign Affairs Task Force of the Hoover Commission. Both books are centrally concerned with the difficulties posed for a continuous and unified foreign policy by a government of separated powers, marked in each branch by "lack of coordination and integration" and "internal irresponsibility." The essential difference between them may be stated this way: Elliott and the Study Group have treated the separation of powers and other institutions and mechanisms as if they were at the heart of policy-making, while Cheever and Haviland apparently feel that the separation of powers, although of great importance, is only one of a number of variables that shape policy. The arguments and proposals of both books are generally familiar to students of foreign policy-making. Of greater interest is what has been left out—not so much out of the books themselves, as out of the conceptions of policy-making that lie behind the volumes.

II

Separate comment is in order, first, about each of these studies, for they are too different in purpose, scope, and treatment to be assayed jointly and solely on the basis of what they have in common. Elliott's report has a composite objective: to stimulate academic interest in foreign policy-making, to recommend areas and problems where further study would be useful, and to give government practitioners "useful signposts" for improving the conduct of foreign affairs. This reviewer has considerable doubts as to whether any but the first of these objectives have been accomplished except in the most formal sense; but if time should tell us that the book has indeed succeeded in arousing academic interest in foreign policy-making, its failings in these other respects may well seem less important. The recommendations for future research, particularly as they are formulated in this book,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

seem to this writer more to reflect the questions for which the Study Group had no agreed answers, than to lay bare the difficult, unexplored, and inviting areas that confront present students of foreign policy problems. A large portion of the questions raised are answerable only in terms of value preferences, and are not susceptible to treatment by scientific methods that would offer hypotheses capable of further testing. Suggestions for "systematic study of the fundamental theories that should guide the development of our governmental system" (p. 237) and questions such as "To what extent is military power to be directed to the ends of purely national policy, or to be used in support of principles that transcend national purposes?" (p. 246) are grist certainly for the mill of political philosophers, but the answers they produce, however scholarly and congenial, can be little more than moral preferences about the means and ends of statecraft. This is not to deny the utility of clarifying such preferences, but rather to suggest that the problems which bother the academic specialist and the policy-maker alike are less in the realm of defining preferences and more in the area of exploring conflicts in and consequences of preferences as they are translated into policy—an intellectual endeavor that calls for more, not less, of the scientific method.

The Elliott report has drawbacks also as a guide to practitioners, who are unlikely to find in its pages any proposals for fundamental reform that would be of practical use to them. A practitioner might welcome a proposal that the power to approve treaties be taken away from two-thirds of the Senate and given to a majority of both houses of Congress, or that both houses be "packed" (Elliott's word) with Cabinet and agency heads chosen at the President's discretion, but he is more likely to welcome these as explanations of his difficulties in operating under present procedures than as concrete propositions he can do anything about. To the extent that suggestions for constitutional reform draw attention to real problems, they perform a valuable function; but when they are offered, as they are here, in a tone of authority and conviction, but with little evidence of any thought having been given to their possible unintended consequences,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

they do a great disservice to their country. The citizen and the scholar, as well as the man in government, have a legitimate claim to further information about the specifications of the fire before they decide whether or not to leave the frying pan.

Some of the more moderate suggestions in the report, on the other hand, may find receptive ears in the new Administration, for there is certainly room and good cause for structural readjustments, especially when new men and new policies come to the fore. Yet it might be to the point to suggest that many of these changes would be more productive of economy in money, time, and effort than of intrinsically "better" foreign policy decisions. Even mild wastes of money, time, and effort are deplorable, to be sure, but it will be the character of policy decisions rather than these prodigalities that pose the real problems for American survival.

This book has even more fundamental weaknesses, however, several of them deriving from the origins of the report, the study group itself. The author makes a repeated plea for clarity of assumptions on the part of specialists in this field, yet the unarticulated and contradictory assumptions in the volume greatly outnumber the explicit and consistent ones. This may in part be a result of study group procedures, which undoubtedly militate against the systematic exposition of the relevant assumptions of each participant. Had the members agreed among themselves on a set of common assumptions for the purposes of the study, however, they might have spent less time differing, for example, "as to the relative importance of maintaining a free hand in terms of ultimate national security as opposed to accepting the procedures and actions of the United Nations as 'world law,'" and more time exploring the consequences of these alternative procedures as they might affect the values and situations postulated by the group. And because the assumptions are rarely clear, the arguments are repeatedly cast in terms of "problems" and "difficulties," the nature of which is left to the reader to determine. One is never clear whether the "problem" is one of avoiding exasperation, saving time and/or money, allowing the Executive greater freedom to do as it wishes, secur-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ing agreement on policy among different agencies and branches, or improving the quality of policy decisions according to some definite and comprehensive criteria.

Because this book is based on the implicit assumptions and collected arguments of half a dozen men, and because the evidence presented, sparse as it is, seems only to be that carried in the heads of the participants, the occasional insights in these pages (such as those on the role of power and power considerations in foreign policy) are overwhelmed throughout by serious confusion and contradiction. For example, after a lengthy illustration showing how the American governmental system works to produce a widely acclaimed policy, the charge is made (but not by all the participants) that the system is "unworkable" (pp. 55, 56); the book is replete with assertions of a "need" for greater "executive discretion," yet there is ample praise for Congress when it was judged right and the Executive wrong (p. 53); reiterated fears over a "natural drift toward Caesarism" (p. 25) are matched by desires drastically to increase the powers of the Executive; the success of the ERP is attributed to the "accident" of Vandenberg's presence in the Senate (p. 51), yet in times of national peril bipartisanship, "this habit of mature democracies," is deemed sufficiently reliable "to overcome ordinary legislative blocks" (p. 62); private pressures and interest groups are condemned for "pulling and hauling over legislation" in the case of ERP (p. 48), but in another context it is asserted that "The [State Department's] task of getting the ear of Congress and persuading that body to favorable action is made even harder by the circumstance that no strong lobbying groups of vitally concerned citizens are at hand to ease the way for foreign policy legislation" (p. 99), a view that disregards the role such groups played in easing the way for ERP; in one place the Secretary of State is regarded as having a primary and dominant responsibility for all foreign policy matters (p. 76), and in another an increased "span of control" in foreign policy matters is advocated for the Secretary of Defense, making him a Deputy Commander in Chief, exercising "the full authority of the President in military matters" (p. 109); drastic constitutional amendments af-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

fecting the powers of Congress are proposed (pp. 57-60), but joint hearings between the Senate Foreign Relations and the House Foreign Affairs Committees are rejected as a "pat suggestion" showing "a complete lack of realistic grasp of the nature of our bicameral system" (p. 122). (One wonders how Professor Elliott's work with the House Foreign Affairs Committee could have convinced him that it was "entirely impracticable" to organize joint hearings, and yet have left intact much of his faith in the practicability of constitutional reform.)

American Foreign Policy and the Separation of Powers is a more discriminating examination of the process of policy formulation and agreement between the Executive and Legislative branches at different stages in the political development of the United States. It contains an abundance of specific data on specific policy issues, but suffers from a narrative rather than an analytical approach to these data; in other words, there is a wealth of material here for comparative purposes, but it is not organized and selected in a way that facilitates comparisons of the consequences of using different procedures and processes for different kinds of foreign policy problems under different sets of circumstances. As a result, many of the general conclusions of the book bear little relationship to the evidence presented in the case studies; these conclusions point often toward a "need" for institutional as well as constitutional reform, yet one of the great merits of the volume is that it shows how informal contact and agreement can be utilized to maximize the benefits of separation of powers and minimize its disadvantages.

It is without question a trying problem for any author to think through a complex subject and present it without basic contradictions to mar the force of its logic. Cheever and Haviland have succeeded in this task to a far greater extent than Elliott and his study group; the fact that they also have failed to be entirely consistent about the importance of governmental structure in the formulation of policy is at least indicative of the possibility that something is missing in traditional theories about the role of this structure in policy-making. Cheever and Haviland are reluctant explicitly to attribute a determining position to the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

separation of powers; and in their evidence they frequently seem convinced that failures in conception, and widely shared ones at that, are more important causes of failures in policy than are the supposedly archaic institutions of government. Yet their terms of reference are basically traditional, and so the whole focus of their book points to the governmental structure, particularly the executive-legislative relation, as "the weakest link in our foreign-policy chain" (p. 164).

No criticism that one might make, however, can minimize the great value of *American Foreign Policy and the Separation of Powers* as a text for courses in the conduct of American foreign policy, an academic exercise continually frustrated by the lack of case studies showing how human beings in positions of authority make foreign policy decisions in a given institutional setting.

III

It is a mistake, however—and simultaneously the basic weakness of these two books—to assume that positions of authority in the foreign policy sphere are exclusively or in every case predominantly located in the institutions of government, and that once you have described the location of this foreign policy power you have automatically described the process by which decisions are reached. Political scientists are making rapid strides away from the conventional approach to the study of foreign policy-making which concentrates on formal institutions, regards "public opinion" as a residual category in which to lump everything non-governmental, and treats the ideas, theories, and conceptions that live in men's minds, and which they employ in the selection and interpretation of their facts and in the making of their decisions, as remnants of information useful chiefly in explaining a circumstance or event that does not quite fit the formal scheme. Studies of policy-making based on this sort of intellectual apparatus have the advantages of simplicity and of clear organization, but their deficiencies are becoming more and more obvious. Each new study hops on the same treadmill, having only the distinction of picking a different step to land on

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

first. Understanding of the nature of foreign policy-making is not advanced, nor is prediction, that indispensable tool without which the future consequences of present choices become a matter of guesswork and intelligent control becomes impossible.

What is lacking in this conventional scheme is a thoroughly realistic conception of the political processes of modern American democracy, the pattern of human interrelationships in which influences of all sorts are brought to bear on the making of formal decisions. Such a conception would, among other things, put the formal institutions of government into their proper place in the sequence of influences and choices that shape policy, and would regard the perceptions of individuals and their evaluations of politics and policy as crucial factors in the determination of their choices of action.

The political process as it emerges in the traditional vein from these two books, but from Elliott's in particular, is static and circumscribed. The participants are, on one side, the President and some of his Departments and agencies and, on the other, the Congress and a few committees. All else is regarded enigmatically as the "electorate," the "public," or "pressure groups." Policy is characterized as originating somewhere in the Executive branch, where it runs through the gamut of unsympathetic agencies with overlapping jurisdictions, and then as passing to Congress, where it is further mistreated by hostile committees composed of men who unfortunately listen most of the time to the voters and to selfish but powerful private interests. The result, it is intimated, is a misshapen substitute for what was originally a brilliantly conceived plan. This description of how the political process is visualized is a caricature, of course, differing from the original primarily by overemphasizing its most striking features. Since the process is viewed as institution-bound, it is no wonder that constructive efforts tend to begin and end with the alteration of the institutions.

There are, in this conception of the political process, a number of value judgments passing as assumptions but rarely subjected to empirical or even logical testing. Two of these assump-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tions deserve special mention, for they go to the core of any systematic theory of policy-making.

The first assumption relates to the political location of enlightenment in the substance of foreign policy. The Executive is prejudged as the repository of the greatest wisdom in foreign policy matters. Congress is viewed as the chief obstacle to the triumph of Reason, and interest groups are regarded as an almost unmitigated evil, except when they are predisposed to lobby *for* a State Department proposal, in which case they are called "devoted voluntary groups." Insofar as an actual political process is perceived even dimly, it is treated as if it were a cross that the "experts" must bear in the name of something called "democracy."

Now it is undoubtedly true that there are instances in which the interests of private groups and the demands of Congressmen have made little sense, given the foreign policy being pursued by the Executive branch; but one is skipping a number of intermediate and necessary steps of hard thought if one then draws the conclusion that the influence of these bodies *should be* reduced by governmental reorganization in favor of the crystal clear logic of the Executive. It would not, in any case, require very much research to turn up ample instances in which the Executive was restrained from blatant foolishness by more sensible heads in the Congress. The Executive undeniably has better sources of information than does the Congress or any other group, but information itself does not constitute wisdom.

Democracy seems to have rooted itself quite deeply in American foreign policy, despite the not-quite-unconscious wish for a return to an aristocratic system of foreign policy formulation that darts through the pages of Elliott's report. Can anyone really say that the "experts" are expert enough to solve our foreign policy problems if only the people would keep their interference to a minimum? There is a great deal to be said against "policy steals" by groups whose private interests are thereby advanced to the demonstrable detriment of others; but difficult as it might be, some distinction needs to be drawn between the exclusive goals of special interests and the sharable values

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of larger social groups. The values that policy is to protect are those of the whole society, not just those of a corps of experts, and the sacrifices that the means of policy entail have to be borne by the people. The problem of policy-making in our time is not one of ejecting "extraneous" considerations from the policy-makers' search for a pure and unassailable policy, but rather one of making a good and workable policy by taking account, *inter alia*, of the ability and willingness of different segments of the American public to make sacrifices for the sake of that policy. No matter how appropriate a policy may seem in the light of the objectives it is intended to attain, it would still be a poor one if the only people willing to accept it were those who had devised it. Expertness in foreign policy-making includes not only calculations of appropriateness, but calculations of feasibility and support.

The second assumption that merits inquiry is that which posits organizational tinkering as an effective device for the solution of policy problems. The effort to decry the importance of formal institutions in policy-making is no less foolish than the attempt to assert their paramount influence. The real question is not, "Are institutions important?" but rather, "In what ways are institutions important?" and no valid answer can ever be forthcoming until we know more about the total processes of policy-making, of which policy-making in institutions of government is only a part. The Senate is unquestionably and perhaps unfortunately jealous of certain of its traditional prerogatives, but it is an evasion of the scholar's responsibility to suggest changes in the formal distribution of Federal power on this account without at least first determining what the types of situations are in which this jealousy operates, what kinds of effects it produces, what the importance of these effects is in the light of the total political process, and what the alternative possibilities are of moderating the undesirable effects without introducing fundamental changes that may well have far-reaching but unforeseen consequences.

Since formal institutions are only one variable out of many in the process of policy-making, it follows that any manipulation of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that variable by institutional reorganization would have only a limited effect on the larger process. In this respect, Cheever and Haviland have provided the best empirical refutation of many of Elliott's assertions, and indeed of some of their own, which imply that tinkering and basic reorganization can provide solutions that are more than partial. The evidence they have accumulated demonstrates without question that when a President makes a sincere effort to achieve bipartisanship and to collaborate with Congress, he can overcome many of the disabilities of the system, he can at the minimum avoid the 1919-type of breakdown, and he can frequently succeed in greasing the runways of established policy-making procedures in the government. The variety of the issues that Cheever and Haviland have examined makes two things clear: that the "state of legislative-executive relations" may be of the utmost consequence for foreign policy-making, but equally, that the institutionalized separation of powers is only one factor out of a greater number that determine what the state of legislative-executive relations shall in fact be. Institutions can rarely be primary obstacles when men know how to, and choose to, use them in a cooperative way.

An institutional approach to policy-making can be of great value when it helps an observer to focus his sights on the governmental actors in a foreign policy drama, for example, or when it serves as the starting point for an analysis of institutional behavior, but as a comprehensive set of descriptive propositions it has very little utility as an instrument of understanding and prediction. For this latter purpose, a more useful conception of the political process would include not only the definition of the channels in which political influence flows, but also the fund of ideas and attitudes, rational and irrational, which different actors bring into play in every channel, whether it starts over a cracker barrel and ends up on a Senator's desk or whether it begins with the staff of the National Security Council and works through different Executive Departments up to the President. The baffling complexity of American politics both in the organizational sense and in terms of reciprocal influences extends also and in equal measure to the private theories people hold

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

about the way the world of politics has operated in the past and can be expected to operate in the future. The foreign policy differences between Senator Taft and former Senator Lodge can in considerable measure be attributed to the different ways in which they view the world and our place in it. Multiply these differences by many millions, since few men think exactly alike, and the range of qualitative complexity in American thinking about foreign policy begins to emerge. Although Cheever and Haviland did not draw such a conclusion, the evidence they adduce is sufficient to sustain the hypothesis that successes or failures in the functioning of American institutions for foreign policy-making on the governmental level are in great part a function of the degree of unanimity among the principal participants in the way they perceive foreign policy issues and the manner in which they evaluate the appropriateness of particular policy means for attempting their solution. These authors' discussions of the fate of the Versailles Treaty in the United States Senate and of our postwar China policy, for example, are striking for their nearly explicit confessions that the weakness in our foreign policy-making processes lay not chiefly in the separation of powers or any other institutions, but rather in divergent privately held theories that led different men to see different meanings in the same set of events; these differences were naturally reflected in and capitalized on by separated loci of power, but they were not caused solely by them. As long as the foreign policy-making power in the United States is not concentrated in one place, different conceptions of the nature of international politics will find different political channels in which to express themselves. Proposals such as those embodied in Elliott's report, which are designed to circumvent these differences by reorganizing the American system of government, are more likely to lead to the suppression of dissent than to the mobilization of consent.

The scholar in this field has a unique opportunity today to play a constructive role in the continuous enterprise of making effective and acceptable foreign policies, by helping to lay bare the processes by which opinions are formed and communicated, ideas take shape, and decisions are made, and by discovering the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

points in these processes, occupied by identifiable individuals and groups, where perception seems unrealistic or incomplete and judgment inappropriate by at least the minimum criterion of national survival. The student would be rendering far greater service if, for example, instead of drawing up futile plans to render democratically elected Congressmen immune from the promptings of a large interest group, he would establish the precise nature of the influence exercised by that group, including the situations which evoke its active interest, and then examine the possible means of making its perception sharper and its judgment less narrow or confused. Political power belongs to new groups today. Rather than try ineffectually to strip them of this new-found power, why not try to teach them what its companion, "responsibility," consists of in the realm of foreign policy?

This is not the place to begin a discourse on method, but a few remarks on that subject might be permitted, in view of the vigorous attack by Professor Elliott on the methods of the social and behavioral sciences. The test of any method of research should be its usefulness in producing insight and furthering knowledge; to condemn any method because it is new or different is to deprive a discipline of the chance even to try to improve the theories and hypotheses which are its proper concern. If the methods of the social sciences were to produce evidence suggesting that a so-called powerful interest group had no real political power in the constituency of a Congressman who had feared it, that would be a useful piece of knowledge, the importance of which would not be diminished by protests that the method employed does not belong in the arsenal of political science.

If studies in the political process are aimed at discovering the nature and the political location and the effect on policy of different approaches to political problems, they can provide a valid foundation on which to erect constructive proposals, both for policy content and for political education, leading in the direction of a democratic foreign policy consensus productive of a freely given, deeply rooted, and broadly based consent. Such

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a consensus would give the Executive the authority he may need to act swiftly and boldly in time of crisis, without altering a delicate balance of internal power by "tinkering" all power into the lap of the Executive in a vain attempt to secure unity.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FAITH, REASON, AND POWER POLITICS*

By ROBERT W. TUCKER

Reinhold Niebuhr, *The Irony of American History*, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1952, pp. xii, 174. $2.50.

WE live in a world that cannot possibly satisfy our highest expectations. For these expectations must envision a universal society in which man would be forever secure from the exercise of arbitrary power; a truly reasonable world governed by harmonious action and not by conflicting interests; particularly, a world in which life would not seek to dominate life and the threat of violence would disappear. Machiavelli once described this world of the imagination as one where statecraft could be based solely upon considerations of "charity, integrity, and humanity, all uprightness, and all piety." In point of fact, however, it would be a world in which statecraft would be altogether unnecessary. But not only is statecraft necessary; there are limitations imposed upon the possibilities of political action and these limitations must have an important, even a decisive, bearing upon the various strategies open to the political actor.

The locus from which Reinhold Niebuhr's political thought proceeds may be found, I think, largely in the elaboration of this one contention. Stripped to its barest essential, it is the conviction that political action in general and foreign policy in particular take place in a world of necessity, a necessity whose limits may—at best—be vaguely discerned, but not transcended. The gravamen of Niebuhr's political criticism against much of contemporary political thought is that there has been an insufficient awareness of, or an outright refusal to recognize, such limitations; and that possibly nowhere else has this failure been

* The opinions or assertions contained herein are the private ones of the writer and are not to be construed as official or reflecting the views of the Navy Department or the Naval Establishment at large.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

more strikingly apparent than in speculation on the nature of international politics and the conduct of foreign policy.[1] In its more innocent manifestations this failure has led merely to confusion in thought; in its occasional translation into the practice of foreign policy it has threatened, and may still threaten, to bring on political catastrophe.

Reinhold Niebuhr's political analysis has, therefore, entertained a twofold purpose. On the one hand, he has directed his efforts toward fashioning a critique of what are considered to be the errors of the traditional political theory informing a liberal democratic culture. On the other hand, he has sought to lay the foundations for an avowedly more realistic political theory, one which will better take into consideration those limitations surrounding political action, and this with the end of presenting a political analysis holding more promise of conserving the values of a free society when confronted by social tension from within and armed menace from without.

Since this article is concerned principally with the bearing of Niebuhr's writings on the study of international politics, the remarks to follow only attempt the briefest summary of Niebuhr's more general views. Special emphasis is directed, however, toward the application of these views to the problems of international politics and the conduct of foreign policy.

I

The political problem has its origin, Niebuhr insists, in the fact that the human situation is involved—though in varying intensity—with two perennial conditions: anxiety and egotism.[2] Man is free, yet he is anxious for his existence. Indeed, it is his

1 In Niebuhr's essay, "Peace and the Liberal Illusion," the charge is put in succinct form: "The cultural foundation of western democracy is eighteenth and nineteenth century liberalism. This liberalism rests upon rationalistic optimism. It believes that it is comparatively easy to 'substitute reason for force' and that mankind is embarked on a progressive development which will substitute 'free cooperative inquiry' for political partisanship and social conflict. It regards the peculiar ambitions and desires of races and nations as irrationalities which must gradually yield to universal values, generally recognized and established by reason, that is, by some kind of discarnate reason of pure objectivity" (*Christianity and Power Politics*, New York, 1940, p. 84).

2 Cf. "Why the Christian Church Is Not Pacifist," in *ibid.*; also *The Nature and Destiny of Man*, Vol. I. New York, 1941.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

freedom, in the specific sense of an awareness of his situation, which makes him anxious. In his efforts to overcome his anxiety, to once and for all make secure his existence, there must always remain the possibility and danger that life will seek to dominate life. What is true of individuals is equally true of social groups.

> Every group, as every individual, has expansive desires which are rooted in the instinct of survival and soon extend beyond it. The will-to-live becomes the will-to-power. Only rarely does nature provide armors of defense which cannot be transmuted into instruments of aggression.[3]

Together with anxiety there is the "inordinate self-love" man entertains for himself and his interests. Rational, moral, and religious resources may, and of course will, present considerable barriers to egotism, and enable man to give consideration to interests other than his own. By themselves these resources can never be wholly sufficient to check the power of self-interest, a power which will always seek to use these very resources for its own ends. It is one of the cardinal errors of liberal political thought that it overestimates the potentialities of both man's reasonableness and his "goodness" for checking the self-interest of individuals and collectives. And this optimism is made all the more dangerous by the deeply rooted failure to recognize that these same resources never have an existence free from the moral ambiguity that characterizes the whole human situation.[4]

Perhaps the most typical and most instructive manifestation of this basic situation, Niebuhr points out, is to be seen in the "ideological taint" invariably present in the claims the individual, or collective, makes in behalf of its interests. There is a deep, and seemingly ineradicable, human desire for justification;

[3] *Moral Man and Immoral Society*, New York, 1932, p. 18.

[4] It is perhaps well to emphasize from the start that this moral ambiguity which Niebuhr sees as inherent in human existence is to be traced to the conviction that the potentialities of man which enable him to rise above "nature" and immediate self-interest also enable him to have desires unknown to nature. Man's freedom not only allows him to be "human" in a sense unknown to nature, but also to be inhuman in a sense unknown to nature. It is in this sense that Niebuhr speaks of the moral ambiguity of human freedom. It must also follow that rational, moral, and religious resources partake of this same ambiguity. It is, in fact, these latter resources that give human egotism its awful potency. The remarks to follow elaborate on this idea.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and this justification must express itself in the belief that what the individual or collective struggles for represents a universal good. The claim need not be wholly spurious. Indeed, to gain any real degree of recognition—even from those who hold it—it must possess a certain measure of validity. Still, it can never be entirely true, for at some point man will always consider his interests in such a manner as to ensure priority over competing claims.

It is, in fact, this very failure of man, together with the repeated attempt to overcome or to hide his failure, that clearly shows the paradoxical character of human existence. Without this attempt to transcend self-interest, to conceive of higher claims than those of the self or of the collective with which the self is identified, a tolerable social life would be impossible. Moral achievement is measured by the extent to which man is both able and willing to weigh the interests of the self against the interests of others, and to make decisions which do not altogether deny the others' interests.[5] No arbitrary limitations may be placed on this capacity when analyzing the possibilities of improving a specific social evil.

Yet the supreme manifestation of evil is always potentially present in this very capacity; for the attempt to transcend self-interest easily becomes the vehicle for sanctifying partial and particular interests by their false identification with universal values.

> The same intelligence which provides universal rather than partial perspectives must inevitably also operate to give partial perspectives the authority of the absolute. Thus even the most refined spiritual achievements of humanity can never result in an unqualified synthesis of human hopes and aspirations. At some point they will always accentuate social conflict by making men more stubborn in the defense of their interests, under the illusion that their interests represent universal values.[6]

[5] Niebuhr's distinction between the Children of Light and the Children of Darkness has as its basis the conflict between the demands of the "moral cynics, who know no law beyond their will and interest," and "those who believe that self-interest should be brought under the discipline of a higher law" (*The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness*, New York, 1944, p. 9). Thus evil is regarded as the assertion of self-interest without regard to the whole.

[6] *Christianity and Power Politics*, p. 156.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The idea of a simple law of moral progress as inherent in history is thus attributed to the failure to see that man's freedom remains morally ambiguous; that it may serve, as it has served, for both good and evil. But even more, it is this same freedom which, while allowing man to transcend nature and self-interest, also gives him the capacity for a will-to-power that is unknown to nature. "Caesars and saints are made possible by the same structure of human nature."[7] Evil, then, is not to be seen in the attempt to transcend nature and self-interest, but rather in the conviction—an illusion—that this attempt has been wholly successful.

It is in the light of these considerations that Niebuhr takes up the political problem, and the possible strategies open to the political actor. The inordinate demands of individuals and social groups, when their power remains unchecked, must be met—and balanced—if tyranny is to be avoided. Self-interest must be checked by self-interest; coercion must be countered by the same instruments. The strategy of the balance of power, despite its obvious moral perils, must therefore be one of the perennial methods for the achievement of a relative social justice.

Of itself the strategy of setting "vital forces against vital forces" is insufficient. It can do no better than to consign society to a state of perpetual warfare; a warfare in which the "instruments of today's redemption" must sooner or later become "the chain of tomorrow's enslavement."[8] Without a consciously directed effort by society, no approximate balance of power can long be maintained. Eventually, one force will succeed in establishing its hegemony. This is not merely to imply that the equilibration of power within society must be a conscious social and moral goal, but that this goal can be satisfactorily achieved only by a central organizing power which can, in the last resort,

> arbitrate conflicts from a more impartial perspective than is available to any party of a given conflict; it must manage and manipulate the processes of mutual support so that the tensions inherent in them will not erupt into conflict; it must coerce submission to the social process by superior power whenever the instruments of arbitrating and com-

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 157. [8] *Moral Man and Immoral Society*, p. 231.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

posing conflict do not suffice; and finally it must seek to redress the disproportions of power by conscious shifts of the balances whenever they make for injustice.[9]

The dangers inhering in the power of the state are no less obvious. If alone the balance of power threatens society with the prospect of anarchy, the power of the state raises the danger of a coerced tyranny. The wielders of the power of the state may be restrained in the exercise of their power by inner and moral checks, but this restraint, at its best, is insufficient. Left free of outer social and political restraints, the state will "destroy the vitality and freedom of component elements in the community in the name of 'order' " and establish that "dominion which one portion of the community exercises over the whole of the community."[10] The democratic state meets this danger, in part, by embodying "the principle of resistance to government within the principle of government itself."[11] In part, however, the danger must always be met by a balance of power.[12]

Both strategies—that of the balance of power and of the organizing center—have their perils. That both are morally ambiguous in the final analysis is only a reflection of the fact that all political action retains an element of moral ambiguity. Yet it is in the combination of these two strategies that a measure of social justice may be attained.

II

If the thesis of *Moral Man and Immoral Society* is not as unqualified as the title may suggest, it is, nevertheless, indicative of a conviction that the potentialities for ethical behavior on the part of social groups remains extremely limited. It ought to be pointed out here that Niebuhr has not said, and I do not understand him as implying, that social groups can "act" as such or that they are capable of ethical behavior. To so assert would, of

[9] *The Nature and Destiny of Man*, II, New York, 1943, p. 266.
[10] *Ibid.*, p. 267.
[11] *Ibid.*, p. 268.
[12] The thought may be expressed by noting the apparent paradox that power is at once the indispensable prerequisite for, and the greatest challenge to, any structure of justice.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

course, be absurd. Only individuals can act, and moral rules can have reference only to the conduct of individuals. There is, incidentally, no more and no less reality to the idea of the "moral behavior" of states than to the conviction regarding the existence of "national interests." If a state can have interests, it surely can have morals as well. Of course, it can have neither, but individuals may—and do—believe that the state has both. But there is nothing absurd in recognizing that we *impute* acts—and hence moral responsibility—not only to the actor, but also to those who may stand in a certain relationship to the actor. And we do this because we think—whether rightly or wrongly—that this social relationship is important; that individuals who form this relationship (e.g., belong to the same social order we call the state) either are or ought to be associated with the act in question. It is also true that many individuals do believe that the state "acts" and is capable of ethical behavior. However erroneous, this belief is nevertheless an aspect of social reality which has rather important political consequences.

The marked antagonism drawn by Niebuhr between individual and social morality, identified in fact as a conflict between ethics and politics,[13] is applied with particular force to the state. Indeed, the existence and behavior of states is almost seen as belonging to the realm of "nature," and inaccessible to change through reason and moral endeavor.

> . . . the nation is a corporate unity, held together much more by force and emotion, than by mind. Since there can be no ethical action without self-criticism, and no self-criticism without the rational capacity

[13] The antithesis Niebuhr has described in *Moral Man and Immoral Society* appears to be founded on the assumption that for the individual the highest ideal must be unselfishness; for society it must be justice—that is, an approximate equality which must be achieved in part by such means as self-assertion, resistance, and coercion. Tension arises not only as a result of differing ideals, but as a consequence of the disparity in the methods peculiar to each sphere. "Politics will, to the end of history, be an area where conscience and power meet, where the ethical and coercive factors of human life will interpenetrate and work out their tentative and uneasy compromises" (p. 4). Part of the difficulty here arises, I think, from the questionable implication that the "purely ethical ideal" for the individual must be entirely autonomous, whereas the social ideal is largely of a heteronomous character. The latter assumption is surely true. The assumption of the autonomous character of the "purely ethical ideal" is a mistake, however. In any event, the actual distinction is considerably more relative than Niebuhr would seem to have indicated in *Moral Man and Immoral Society*.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> of self-transcendence, it is natural that national attitudes can hardly approximate the ethical.[14]

Naturally an analysis of international politics that proceeds from this perspective is bound to place severe limitations upon the possibility of basing a foreign policy upon considerations other than self-interest, even to a limited degree.[15]

Niebuhr has since modified this earlier attitude. The individual no longer stands in such a marked contrast to society and state; the disparity between the moral standards applicable, and possible, to these two realms has been somewhat narrowed. The state may represent the most extreme manifestation of man's pride and egotism, but there is no essential element of this egotism that does not have its final source in the individual and his conduct. Nor can the vices of national behavior be so simply equated with the instinct of survival. The latter is characteristic of all life, not unique to the state.

> The most conducive proof that the egotism of nations is a characteristic of the spiritual life, and not merely an expression of the natural impulse of survival, is the fact that its most typical manifestations are the lust-for-power, pride . . . contempt toward the other . . . hypocrisy . . . and finally the claim of moral autonomy by which the self-deification of the social group is made explicit by its presentation of itself as the source and end of existence.[16]

The distinction between the moral capacities and limitations of individual and collective is accordingly given a more relative standing, and the tension between ethics and politics thereby eased.

A distinction must still be drawn, however. That it is less absolute than originally conceived does not render it less important. For the fact remains that social groups may achieve a degree of control over the individual that easily leads to the unconditional demands the group is able successfully to make upon the individual. The collective must still be viewed as suffering

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 88.

[15] Still, the distinction is not made without some qualification, and throughout *Moral Man and Immoral Society* Niebuhr displays some uncertainty as to the degree to which the distinction is justified.

[16] *The Nature and Destiny of Man*, I, p. 211.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

from pretensions and claims that will generally far outstrip those made by the individual. The collective must still be regarded as "more arrogant, hypocritical, self-centered and more ruthless in the pursuit of its demands than the individual"; hence, an "inevitable moral tension between individual and group morality is therefore created."[17] That the egotism of social groups is most consistently expressed by the nation state, Niebuhr attributes to the fact that the state gives

> the collective impulses of the nation such instruments of power and presents the imagination of individuals with such obvious symbols of its discrete collective identity that the national state is most able to make absolute claims for itself, to enforce these claims by power and to give them plausibility and credibility by the majesty and panoply of its apparatus.[18]

All this is not to deny that the nation state does, in truth, protect values which transcend its most immediate claim to existence. It is to deny that the state ever represents these values quite so completely as it claims, and that it always regards them as more absolute than impartial reflection would be willing to grant. The moral dilemma in foreign policy arises just from this tension between the particular interests of the state and the individual's desire to transcend these interests, or at least to reconcile them somehow with values not exclusively identified with the state. On the one hand, then, "the force of collective self-interest is so great, that national policy must be based upon it." On the other hand, "the sensitive conscience recognizes that the moral obligation of the individual transcends his particular community. Loyalty to the community is therefore morally tolerable only if it includes values wider than those of the community."[19]

III

The point at which Niebuhr's writings enter most directly into current controversies among students of foreign policy may now be examined. Granted, the imaginary critic of Niebuhr

[17] *Ibid.*, pp. 208-9. [18] *Ibid.*, p. 209.
[19] *The Irony of American History*, pp. 36-37.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

may reply that a relative distinction must be drawn between the behavior and moral potentialities of individual and collective. Granted also that this distinction is more accentuated in the case of the state. Still, this same distinction must presumably apply to all social groups. It can hardly be denied, even from the viewpoint of a very realistic political analysis, that the attitudes of social groups have on previous occasion shown a capacity for transcending self-interest, to a degree allowing of a compromise of their conflicting claims. It is true that within the state there is a power that will, in the last analysis, adjudicate such conflicts in a manner that, while never wholly impartial, is at least not simply the reflection of the power of each group. These reflections would still appear to indicate, however, that much of the distinction between individual and collective is not due to any intrinsic or inherent characteristic of this one collective—the nation state—but rather to a specific social situation that may be altered by conscious political effort.

It may be replied, so this criticism could continue, that in the relations of states there exists at present neither that central organizing power nor those commonly shared political and moral principles which must provide that minimum willingness to undertake the compromise of disputes. Admittedly, the first condition does not as yet exist, but is it not a fact that there are certain values recognized as universally valid by peoples everywhere? Do not these values reflect, in turn, concrete experiences common to all peoples? Is this not in itself a sufficient basis for the development of a world community in the true sense? And, finally, is it not possible, therefore, to conduct a foreign policy divorced primarily from considerations of self-interest and power, and rooted in these universal values and experiences?

Niebuhr's reply to this argument must take, I believe, the following form:

Let us initially agree that it would be desirable to conduct a foreign policy primarily upon values transcending the interests of the immediate community. The chief question then is whether such a policy can be successfully conducted. Is there a reasonable possibility of achieving your ends and yet avoiding the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

danger of bringing about greater evil in the form of increased insecurity and conflict—evils the statesman may bring not only upon himself, but upon the millions for whose safety he must bear responsibility? Political realities must be measured, by responsible statesmen, not by comparison with purely ideal possibilities, but in terms of actual historical alternatives. And, in this sense at least, a political choice, informed as it is by political values, must be highly relative. Recognition of this fact does not prevent men from making meaningful choices. A choice must be made in every situation, and men must always bear responsibility for their decisions. But they should at least be aware of the highly contingent character of their decisions.[20]

There is, at last, growing recognition of the fact that an indispensable prerequisite of justice—if justice is here conceived as the willingness to transcend self-interest—is a condition of peace and security; and that the growth of a more effective international political morality is thus largely dependent upon the effective organization of power. But to hope that in the absence of an effective international organization of power foreign policy may still be based simply upon the "universally held values and common experiences of mankind," is merely to replace one illusion by another. The latter illusion is the more difficult to refute because of the profound element of truth it contains. Perhaps for this reason it is all the more dangerous.

The postulated universal values of humanity, while of great importance perhaps for mankind's inner moral and religious life, do not guarantee the existence of common political interests. Nor can they easily provide criteria for successful political action. These values will, in fact, have little effect in directing men's political actions, for the concern in these actions is mainly with the welfare of the community in which men have lived and with which they have had concrete experience. And just as there is neither a specific political experience nor concrete political interests common to men everywhere, so there are no universal values whose appeal is so self-evident that they

[20] *Christianity and Power Politics*, particularly the essay, "Idealists as Cynics."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

can directly transform the tragic facts of international political life. When such values are attested to, they are almost invariably interpreted within the context of national interests and traditions. The descent from the ethereal atmosphere of a Declaration of Human Rights to the more mundane climate of national policy is as disillusioning as it appears to be inevitable.[21]

It is in the light of these reflections that we can understand how the hope of reforming international politics by conducting foreign policy according to presupposed universal values and experiences can result in causing still greater insecurity, disorder, and even tyranny. Here we may find the supreme paradox: that evil comes from what has originally appeared to be the pursuit of good. For it is precisely in the face of a tragic situation which would compel even the most moral, yet responsible, statesman to set limitations on the possibilities of self-transcendence—if only to guarantee survival—that there is the most compelling need to justify conduct, to disclaim egotism. Thus the particularly strong impact of the "ideological taint" on the part of those who conduct, as well as those who merely speculate on the conduct of, foreign policy. Invariably those caught in the vice between a collective self-interest which requires that policy be largely justified in terms of survival, and a social situation (i.e., a threat from potential aggressors) which would demand this policy in large measure anyway, will seek a way out that will somehow easily reconcile conduct taken in accordance with these necessities and the eventual realization of a universal good. This moral dilemma is not unique with the state; all human life is involved in it. In the case of foreign policy, however, it takes on a special poignancy.

A policy that would actually seek the immediate application of these universal principles regardless of circumstances, using them not merely as a conscious ideological disguise, must run the risk of political failure.[22] Nor will political failure find

[21] "The Illusion of World Government," *Foreign Affairs*, XVII (April 1949), p. 387. See also Niebuhr's remarks in "The Theory and Practice of UNESCO," *International Organization*, IV (February 1950), pp. 3-11.

[22] I am using the term "failure" here in its most obvious sense, that is, the inability to reach the intended goal.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

its compensation in moral achievement. Either a foreign policy consistently based upon these principles will destroy what little security is already possessed, with no assurance that there will result any subsequent increase of security in the world at large. Or it will turn out that, finding itself unable to apply these universal values successfully because of the recalcitrance of the many forces that make up the international political system, the same state will confound these supposed universal principles with its particular national interests. No increase in international morality can come from this forced identification. On the contrary, the way is opened for a policy whose aim is that of universal domination; a domination whose character and methods are likely to be the more demonic because informed by the fury of a frustrated righteousness. The original denial of the ideological disguise thereby results in its most radical manifestation, just as the original pursuit of a proclaimed universal good results in its most radical perversion.[23]

Clearly, however, Niebuhr has not argued that foreign policy must fall back upon self-interest as the only yardstick for (measuring) action if these dangers are to be avoided. Neither does he say that any attempt even partially to resolve the moral dilemma sketched out above must invariably fail. On the contrary, he has insisted that our efforts must be directed as far as possible toward the resolution of this dilemma. What he has argued is that we should be more aware of the great difficulties placed in the way of achieving a tolerable, though a tentative, solution, and that there are considerable dangers in underestimating these difficulties—or limitations—by virtue of a misplaced optimism as to the ease by which the recalcitrant facts of international life may be overcome.

IV

It has become customary, if not almost obligatory, to expect that any respectable political theory will have as its basis certain assumptions concerning the nature of man and society. This requirement is presumably applicable to those theories which have

[23] It is this thought which seems to run throughout *The Irony of American History*.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

as their special object of interest the state system. And yet political theories that do attempt to indicate the possible limits of political action by proposing to define the nature of man (at least "political man"), and therefore the "essential character" of politics, must invariably operate under certain dangers. The chief source of these theories will be historic experience. But a study of history reveals a great deal. For one thing, it indicates that under varying social conditions there have been equally varying political arrangements. It also illustrates that men have been able to devise political institutions in order to alter undesirable social situations. And under these diverse political arrangements it is clear that men's convictions regarding their proper political interests, and those highly important decisions as to the methods by which they would pursue these interests, have enjoyed a very considerable disparity.

These are some of the more obvious reasons why it is always hazardous to plead the "necessity" of a specific social situation—the international political system, for example—in terms of limitations set by the nature of man and society. Anything that man has ever done must in some sense be a result of his nature. History, that sacred source to which we are constantly referred, has shown him to have been through the most diverse kinds of political experiences. It may well turn out then that, contrary to the pretentious claims that have been made, there are many types of "political man."

These rather general remarks have a special relevance today to the problems of international politics and foreign policy. The idea that political wisdom must exhaust itself in adaptation to existing social reality, while having only a qualified appeal when applied to the state, has come to enjoy a much higher status in theories of international politics. The twentieth century has, above all, been dominated by international conflict, and the sources of this conflict are, not too implausibly, made to appear as inevitable. Why not, then, make a virtue of these necessities? We are reminded of Machiavelli's advice: "Whoever desires constant success must change his conduct with the times." The temptation in international affairs to clothe even temporary

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

power realities in the ideological disguise of inescapable necessities is very strong. Yet it must be firmly resisted.[24]

These remarks ought not to be construed as a denial of any limitations upon the possibilities of political action. There are admittedly certain facts that do bear witness to a universal social experience. Some of these experiences are certainly rather trivial in content. Others, however, are very important, and Reinhold Niebuhr has rendered a service of the highest order in calling attention to them. His criticism has forcefully brought out the dangers of overestimating the rational elements of human existence; of obscuring the power of irrational forces in men and societies which lead to conflict; and of believing that history embodies a law of moral progress pointing inevitably toward the goal of universal peace and justice—a peace and justice which will once and for all substitute reason for force and universal values for particular interests. Insofar as the social sciences have shared—and furthered—these optimistic illusions, Niebuhr properly brings them to task. If he has occasionally overshot the mark in depicting his object of criticism, and sketched a caricature rather than painted a portrait,[25] there is surely enough truth in his characterizations for them to demand serious consideration. To sum up the matter, Niebuhr has argued that we must be more modest in our aims; that lack of modesty in facing complex social problems gives rise to confusion in thought and, often, cruelty in practice; and that we will become more

[24] "It is even more grievously wrong," Niebuhr has rightly warned, "either to bow to 'waves of the future' or to yield to inertias of the past than to seek illusory escape from historical difficulties by utopian dreams" (*The Irony of American History*, p. 144). It is to be noted that the idea of "political necessity" serves as a very comforting ideological device, since nothing is quite so reassuring as the thought that one acted as one had to act and, therefore, ought to have acted. (The same idea can be projected into the future to justify intended action.) From the point of view of a purely causative description of political behavior, and nothing more, the assertion that one acted as one had to act is trivially true. From the point of view of a normative interpretation—or evaluation—the same point may be quite false. Niebuhr has remarked that "What is significant about the Christian ethic is precisely this: that it does not regard the historic as normative" (*Christianity and Power Politics*, p. 215). It must be observed that this refusal ought to form the significant characteristic of any decent ethic.

[25] This element of exaggeration has always been characteristic of Niebuhr's critique of "liberal political thought," but nowhere does it seem so patent as in *The Irony of American History*.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

modest only when we have the humility and courage to face those limitations set upon all human endeavor.

Certainly these strictures should be taken to heart, especially by those whose business it is to examine the problems of foreign policy and international politics. There are several possibilities for confusion, however, that may arise in connection with any discussion of the problem under consideration here. It is desirable to comment briefly on these possible sources of confusion since they have a direct relevance to current controversies.

It is all too infrequently realized that the general limitations imposed upon political action indicate not so much what is possible, but rather what is impossible. This distinction is not hairsplitting, but quite important. We may grant, for example, that the desire for power is a universal experience, and that neither rational nor moral forces can alone guarantee a "perfect coincidence between the value which justifies it [i.e., use of power] and the interest of the wielder of it."[26] The recognition of these truths, however important they may be, does not determine the "essential nature" of political activity, or the necessity of any particular type of political arrangement, except in a very limited sense. They are indeed a testimony to the fact that the state is a necessity if we are to ensure social peace. They also testify to the fact that we are never free from the threat of arbitrary power, and that any political strategy which does assume that this freedom is a possibility will accordingly fail. But beyond this we cannot safely go. The state has served not only as an instrument for the greatest exercise of arbitrary power, but as a very effective institution for the control of power. The one type of political activity is no more necessary than the other. The same human nature that desires power has also desired to create political institutions in order to control power.

It is also of importance to draw a distinction, however approximate it may be, between those more general limitations to which we have already referred, and factors that, while limiting the possible courses of action open in a given situation, are

[26] *Ibid.*, p. 41.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nevertheless characteristic only of that specific situation. These factors may be termed contingent—or, perhaps better, situational—necessities. Obviously, there are many factors in every political situation which cannot properly be assigned to the realm of political necessities in the above sense. This is particularly true of the international political system. To recognize these necessities as situational in character is by no means either to dismiss them or to underestimate the difficulties of changing them. Political necessities need not, after all, be eternal in order to be important. There may be small consolation in the knowledge that even though an undesirable situation could possibly be altered, the more immediate considerations confronting those who must bear responsibility for the conduct of foreign policy would not allow endless experimentation. No one will reasonably argue that statecraft can be based merely upon what is theoretically possible; rather must it deal with those contingencies of the present. And there are occasions in which the desire to further some good transcending self-interest may so violate this immediate environment in which foreign policy is to be carried out as to lead to evil results. But these latter considerations must be dealt with on their own merits; and, far from establishing any extravagant claims concerning eternal political necessities, they imply that the useful consideration of the problems of foreign policy should be undertaken primarily upon the analyses of a particular situation and of the possible methods for altering this situation.

The principal conclusion to which these reflections lead is that, however important the recognition of these limitations—both general and situational—may be, it is nevertheless true that taken together they only set "outer limits" upon the possibilities of statecraft. The contention can hardly be made that we possess anything resembling a precise knowledge of these limits. Indeed, it is just this point that has recently been the source of so much misplaced controversy among students of foreign policy. The case of general agreement upon these limitations and the sharpest disagreement upon their application in a concrete instance is not the exception, but the rule. This is as it should be. To

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

know that there will always be conflicting interests in any political situation is not to know how strong this conflict will be in a particular instance. All we can say in the way of a general statement is that men must be expected, within varying degree, to differ in what they consider as desirable social goals, and that this expectation will place limitations upon what is politically possible. This is assuredly a rather vague statement, but it is the best that can be made. There is no greater error than to believe that we can somehow deduce from this observation how men will act in specific circumstances, or, more particularly, what methods they must use in pursuing these diverse interests.

Even when we describe the more specific situation in which foreign policy is to be conducted, we must content ourselves with rather general statements. We can agree that it is politically impossible as well as morally pernicious to act in disregard of the forces that historically have shaped the foreign policies of states and continue to do so today; to ignore the tenacity that often characterizes the conflicting interests of states, the support given these conflicts by the absence of any effective international organization, and the dangers incurred by an uncritical advocacy of altruism in a situation where others do not reciprocate. And we should correctly call a policy utopian that does attempt to proceed in this manner, that does believe it possible suddenly to create an entirely new situation. Obviously we cannot "kill power politics" in this sense.

But the recognition of these situational necessities requires us neither to follow every "variation of fortune" nor to proceed on a basis that completely ignores power realities. Whether or not a policy attempting, let us say, to bring about some limited reform of the state system is capable of succeeding will assuredly depend upon whether it does operate within the limitations set by this over-all situation—that is, whether it is in fact a limited reform. It will depend further upon the more particular circumstances operative at a given time (circumstances whose evaluation must always be touched with uncertainty), and the degree to which policy-makers can, and are willing, advantageously to make use of these circumstances. It is, I think, this latter

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

problem that is most often at the basis of the controversies over foreign policy today, even though some writers attempt to attribute every controversy to "profoundly significant philosophical problems dealing with the nature of man and society." Unfortunately, these controversies are in many instances not resolved, but merely obscured by the seemingly endless, and at times quite irrelevant, dispute over utopianism versus realism. No one will deny that there is an important relationship between these deeper questions and controversies over the present conduct of foreign policy. But it is both absurd and presumptuous to pretend to see in each such controversy either a sinister Machiavellianism or a hopeless utopianism.

V

There remains the question of the faith that is to inform a foreign policy holding some promise of avoiding the perils of utopianism and cynicism. Clearly, in *The Irony of American History* Niebuhr's principal contention is that a foreign policy not finally anchored by faith in a power which transcends man's aims and purposes in history must either court utopian illusions of historical possibilities or fall into an attitude of cynicism and despair. It is the rejection of a faith that alone can give an ultimate meaning to human existence, while nevertheless setting limits to this existence, that has led us to underestimate the recalcitrance of historical forces, and to overestimate the purity of the wisdom—or "reason"—which directs our power. The irony in the contemporary American situation is to be seen, then, in the contrast between these traditional hopes and present realities; an irony to be overcome "only if American idealism comes to terms with the limits of all human striving, the fragmentariness of all human wisdom, the precariousness of all historic configurations of power, and the mixture of good and evil in all human virtue."[27]

This theme is of course not unique to *The Irony of American History*. It is a characteristic feature of all of Niebuhr's writ-

[27] *The Irony of American History*, p. 133.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ings. In this most recent study, however, it is pressed with a special vigor, and the indictment leveled against those who would substitute the "heady notion that man is the master of his fate and the captain of his soul" for the "Christian idea of providence"[28] takes on a particular force. So much is this the case that at times Niebuhr gives the appearance of condemning the social sciences to the status of an irrelevant futility in their attempts to clarify the problems of the contemporary social world. The defense of vested interests is not important here. Yet it is important to note that in *The Irony of American History* there is occasionally shown a seemingly derisive attitude toward any attempt to find through reason, though not solely through reason, limited solutions to limited problems.

It would be very foolish indeed even to pretend to undertake in these concluding remarks a cursory examination of so far-reaching an indictment. Still, it is not entirely out of place at least to raise a few questions. Why, to begin with, does the "heady notion" that man is the master of his fate necessarily stand in contradiction to the Christian idea of providence? Does the Christian idea of providence relieve man from the burden of making his own decisions in history, and from bearing a personal responsibility for these decisions? Niebuhr has never really claimed so, and surely he has been right in this. He has in fact always insisted that despite an overruling providence there is no greater danger than the attempt simply to deduce political consequences from religious insights, and thereby seek to invest a given social system with a sanctity it does not deserve. History is, unfortunately, only too full of such attempts.[29]

It is in this same connection that Niebuhr charges the predominantly naturalistic bias of a liberal culture with resulting in views of human nature in which the dignity of man is not very clear. This for the reason that

> It is frequently assumed that human nature can be manipulated by methods analogous to those used in physical nature. Furthermore it is

[28] *Ibid.*, p. 13.

[29] "As politics deals with the proximate ends of life, and religion with ultimate ones, it is always a source of illusion if the one is simply invested with the sanctity of the other" (*ibid.*, p. 120).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

generally taken for granted that the highest ends of life can be fulfilled in man's historic existence. This confidence makes for utopian visions of historical possibilities on the one hand and for rather materialistic conceptions of human ends on the other.[30]

This statement is typical, both in its justified criticism and in its questionable inferences. That "human nature" can be manipulated simply by methods analogous to those used in physical nature is the illusion of a philosophy, and a social science based upon this philosophy, that has far outreached itself. That if human nature could be so manipulated the political problem would then be resolved by a "scientific politics" is a reflection of the absurd—and dangerous—belief in a "scientific ethics," informed, as Niebuhr would say, by the pure objectivity of a discarnate reason.

On the other hand, there is the implication here that if such knowledge were possessed we would somehow be committed to the "control of human nature." The conclusion in no way follows from the premise. For the decision would always depend upon the choice we would make, and that choice could not be dictated either by the "facts" or by some "discarnate reason." Nor is there much justification for insisting that efforts to make some progress toward resolving our problems will lead necessarily to "rather materialistic conceptions of human ends," if by this is meant the denial of a faith—and a hope—that can find no rational justification in the moral ambiguities of history. Truly we need such hope, but, once again, does this hope relieve man of the responsibility which is his to bear for the realization of good works in this world?

The real nub of Niebuhr's argument, however, is that man's increasing confidence in his own power has led him to overestimate that power, and, even worse, to view on occasion what power he does have in the wrong light altogether. Not only do we stand in need of a deeper sense of humility in our limited efforts to understand the complexity of the social world, but the same humility is needed in assessing our own actions as well as the actions of others. And from this sense of humility will

[30] *Ibid.*, p. 6.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

come a spirit of charity, something of which the world stands sorely in need. Certainly these are noble sentiments, and Niebuhr's charge against the pretensions to which a liberal culture may be subject has too much historic justification to cause its easy dismissal. But pretensions of omniscience have not been the exclusive possession of a liberal culture. Religious humility has, after all, been a very rare achievement in history, and this achievement has been rarer still when religion has come to be too closely connected with the relativities of politics.[31]

[31] Niebuhr has himself emphasized almost all of these points in earlier writings. And it is for this reason that, despite the general tenor of *The Irony of American History*, I think there could be no greater mistake than to associate Niebuhr with those who either deride or despair of man's attempts to improve the human situation. His so-called "pessimism" may deny the possibility of constructing a heaven on earth, but it has never denied the possibility of the most considerable improvement on earth. It must also be observed that if Niebuhr has concentrated almost exclusively in *The Irony of American History* on the dangers that attend a too optimistic secular philosophy, he has been just as diligent elsewhere in making clear the social and political hazards of religion.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SOVIET PSYCHOLOGY AND THE SOVIET CONCEPTION OF MAN

By LEOPOLD HAIMSON

Raymond A. Bauer, *The New Man in Soviet Psychology*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1952, pp. xxiv, 230. $4.00.

IT is an often-repeated "truth" that an understanding of the fundamental assumptions which the rulers of a society entertain concerning the nature—or natures—of man is one of the keys to the workings of that society. Indeed, it is clear that in highly integrated societies, at least, men's efforts to influence their fellows are necessarily founded, to a certain degree, on some generally shared expectations concerning their responses—on some widely held assumptions about the motivations of man's behavior and the character of his apprehensions of reality.

It is also rather obvious that any inquiry into these generally held expectations and assumptions is fraught with difficulties: Pareto was not the first to point out that the relationship between ideology and action, between beliefs, statements, and other forms of behavior, is not a simple one; indeed, the study of these tangled relationships constitutes one of the chief areas that contemporary depth psychologists and sociologists of knowledge are attempting, not too successfully, to explore.

Such studies are especially difficult to pursue in the Soviet field: not only is the contemporary Soviet Union inaccessible to field study, but almost every bit of information that reaches us about the character, beliefs, and behavior of the members of the Soviet elite has passed through an extremely tight net of political controls. Almost every discussion of doctrine, almost every purported description of actual behavior in contemporary Soviet writings—whether they be concerned with "Socialist criticism and self-criticism," with the role of consciousness in human behavior, or with party activities in industry and agriculture—appear to conform to extremely rigid prescribed patterns. Not only

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the same substantive points, but even the same order of presentation, the same quotations and metaphors, appear in discussion after discussion of a particular subject. So prevalent is this uniformity of treatment that it is possible to determine that a writer has risen to a position of considerable importance in the political firmament merely from the fact that he permits himself some liberty in the imagery he uses to illustrate his arguments!

Behind the uniform statements of doctrine, behind the rigid descriptions of social behavior, the student of Soviet society must seek to discern the actual modes of orientation and motivations of the actors. Are the orientation to action and motivations of, say, a provincial party secretary who, in the course of a discussion of the activities of his party committee, repeats the sacred political formulas almost word for word identical to those of his fellow writers on this subject, or to the assumptions and motivations that underlay the original model from which his formulation is copied? This is hardly likely. Yet, if changes have occurred, if differences exist, what is the nature of these changes and differences?

At every step of an analysis one may find it necessary to ask: Is a statement to be interpreted as a purely exoteric device, as a cynical bow to official dogma? Or is it to be considered as an expression of belief? If an expression of belief, is the belief ritualistic in nature? Does it reflect a segregated facet of the actor's consciousness which may bear little relationship to his day-to-day activities, or is it an inherent component of his actual orientation to social action?

The foregoing questions, quite typical of the problems that constantly confront the student of Soviet society, are indicative of the degree to which he is compelled to compare and relate the scattered evidence that is available to him from different areas of Soviet behavior—or from discussions, at different levels, of the same area of behavior—to a set of tentative general formulations about the social group he is studying or about Soviet society as a whole. In these quasi-archeological endeavors—in these efforts to reconstruct the whole from the parts and the parts from the whole—it is for him a matter of necessity and not of choice

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to draw as fully as he can from the as yet inadequate systematic knowledge about human behavior provided by the theoretical baggage of contemporary social science. However difficult and hazardous, this approach is at least conducive to the delineation of crucial questions—to the formulation of significant hypotheses—and it affords the student of Soviet society the consolation that the inferences which he draws from his all too scattered data are at least consistent with existing theoretical knowledge of human behavior.

It is in the light of these peculiar difficulties inherent in the Soviet field that the aim which Raymond Bauer has set for himself in his recent study should be especially commended. Mr. Bauer states in his introductory chapter that "even though focusing primarily on assumptions about human nature as they are expressed in the personality theories of Soviet psychologists" his book has "also the broader goal of understanding the conception of man that underlines the Soviet system, and thereby contributing to the understanding of the system itself" (p. 2). Thus Mr. Bauer has aimed to exploit the specific evidential richness of his material to shed additional light on the Soviet elite's conception of man and orientation to action.

In the opinion of this reader, substantial arguments may be advanced in support of the validity of Mr. Bauer's objective. Insofar as the question of the relevance of his material for the psychology of the ruling elite is concerned, it may be pointed out, in the first place, that since the middle thirties the basic tenets and the chief emphases of Soviet psychological theory and research have been brought systematically into accord with the ideological and practical objectives of the over-all system of leadership and training.

However, it would be an oversimplification to ascribe the continuities that can be traced between academic psychology and party theory and doctrine purely to the control that the leadership of the Party and state exercises over every sphere of intellectual life. For it appears that the members of the upper strata of Soviet society share to a remarkable degree—if not the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

same patterns of motivation—at least similar modes of orientation to action, similar interpretations of the mechanics of social behavior. And if the experience of interviewers of recent DP's is at all indicative, it would seem that even political defection does not necessarily upset this orientation to social reality.

Not only should the inferences to be drawn from the writings of Soviet psychologists be applicable to the study of the Soviet ruling elite, but they should also prove especially rewarding. We are all too familiar with the fact that the discipline of psychology—in particular, the study of child development and the analysis of the processes of cognition and motivation among adults—affords the observer the opportunity to project onto his material his own articulate and inarticulate assumptions, his own conscious and unconscious preoccupations about the position of man in his world. Even in the Soviet Union, where psychological theory and research are so largely politically controlled, such nuances are not always *specifically dictated* (even though some may ultimately be rejected and suppressed). And it is for this reason that the study of Soviet psychological literature enables us to gain considerable insight into the less articulate preoccupations, the unspelled hopes and fears that frequently lie hidden behind the political pronouncements of the ruling elite.

Before assessing Mr. Bauer's attempt to relate the conception of man in Soviet psychology to the orientations of the contemporary Soviet elite, it should be emphasized at the outset that his book is intended to satisfy yet another aim: to trace, in the light of *world scientific trends*, the evolution of Soviet psychology as a field of scientific inquiry. I stress the point because much of Mr. Bauer's difficulty has arisen, I believe, as a result of this duality of purpose.

As the writer of a history for the benefit of Western psychologists, Mr. Bauer has had to conduct an over-all survey of his material in terms of the categories of Western psychological theory. As he himself puts it, he has had to determine which, from the trends in world psychology, Soviet society has "en-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

couraged" and which it has suppressed, which concepts it has "picked" and which it has discarded "from the available supply of psychological concepts in the world" (p. 9).

From this point of view, little fault can be found with his inquiry. He traces with clarity and with remarkable objectivity the evolution of Soviet psychology in the last twenty-five years from a widely ranging deterministically oriented science, largely concerned with the effect on behavior of the long-range stimuli of the biological and social environment, to a much more narrowly confined discipline which is specifically saddled with the task of describing as well as training a new generation of men "endowed" with initiative and responsibility. He succinctly describes how, in the course of this evolution, the theoretical constructs of associational psychology have been discarded in favor of more dynamic conceptions of man's relation to his physical and social environment.

In place of the tendency to present man "as a hollow shell of his psychological self, as no more than a convenient meeting place in which biological and sociological factors worked out their interrelationships" (p. 90), there has emerged in contemporary Soviet psychology the model of a conscious actor who in the process of his activity strives for goals that lie beyond his contemporary situation—the image of a man who liberates himself from the constraints of the immediate present by becoming conscious, through purposive action, of the relationships in which he is involved.

Mr. Bauer's study also describes how the area of social behavior left open to scientific investigation has gradually narrowed in the course of the establishment of a "socialist" society. Once, with the era of the Five-Year Plans, the Soviet regime set out upon the large-scale transformation of the physical and social environment—and, thereby, inevitably assumed a rising responsibility for the conditions of social living—it could no longer tolerate the wide empirical investigations of environmental influences in which the psychologists of the twenties had indulged. Comparative studies of the IQ's and attitudes of various ethnic and social groups, empirical investigations of workers'

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

responses to industrial situations now became a thing of the past, and the attention of Soviet psychologists was diverted from the examination of the *abilities* and attitudes of adults to the study of man's *potentialities* and to the training of the young.

Mr. Bauer's survey should make very clear to his fellow psychologists the direction in which Soviet psychology has moved from the point of view of world psychological theory, as well as the areas of empirical investigation to which it has been confined. If a criticism is to be advanced about this aspect of his analysis, it is that viewing Soviet psychology, as he does, in terms of a broad historical survey and through the prism of Western psychological categories and criteria, he fails to devote much attention to some of its nuances which are of special significance for an understanding of Soviet culture (if not from the point of view of psychology as a *scientific discipline*). In his treatment of the Soviet theory of cognition, for example, we find little discussion of the emphasis that Soviet psychologists now lay on the role of "leading ideas" and systems in the organization of human experience—while at the same time these psychologists stress that even the most general and abstract ideas reflect qualities, attributes, signs (*priznaki*) of objective reality. We find no discussion of the concept of representations (*predstavlenii*), "the images of objects or processes recalled by the psyche at moments when these processes and objects are not being perceived by us,"[1] an intermediary category which Soviet psychologists introduce in order to provide a secure link between ideas and perceptions. Yet a knowledge of these facets of the Soviet theory of cognition is needed for an understanding of the emphasis now being laid in Soviet pedagogy on the explanation and "conscious mastery" of principles, which is so different from the wholesale reliance on "learning through doing" that was characteristic of the pedagogy of the twenties.

To cite another illustration, in Mr. Bauer's discussion of contemporary motivational theory, reference is made to the use of concepts of Western dynamic psychology such as needs and interests, but no analysis is to be found of the construct of *will* to

[1] B. M. Teplov, in Kornilov, *et. al.*, *Psikhologiya*, Moscow, 1948, p. 141.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

which Soviet psychologists descend whenever their studies of motivation become at all specific. In the eyes of Soviet psychologists, the will is a tangible quality of personality, the essence of which is a readiness to act, sometimes against feelings. This necessary component of personality is developed and shaped when the self is pitted against obstacles, when "activities are directed against resistances external or internal to the self."[2] And its presence in the personality insures that "the mental processes that enter into the formulation of decisions" will constitute "previews of actual action, commitments to its execution."[3]

It is, of course, quite possible that the conception that I have just sketched may be of little scientific interest, but its *cultural* implications are very wide. To cite only one of the most obvious, this view of motivation throws considerable light on the psychological assumptions that underlie contemporary theories of planning and organization.

It may well be pointed out that the "culturally crucial" aspects of the writings of Soviet psychologists can be singled out only on the basis of inferences from other data about the orientations of "Soviet man." As I have already indicated, Mr. Bauer does attempt to satisfy this requirement, since he makes an effort to relate the evolution of Soviet psychology to the over-all development of Soviet society.

He points out, for example, that the decisive decrees on psychology and pedology came in the wake of important political and economic decisions: the rejection, at the end of the twenties, of the Right's theory of economic equilibrium and gradual economic change in favor of the much more dynamic conception of economic expansion that was expressed in the final version of the First Five-Year Plan; the introduction of large-scale differentials in the wages of the labor force; the revision of the penal code to allow, among other things, for the severe punishment of infractions of labor discipline. Mr. Bauer shows how the trend toward individual responsibility inevitably sharpened with the official establishment of a socialist society—how the responsibility

[2] Kornilov, *op.cit.*, p. 316.
[3] K. N. Kornilov, *Vospitanie voli i kharaktera*, Moscow, 1950, p. 11.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

for man's misdeeds had to be shifted from the social environment as a whole to the individual himself and to the agencies specifically entrusted with his training.

Yet, again, it must be pointed out that some of the facets of the development of the Soviet regime which are most crucial for an understanding of the present orientations of the Soviet elite are left out of the compass of Mr. Bauer's analysis. Absent is any discussion of the process of formalization of party doctrine that has accompanied the official concentration of all policy formulation in the hands of the top party leadership and the latter's rising claim to foresight and infallibility. Yet the formalization of party doctrine, the shift of responsibility for all errors of policy to those who are entrusted with the "application" and implementation of party directives (which are frequently so double-edged as to provide no real guidance for action) have necessarily exercised considerable influence on the Soviet elite's attitude toward theory and toward ideas generally. An analysis of this phenomenon, just as a discussion of the psychological nuances of Soviet doctrines of planning and organization, might have proved extremely illuminating in the light of Soviet theories of cognition and motivation.

Perhaps some of the gaps in Mr. Bauer's analysis would have been filled had he *consistently* held to his original intention of relating his various data to each other and to a *systematic* set of inferences about the over-all conception of man that underlies them. Unfortunately, much of this effort does not seem to have taken place until *after* the analysis of the data was completed. As a result, some of the promise that this highly ingenious multilevel investigation offered for the delineation of crucial problems and for the mutual illumination of data seems, in the eyes of this reader, to have remained unfulfilled.

I hope that this criticism will not create any confusion as to my opinion of the value and importance of Mr. Bauer's study. It is precisely because his is such a path-tracing work in the Soviet field and the sociology of knowledge generally that it has seemed important to determine where it may have erred from its path.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Mario Einaudi and Francois Goguel:

Christian Democracy in Italy and France

An analysis of the achievements, organizations and problems of the Christian Democratic Parties in Italy and France. *$4.00*

Waldemar Gurian:

Bolshevism, An Introduction to Soviet Communism

"It is excellent and certainly fills a great need. It should be widely read and used."—CLYDE KLUCKHOHN, *Director, Harvard University Russian Research Center* *$3.25*

M. A. Fitzsimons:

The Foreign Policy of the British Labour Government: 1945-51 *$3.25*

The Review of Politics

Published quarterly by the University of Notre Dame. *Subscription price $4.00 per year USA, $4.40 foreign.*

WALTER LIPPMANN says: "I regard the *Review of Politics* as having very few equals and no superiors in the English-speaking world in the serious discussion of international politics."

THE UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME PRESS

NOTRE DAME • INDIANA

NEGOTIATING WITH THE RUSSIANS

By

JOHN R. DEANE
JOHN N. HAZARD
SIDNEY S. ALDERMAN
RAYMOND F. MIKESELL
GEORGE H. BLAKESLEE
E. F. PENROSE
MARK ETHRIDGE
C. E. BLACK
FREDERICK OSBORN
ERNEST J. SIMMONS
PHILIP E. MOSELY

On

military assistance, lend-lease, the Nuremberg Trial Agreements, refugees and displaced persons, the Balkans, and atomic energy

$3.50 at your bookstore or

WORLD PEACE FOUNDATION

40 Mt. Vernon St.
Boston 8, Mass.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED